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This study focused on presenting an analysis of the concept of marginalisation of 
former fighters after the Liberian civil conflict and how the web of connections such 
as status, identity and networks were central to any proposed establishment of a 
debate.  The study had two aims.  The first aim was to give a voice to the ex-soldiers 
who became neglected after the war, allowing them to tell their own stories of 
marginalisation before, during and after the conflict. The second aim was to help 
establish a debate on the notion of marginalisation that existed before the war and 
impacted the soldiers after the war.  Within this, the study aimed to assess how the 
evolution of identity of individuals from youth to neglected veterans had occurred and 
to further the knowledge of the empirical literature in this regard.  A secondary aim 
was to evaluate the success of reintegration of the ex-soldiers into Liberian society 
post-conflict and how far marginalisation hindered this attempt.  
To achieve these aims, the study focused on the use of a qualitative research 
methodology as the central research component.  As well as considering the view of 
the empirical literature, the researcher wished to provide an account of 
marginalisation from those that had experienced it first-hand.  Therefore, the study 
dispensed with the use of quantitative surveys and instead carried out personal 
conversations face to face that would reveal the former fighters’ feelings and attitudes 
in a more rounded and richer way.  This methodological approach aimed to give a 
voice to the ex-soldiers and whether or not they perceive themselves as part of 
society. Using these interviews, the thesis aimed to analyse the influence of internal 
and external factors that caused the former fighters to perceive themselves as being 
either included, excluded or marginalised within Liberian society.  
The interviews, combined with the results of the review of the empirical literature, 
enabled the researcher to draw a number of salient points regarding the concept of 
marginalisation.  The study found that the creation of the feeling of marginalisation
for former fighters was composed of a variety of psycho-social factors.  These 
included detachment from family, marginalised primary identities, the development of 
war-connected networks and a resilient sense of belonging, all of which combined to 
create a distinct group identity of the neglected veteran that currently exists in 
Liberian society.  This has been because the former fighters have been unable to
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homogenise their status and identity with the rest of the population.  This has 
stemmed from their perception of the failure of the reintegration process to eliminate 
the gap between former fighters and civilians and has led to serious problems within 
Liberian society. 
The study concludes that Liberian youth developed a war-family identity (collective 
group identity) and gained a strong sense of belonging.  The actions of DDR led to 
this disintegration of the war family and triggered a series of reactions
psychologically and socially. Moreover, reintegration attempts have proved 
unsuccessful due to the lack of education and skills held by the former fighters.  
Attempts to be accepted into society has not led to real integration.  This has increased 
the perception of former fighters that they are now neglected veterans. 
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Chapter 1: The case for a new perspective on former fighters 
in Liberia
1.1 Introduction
This study aims to present an analysis of the evolution of marginalisation in Liberia, 
assessing the perceived concept of the stated marginalisation from the personal views 
of former soldiers of the Liberian civil conflict.  The study had two aims.  The first 
aim was to give a voice to the ex-soldiers who became neglected after the war, 
allowing them to tell their own stories of marginalisation before, during and after the 
conflict. The second aim was to help establish a debate on the notion of 
marginalisation that existed before the war and impacted the soldiers after the war.  
This work combines a qualitative primary research methodology (using personal 
stories from interviewed ex-soldiers) as well as a comprehensive synthesis of the 
existing empirical literature on the subject.  The analysis focuses on how former 
fighters view the attempts at their integration made by Liberian society and the factors 
that has hindered this integration.  In this manner, the study concentrates on psycho-
social factors that have led to the creation of the feeling of marginalisation felt by 
these ex-soldiers as they have transformed from young individuals to fighters in the 
civil conflict and then as they have developed into ex-soldiers in the post-conflict era 
in Liberia. 
1.1.1 First impressions: general considerations of post-conflict changes and 
related research problems
Some of my own brothers who never fought the war can most of the 
times call me killer and so many times I do not follow them when they are 
going out especially so during the last independence day, my own cousin told 
me not to follow them to the beach because people were going to take all of 
them former fighter once people who see me fighting the war is with them. 
So, I feel so bad. (Dan 2009, pers. comm., 16 May)
Dan is a young ex-combatant experiencing some problems with his peers and 
he is not the only one. The relationship between former fighters and the rest of the 
population has been changing since the end of the war. When I first arrived in Liberia 
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in 2004, only few months after the establishment of the peacekeeping mission, the 
country was experiencing a period of adjustment and enormous change. There was an 
atmosphere of transformation, driven by the determination of Liberian institutions and 
former factions to change direction from the previous situation. From the beginning 
there was a clear will to leave the path that had led the country to conflict and 
instability. Furthermore the significant presence of the international community 
demonstrated a new and major involvement of regional and extra-regional actors in 
the country’s stabilisation. However my impression was that this considerable 
determination at institutional level was in contrast with the perplexity and confusion 
among individual Liberians. Approaching this situation from an academic perspective 
I realised that some of my earliest impressions could provide the basis for a number of 
questions. The background that generated these questions was general and related 
only in part to previous studies and literature, but pointed me in the right direction on 
what the field of my research could be. 
First, I noticed that the end of the war acted as a “big bang” that gave birth to 
new relationships between citizens. Those categorised as former fighters were 
demobilised and placed in a pacified Liberia. The new interaction between ex-
combatants and civilians represented virgin territory, not previously studied in 
Liberia, or only after previous conflicts (see Utas 2003). This reflection helped to 
identify a first research problem: How did the relationship between Liberians change 
after the conflict? In order to address this problem an appropriate analysis must be 
made of the sudden change of circumstances brought about by the end of the war that 
left many citizens in chaos, especially those who played an active part in the conflict. 
It appeared that former fighters were trying to fit into the new social system brought 
about by the pacification, finding their way back into a reconciled society. Many of 
them had been through the disarmament and demobilisation process, giving up their 
previous standard of living and trying to find a new purpose for their lives. At first 
glance it seemed that the end of the war brought short-term chaos into their lives, 
especially as many of them were used to a hierarchical military order that kept them 
safe from the uncertainty of day-to-day decisions. In most cases the factions provided 
the means to access food, shelter and work during the war. For the soldiers this state 
of affairs was suddenly dissolved, in a kind of “big bang”, when the fighting ceased. 
The end of certain conflicts can sometimes be as traumatic as the beginning, 
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breaking the status quo that had been created. Part of this status quo is also 
represented by relationships among and around the fighters.  In Liberia, after 
demobilisation the system of relationships of the ex-combatants was essentially 
“blown up”, leaving space to create new ones. I realised that these phenomena needed 
further analysis. The interaction of the ex-combatants with the external environment 
and the interface with the communities represents the central part of the reintegration 
process. Consequently a further development of the research problem is: How did the 
relationship between civilians and ex-combatants influence the success or failure of 
the reintegration process?  
As a follow-on from the transformation of the relationships I noticed another 
phenomenon that stimulated my interest. Some population groups were experiencing 
difficult relationships within themselves. As I decided that ex-combatants should be 
the focus of my research, attention was focused on the troubled connections of former 
fighters with civilians and among them. Many former fighters used the opportunity 
given by the end of the conflict to go back to their communities and families. Others 
for various reasons tried to find new places to stay and begin their attempt to fight 
their way back into civilian life. I noticed that in some cases this effort had been not 
successful, leading to exclusion from society. This segregation was already producing 
effects of marginalisation on the individuals. The marginalisation of the former 
fighters in this case represents the other side of the coin of reintegration.  Even if very 
intuitive and devoid of theoretical background, these original hypotheses also 
stimulated the initial ideas for the research. The following paragraphs will add to 
these first intuitions the required historical background and theoretical framework to 
facilitate the formation of more structured theoretical questions.  In order to address 
this problem a further analysis on the reintegration or the marginalisation processes 
and their interaction is tackled in the next paragraphs.
1.1.2 Being ex-combatants in Liberia
I am originally from Butuo but moved to Monrovia. Since 1990 I stopped 
going to school. Sometimes I feel bad ‘cause I don’t have an education. I 
don’t know how to read and write. To not be stigmatised as an ex-comb [ex-
combatant] I keep myself busy with my job, and I encourage some of my 
friends. We graduated together from the vocational school, sold our tools and 
bought goods to sell in a wheelbarrow. I called them so we can work to fit in 
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the rebuilding process. The others are cooperating and trying to work in 
schools within the communities in their area of occupations, changing 
behaviour and working towards progress. I don’t fear the community 
recognising me as an ex-comb because some of them already know. Now 
they see me as good man, Christian. We Liberians are quick to forgive one 
another so everything is fine. 
It is very difficult to earn a living here in the city. Everything is 
expensive and to get money is hard. Everything you do in the city is only 
money that can get you anything here. There is no scholarship to go to school 
so I would love to go back to my village to make farm. Everybody is happy 
and will go to receive me in Senekola Kamply Bang [probably his village but 
it was not possible to locate it]. The last time I went to my village was 2006. 
We and Ivory Coast share common border. A lot of ex-combs are there doing 
business. The problem between ex-comb and civilian is cool but it depends 
on the community you find yourself in. Some communities reject some ex-
combs based on their attitudes. With the civilians, if you change, the 
community will accept you but if you don’t change the community will reject 
you. (Sheriff 2006, pers. comm., 23 July)
Sheriff is a 36-year-old Liberian man who, after the end of the conflict in 2003, took 
part in the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) 
programme to enhance his skills so he could finally participate in community life and 
seek an opportunity for positive engagement. Like some of his former comrades he 
quickly recognised the limitations on them for constructive political, social and 
economic involvement. His position was not so different from that of his youth before 
the war. In fact, according to some authors studying West Africa, the exclusion of 
particular categories from the social, economic and political life was also very 
common before the war (Richards 1995; Utas 2004; Vigh 2006). “Pre-war Liberia 
was a country in which exclusion and marginalisation were normal conditions for the 
majority of the inhabitants” (Jennings 2008: 22). “Marginalisation is understood in 
this context to mean the mechanisms that cause an individual to become outside the 
mainstream of productive activity and/or social reproductive activity” (Leonard 1984: 
180). Sheriff did not have the chance to have a proper education during his 
adolescence and tried when he was an adult but stopped because of the outbreak of 
hostilities. Telling his story revealed that the alienation from the decision-making 
process of his community pushed him to take part in the Liberian war, fighting for 
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more than one warring faction. “I had no other choices; there was no future for me” 
(Sheriff 2006, pers. comm., 23 July). Hence he joined the NPFL (National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia) in 1991, and in 1994 he fought for ULIMO (United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy). For him and others, exclusion from the active 
life of the communities did not end with the conflict. Some of the surveys on former 
fighters’ reintegration in Liberia (Jennings 2008; Pugel 2007; Hill, Taylor and Temin 
2008; Bøås and Hatløy 2008) show that there are a number of stories of ex-
combatants like Sheriff’s revealing low acceptance by the communities. I decided to 
see how the marginalisation experienced by people like Sheriff before the war 
evolved after the war.
In Sheriff’s words above, exclusion from society is due to the attitude of some 
of the former fighters, who share the experience of being rejected by their own peers. 
Other writers (Jennings 2008; Bedert 2007) believe this exclusion has its roots in 
discrimination based simply on being ex-combatants.  In fact, the conflict produced 
many changes in Liberia affecting the whole population, or part of it; and it is fair to 
assume that the process of marginalisation was no exception in terms of its extent and 
the individuals affected. In some cases marginalisation implies discrimination, for 
instance when the exclusion is based on prejudice. In post-conflict Liberia too, some 
inhabitants could be the victims of prejudice, especially those who took an active part 
in the conflict. To support this supposition there is an extensive literature engaging the 
phenomena of marginalisation as cause and effect of war in West Africa (Richards 
2005; Utas 2003; Peters, Richards and Vlassenroot 2003; Munive 2010b). In a post-
conflict case, marginalisation can be considered as consequence or cause of a failed 
reintegration process. Liberia serves as an interesting case study for the reintegration 
of former fighters due to its large number of former soldiers, estimated at about 
103,000 (UNMIL Today 2009), and the deep involvement of the international 
community after the end of the war, in terms of providing human and financial 
resources.
The reintegration of former fighters has been widely investigated in economic 
and sociological terms, focusing mainly on technical issues such as vocational 
training, education and employment opportunities. For this study, I decided to 
approach the reintegration of former fighters through the identification process of the 
ex-combatants themselves, considering how this identification engenders inclusion or 
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exclusion in society. Being identified by others as a member of the category of ex-
combatants or deliberately choosing to be included in that group creates divisions in 
society. During the fieldwork I noticed that the communities are not always ready to 
reinsert the former fighters within their social and economic fabric, leading them to 
feel rejected. As a reaction to this sensation, ex-combatants in some cases tend to keep 
their distance from the rest of the population, gathering with those who they find more 
similar. The research on the identification process is part of the fieldwork conducted 
in Liberia between 2004 and 2009, and is described by this thesis through the help of 
Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s Social Identity Theory (SIT).  As part of social 
psychology, SIT facilitates the explanation of some of the behaviour of the Liberian 
population in both categories: civilians and former fighters. Using the mechanism of 
in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination proposed by SIT represents the 
perfect link between identity and marginalisation, where the stronger the 
identification with a group the greater the tendency to marginalise the others (Tajfel 
and Turner 1979). 
In explaining the correlation between marginalisation and identity, this thesis 
analyses some factors that transformed the soldiers’ web of connections at the end of 
the war. The concept of “web of connections” here refers to three specific elements 
that together make it easier to locate the socio-economic position of former fighters in 
society: status, networks and identity. “Status” represents the social position of the 
individual in relation with others; “networks” embody the circles of people with 
whom the individual interacts; and “identity” serves to measure the intensity of the 
ties of the individual with his groups. Analysing the three elements together facilitates 
the production of a framework of the relationships of the individual with the social 
environment. The relationships between the individual and his environment change 
constantly as a result of the changing circumstances. The end of the conflict in general 
has produced changes in all aspects of soldiers’ lives, and consequently on these three 
factors. 
It is clear that, between 1989 and 2003, those who took part in the fighting 
abandoned their previous identity as civilians and then, with the end of conflict, 
became civilians again, but with a new identity. “Before the war I was a farmer with 
my family, a simple life for a simple job, but with the war everything changed” (Balah 
2005, pers. comm., 23 October). Thus in order to describe the marginalisation process 
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the aim of this research is to track developments in the soldiers’ lives triggered by 
DDR and, in particular, changes in their identity after the end of the conflict. The 
focus of the study is ex-combatants, rather than the wider population. However, in the 
light of experience in other countries, it is not feasible to draw a precise boundary 
between the categories of former fighters and civilians. In most civil conflicts, the 
internal political situation of the warring factions is confused and creates many 
ambiguities. At least 11 factions fought inside Liberian territory during the 14 years of 
war (Aboagye 2002). Some of these factions had common roots and proliferated after 
internal divisions and splits, while others materialised for specific periods of time and 
disappeared shortly afterwards (Aboagye 2002). The volatility of these groups 
reflected the fact that their members were soldiers at a certain point of the conflict 
and, at another, civilians. This confusion made differentiation difficult after the war. 
For this reason, this thesis does not focus on the actions perpetrated by the individual 
in the past, because this is often confused and uncertain; but rather on the way he 
perceives himself, and how he is perceived by others – in a word, his identity. This 
research encompasses individuals who recognised themselves as former fighters, 
accepting that identity is our understanding of who we are and of who other people 
are (Jenkins 1996: 5).
This criterion of self-identification has been also useful in evaluating how 
former fighters sense their reintegration into society or, rather, to what extent they 
perceive themselves to be included or excluded by the communities. Apparently 
convenient self-identification with what is really a problematic group is a symptom of 
the sense of exclusion felt by the individual (Tajfel 1970). This feeling of exclusion 
plays a central role in the study of the marginalisation process. Marginalisation is in 
fact the relegation of an individual or a group to the edge of society (Kagan and 
Burton 2010) – in other words exclusion from active participation in the community. 
The study of self-identification allows the thesis to analyse the marginalisation 
process through the eyes and words of the ex-combatants themselves. This thesis 
illustrates the concept by using the conversations, interviews and personal comments 
of the informants themselves. In many cases their words are more immediate than 
their interpretation. 
For instance, Samy, an ex-combatant I met in Monrovia, had a remarkable 
story to tell. The use of his interview is a perfect example to summarise some of the 
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concepts expressed above.  During the interview he reported that he was forced by the 
governmental forces to fight against LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy) during the siege of Monrovia in 2003. As he says:
The fighters came in their cars and catch us so we could go and help fight in 
the front line. I fought for the ex-GOL because they took advantage but when 
I had the opportunity I left and I crossed the bridge and I joined the LURD 
forces on the other side. (Samy 2005, pers. comm., 16 November)
Samy was abducted and forced to fight. At this stage of his life he was a 
victim. He changed sides and joined the LURD forces as they promised to take better 
care of him if he stayed at his own will. From then on he considered himself a soldier. 
In cases such as this, it is not feasible to separate victims and perpetrators. After the 
war Samy took part in the disarmament and demobilisation process, when he was 
given the ex-combatant ID card that confirmed the end of his status of fighter in order 
to acquire the status of civilian. This was the first change in his web of connections.
In 2004, when UNMIL troops came and disarm us I voluntary went at the 
camp of disarmament. I did this for the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars. 
In exchange they gave me an ex-combatant ID because I got registered in the 
programme handing over my SMG-AK (Samy 2005, pers. comm., 16 
November)
Samy speaks about his former comrades and their integration in the community, 
expressing some concerns.
Some of my friends are not well in the community but some are well, when 
you go in the community and ask for soldiers they will say they are alright. I 
feel all humans don’t have the same heart, some will hate you while others 
will like you. We have no problem also if now we [former comrades] still 
live together in the community. (Samy 2005, pers. comm., 16 November)
These words confirm the existence of some degree of exclusion from the 
community. The spontaneous reaction of some former fighters to such exclusion is to 
create their own functional links, their own society and their own networks. In a few 
words Samy described to us his situation and the conditions of the group of former 
fighters. However, even if the first person narrative is very valuable, interpretative 
methods are also widely used in this work. Due to my background in political science 
and my studies in peacekeeping operations, the approach to these issues is not purely 
sociological, but often has a conflict management theory background. 
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The following paragraphs introduce my work in the field of literature, 
outlining the literary review, the historical background to the peace process and the 
methodology used. They outline the conditions of and backdrop to my work. 
Subsequent chapters expand these concepts through analysis of the data collected in 
the field, and describe outcomes and conclusions. 
1.2 Marginalisation, discrimination and conflict in Liberian history
One of the reasons for analysing the historical situation in Liberia is that the country 
played a major role in generating regional instability in West Africa and that, by 
identifying this country’s dynamics, it is possible to understand some far-reaching 
events that affected the whole region. In approaching the Liberian context as a 
regional problem, the international context must be considered as a primary source of 
background before proceeding to the next step of national perspective. To do that, we 
have to consider geographical position and the complex web that linked some of the 
countries during the last 20 years. The history of West Africa involves a consideration 
of politics and its impact within the broader themes of religious and ethnic hostility, 
and sometimes even the breakdown of relations among family or friends leading to 
personal enmity and a desire for revenge.  
1.2.1 Inequality lays the foundations for conflict
For 133 years after its creation, Liberia enjoyed stability and peace, albeit on a 
highly unjust basis. The country has since its establishment had highly discriminatory 
characteristics, and elements in its society typical of a marginalisation process. The 
“founding fathers” were former slaves from the US, shipped to Africa in 1822 by the 
American Colonization Society (ACS) (Boley 1983). This organisation was 
established in 1817 to solve the problem of Negroes in the US, as they were 
considered incompatible with the Anglo-Saxon culture (Boyd 1962). Sending them 
back to their “homeland” was essentially seen as a workable solution to the problem 
of a group suffering discrimination in America. After the first group reached West 
Africa, many of those descended from Africans decided to migrate to Liberia and 
establish some settlements on the coast (Blyden 2004). Between 1822 and 1841 the 
settlements were under the direct control of a white American governor appointed by 
the ACS. In 1841 a settler, Joseph J. Roberts, was chosen as governor and he led the 
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country to the constitution of 1847 that established Liberia as an independent nation 
(Akpan1973). Due to fundamental discrimination in the constitution, a hierarchical 
social structure was set up limiting political and economic participation only to 
“Americo-Liberians” – descendants of freed slaves – until 1980 (Dennis 2006). The 
approximately sixteen tribes of native Liberians were not entitled to any citizenship, 
privileges or rights, and were discriminated against also in matters such as public 
employment and franchise (Akpan1973). According to Dunn-Marcos et al. (2005) the 
biggest heritage the Americo-Liberians brought with them from the US was social 
stratification based on skin colour. The mulattos, light-complexioned people with 
mixed-race lineage, were at the top followed by other Americo-Liberians with darker 
skin. Below them there were the “Congos”, slaves freed from slavers’ ships, and at the 
bottom the African Liberians of the indigenous population (Dunn-Marcos et al. 2005).  
While in the first years the struggle for economical influence between Congos and 
Americo-Liberians was quite evident, at the end of the 1800s the two groups shared 
the same status, to the point that the two terms (“Congo” and “Americo-Liberian”) 
became interchangeable (Dennis 2006). What did not change, according to the above-
cited literature, was the economic and political suppression of the indigenous 
population. On this point some authors (Burrowes 1989; Moran 1995; Dunn and Tarr 
1988) controversially assert that there is no evidence of alienation between the ethnic 
groups besides the fanatical interest of the Americo-Liberians in endogamy.  The only 
certainty is that the political situation of low representation on the basis of 
discrimination did not change until 1947, when an illuminated President Tubman 
started a new “Unification policy”. Following his installation in 1944 Tubman 
extended the vote first to women and then to indigenous Liberians. The changes to the 
inequitable political system boosted also the sense of pride of the indigenous 
population, reducing the psychological subjection of the Afro-Liberian (Dunn-Marcos 
et al. 2005). Tubman’s government lasted for 27 years and after his death in 1971 the 
administration passed to his Vice-president, William R. Tolbert. The new regime was 
even more open to the indigenous population, promoting ethnically inclusive policies 
(Nass 2000). But if a new wave of hope arose, the gap between the two groups was 
far from being filled and the discontent of the population following the proposal to 
increase the price of rice led to the violent events of the 1980s (Dolo 1996). The 
general self-segregation of the Americo-Liberian population was an indicator of their 
superior attitude towards the “heathens and savages” (Nass 2000: 9). The former 
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slaves brought from the US the racist notion of African ethnicity as inferior, taking 
full advantage of the indigenous population – a practice fully supported by ad hoc 
elaborated constitutional rights. The consequences of these constitutional policies “led 
to frustration, anger and animosity towards the settlers, thus laying the foundations for 
a future civil war” (Ballah and Abrokwaa 2003: 57).
1.2.2 The Liberian civil war: from ethnic disparities to indiscriminate violence
This section focuses on providing a brief analysis of how the situation in 
Liberia deteriorated from a collection of ethnic disparities to the outburst of 
indiscriminate violence and the outbreak of the Civil War in the country.  This 
analysis is important not only to gauge how soldiers were suddenly thrown into the 
Civl War scenario but also because it allows a more detailed and comprehensive 
background of the study to take place. This section presents a focused discussion of 
the events that turned the country from one experiencing ethnic disparities to one 
where indiscriminate violence occurred.  The situation in Liberia prior to the outbreak 
of the Civil War highlighted that there was a growing disparity between those in 
power and the majority of the rest of the population.  A study by Clapham (1976) 
indicates that the decision-making at the centralized level in Liberia was restricted to 
only 0.6% of the overall population, reflecting this viewpoint, and was the part of the 
population supported by the American government. The growing resentment and 
disconnection between those in power and the ordinary population, combined with the 
fact that the army had been deinstitutionalized during the administration of Tolbert, 
meant that this led to a number of skirmishes and incidents of violence in the country. 
This growing disconnection between the population and ruling elite led to a 
succession of attacks and mass detentions and massacres (Fayemi 2004).  During this 
time, the rise of Samuel Doe was being witnessed as he rose through the ranks from 
humble beginnings as a poorly-educated army sergeant from the Krahn tribe.  It was 
he who gained control of the People’s Redemption Council (PRC), assuming the full 
executive powers of the position following the coup d’etat against the ruling Tolbert 
in 1980 (Dolo, 1996).  The strengthening of the PRC was down to the fact that the 
members of the group were all local and indigenous Liberian soldiers and were from 
the Krahn ethnic group, just like that of Doe.  Because of this, it is believed that the 
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that the predominant ethnic composition was a major reason for the development of 
the Civil War (Ballah and Abrokwaa 2003).
Under Doe, it is clear that the situation in Liberia deteriorated quickly.  It has 
been highlighted that the Doe regime was one that was extraordinarily brutal.  The 
tactics employed by Doe not only disenfranchised many Liberians, but also 
effectively erased the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate political action 
(Nass 2000).   This saw the deterioration of society from one that was fragile and in 
the balance to one where Civil War was increasingly more likely and outbreaks of 
violence were more common.  The tactics used by Doe ensured that by 1984, his 
group had lost a lot of the general support it had garnered previously.  Doe lost 
support while the common feeling was that the government system was unchanged 
and basically  one of the same body but just a different leader (Gifford, 1993: 18).
The political situation in Liberia was being restricted by the ruling party.  It is 
noted that with the use of force by the AFL, the existence of rival political parties 
remained banned until 1984 (Nnoli, 1998).  In this manner, the country experienced 
its first elections held the year after this.  In 1985, the elections were held and Doe’s 
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) was presented as the overall winner.  
However, the nature of these elections and how they were completed were also a 
reason for dissatisfaction and division. The literature notes that during the election 
and the period shortly after, they were characterized by a great level of fraud and the 
belief that votes were bought or that the system was rigged (Nass, 2000).  At any rate, 
once the elections had taken place, there were also examples of widespread human 
rights abuses, the growth of ethnic tensions and high levels of corrupt that occurred at 
the highest levels of government (Nass, 2000).  The regime of Doe failed to address 
these issues and actually increased tensions with the view that he was too busy taking 
the government into his own hands, concentrating power and taking resources to 
strengthen his own party (Adebajo, 2002).  The acceptance of this as fact had already 
led Doe’s support to weaken, with fellow comrades from different ethnicities 
distancing themselves from the regime of Doe.  This led to an ethnic purge of the 
origninal PRC, with the 16 founding members of the PRC killed or exiled by Doe 
(Alao, 1998).  Here it is apparent that the system of government under Doe in Liberia 
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was failing and that the government was resorting to more and more desperate tactics 
to help retain power.  This acknowledges that the situation in Liberia had been 
steadily moving from one of discontent to one of outright condemnation of the regime 
and the respective retaliation of the Doe regime, responding to this criticism by using 
violence to control the population. 
A remarkable example was Thomas Quiwonkpa from the Gio and Mano 
ethnic groups. He led a failed coup plot against President Doe in 1985 that led to his 
murder. After this Doe’s government increasingly adopted an ethnic-based outlook 
(Richards 1996). The rivalry between Quiwonkpa and Doe led to ethnic hostility in 
Liberia, with people from the Gio and Mano groups beaten, murdered and treated as 
enemies (Harden 1993).  Until then the government did not explicitly practise 
violence against any ethnic group, but ensured a disproportionate representation of the 
Krahn in decision-making. The overthrow of the regime in 1980 had effectively 
substituted one hegemonic ethnic group for another (Conteh-Morgan and Kadivar 
1995). In any case, on 6 January 1986 Liberia officially returned to the pretence of 
civilian rule with the inauguration of Samuel Doe as president (Gifford 1993).
The marginalisation process during Doe’s administration in fact found 
expression in ethnic decriminalisation. A very effective instrument of Krahn’s ethnic 
power was the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The new national army under Doe 
was highly ethnicised through a recruitment policy that favoured the Krahn. The AFL, 
with an estimated 9,000 troops (Dolo 1996), remained loyal to Doe until his death.  
With the purge of the Americo-Liberians, members of Doe’s Krahn ethnic group soon 
dominated political and military life. This heightened ethnic tension, leading to 
frequent hostilities between the politically and militarily dominant Krahn and other 
ethnic groups. The almost unilateral violent ethnic polarisation eventually took a 
break with the attempt in 1989 by other ethnic groups – led by Charles Ghankay 
Taylor, himself of Americo-Liberian extraction – to take power. 
Hostilities started on 24 December 1989, when 100 fighters under the colours 
of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), headed by Taylor, crossed the 
frontier from Côte d’Ivoire and attacked Doe’s Liberian army (Aboagye 2002).  While 
the events of 1980 represented only a power overthrow followed by a short period of 
conflict, the fighting after 1989 characterised a proper civil war lasting more than a 
decade. The first Liberian civil war lasted for seven years, from 1989 until 1996; after 
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the presidential elections of 1997, the second civil war erupted in 1999 and lasted for 
four years, until 2003 (Kieh 2009). The conflict opened the scene to new contenders 
and factions in the struggle for power in Liberia. Among the most important was 
Taylor and his NPFL, accepted to be the real mastermind behind events in recent 
Liberian history up the end of the war in 2003. There are differing opinions about the 
origins of the NPFL but these can be simplified into two theories – first, that it was 
established by Quiwonkpa in 1985 (as argued by Ellis (1999)) and, second, that it was 
set up by Taylor in 1988 (Aning 1997).
The NPFL totalled around 25,000 troops during the first civil war, with most 
of the fighters coming from the ethnic groups of northern Liberia (Nimba county) 
who were persecuted by the Krahn under the Doe regime, especially the Gio and 
Mano (Outram 1997). The NPFL’s leader, Taylor, was a former Doe loyalist and the 
director of the General Services Agency until goods worth almost US$1 million were 
bought by his department and never delivered to the government (Ellis 1999). He was 
arrested in the US and charged, but while awaiting extradition he escaped from prison 
and reached Ghana, joining the opposition to Doe’s regime. He claimed in a private 
interview with Herman J. Cohen that he had been allowed to walk free from prison by 
his Massachusetts jailers (Adebajo 2002). Taylor capitalised on the current ethnic 
tension, hiding his personal motives behind the search for justice while manipulating 
ethnic differences – on one side the Mandingo and Krahn of the government troops 
loyal to Doe and on the other the Mano and Gio of the NPFL under Taylor. The NPFL 
was targeting the rival ethnicities during its march down from Nimba County to the 
capital, while government troops were decimating Monrovia-based opponents 
(Conteh-Morgan and Kadivar 1995). By mid-1990, Samuel Doe and his troops were 
barricaded in the Executive Mansion in the capital city. Taylor and his companions 
controlled much of the country while Prince Johnson, an NPFL fighter who split to 
form his own guerrilla force, took most of Monrovia with his new faction, the 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). 
Since it was feared that the instability of the country could provoke an 
outbreak of violence in the wider region, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) sent a contingent of soldiers, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), to try to control the violence; but they were poorly prepared. On 9 
September 1990, as President Doe was visiting the newly-established ECOMOG
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headquarters in the Free Port of Monrovia, Johnson’s forces invaded the building and 
captured him. They tortured and killed him shortly thereafter. However, the removal 
of Doe did not stabilise the situation since both Taylor and Johnson claimed power. In 
the efforts to find a stable solution for the government of the country, ECOMOG 
declared an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), with Amos Sawyer as 
temporary President, but this was not accepted by Taylor and he attacked Monrovia 
with his troops (Dolo 1996). At this stage there were three factions involved in an 
internecine war, eventually becoming four as a result of another split among Doe’s 
remaining supporters, known as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for 
Democracy, or ULIMO. This latter faction, created in 1991, was led by Raleigh Seekie 
and operated against the insurgency of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) in 
Sierra Leone and western Liberia, supporting the Sierra Leone government. In 1994 
internal pressures caused the faction eventually to split in two: ULIMO-J, a Krahn 
faction led by General Roosevelt Johnson, and ULIMO-K, more Muslim/Mandingo-
based, under Alhaji Kromah. ULIMO-J totalled around 8,000 combatants and 
ULIMO-K around 12,000 (Outram 1997). 
In the light of the complicated situation the UN decided to step in. The 
Security Council adopted Resolution 788 (1992) which imposed “a general and 
complete embargo on the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Liberia” (SC 
1992), supporting ECOWAS in its efforts to end the civil war. Taylor was forced to 
negotiate a treaty between the NPFL, IGNU and a not-yet-separated ULIMO. The 
ceasefire could not be implemented and in the following months a number of 
supplementary agreements, amending and clarifying the previous arrangements, were 
negotiated without achieving either peace or stability.
The UN tried to speed up the peace process, establishing the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) on 22 September 1993. However, fighting 
continued until the end of August 1995 when the Abuja Accord restored the ceasefire. 
Even if the alternation between peace and war did not cease, the humanitarian 
situation seemed to improve in several parts of Liberia. The UN Secretary-General 
reported to the Security Council on 13 September 1995: “While at least 10 peace 
agreements have been signed and broken since 1989, the prospects for peace in 
Liberia are perhaps better now than they have been at any time since the outbreak of 
the civil war” (SC 1995: 8). Despite this, the crisis continued: in October 1995, 
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approximately 1.5 million people were receiving humanitarian assistance; an 
estimated population of between half a million and one million were internally 
displaced, while over 800,000 Liberian refugees had settled in neighbouring countries 
(URW 1995: no page).
The Abuja Accord brought a short break to an internal conflict that had seen 
the involvement of half a dozen factions (Outram 1997). The first civil war ended as 
the sides agreed on disarmament and demobilisation by 1997, and elections took place in 
July that year. These “free and fair” presidential elections saw the victory of Charles 
Taylor and his NPFL. However, most people had voted for him out of fear and 
because many though that electing him was the only way to improve living conditions
(Harris 1999). Taylor instead turned Liberia into a centre of gun smuggling and 
“blood diamonds”, allegedly being involved in a multimillion dollar business that 
helped to spread war and chaos throughout the region and included support of 
guerrillas in neighbouring countries.
On 30 September 1997, after the withdrawal of its UNOMIL military 
personnel, the United Nations progressed to the next step of conflict management, 
establishing a United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL). 
However, the situation in the country remained unstable, with constant attacks by 
several rebel groups. The elections in 1997 did not lead to recovery or the resumption 
of growth and development. The failure of peace-building efforts after the first civil 
war made further conflict almost inevitable (Yangbeh Jr. 2006). The second civil war 
began on 21 April 1999 with armed attacks launched by a warlordist militia, Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Its members included former 
soldiers of some of the militias that fought in the first civil war and disaffected 
members of the NPFL (Pham 2004). 
LURD launched its attacks from Guinea, north of Liberia. The second civil 
war appeared to be a confrontation of three warring factions, mostly as result of the 
merger or restructuring of the previous factions.  The Government of Liberia Forces 
(GOL) under the command of Taylor were mainly the successor to the NPFL. The two 
opponents were LURD, led by Sekou Conneh, and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL), led by Thomas Nimely. (Created in March 2003, MODEL joined 
the fight against Taylor’s regime, launching its attack from Côte d’Ivoire, east of 
Liberia (Kieh Jr. 2009)). The conflict led to the exodus to neighbouring countries of 
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around 350,000 refugees and the internal displacement of around 530,000 Liberians 
(UNHCR 2003: 222). 
Charles Taylor resigned as President on 11 August 2003 and was flown into 
exile in Nigeria. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in Accra on 18 
August by Liberia’s three fighting forces (the GOL, LURD and MODEL), promised 
to bring sustainable peace and security to Liberia. This agreement did, indeed, bring 
an end to the brutal civil war in Liberia. It led to a request to the UN to deploy a 
peacekeeping force to Liberia to support the National Transitional Government and to 
assist in the implementation of the CPA. UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia) 
was established by Security Council Resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003 (SC 
2003). Its mandate included the development and implementation of the 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation programme (DDRR) 
(Aning, Birikorang and Jaye 2010: 19). The peculiarity of the Liberian case added the 
extra “R” to the usual mechanism of UN missions. Under the terms of the CPA, the 
additional “R” stood for the physical and psychological “Rehabilitation” of former 
fighters.
1.2.3 From fighters to civilians through the DDR programme
Having already introduced the DDR program, it is important to assess its impact 
on the reintegration of individuals into Liberian society following the end of the 
conflict.  As stated, the DDR programme was viewed an essential part of eventual 
reintegration. Firstly, the DD phase helped to disconnect the fighters from their chain 
of command; Secondly, the R phase was the actual reintegration of the ex-combatants 
into communities. “For instance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) programmes often fail to address the appropriate needs of young women and 
in a variety of ways ‘prevent’ them from participating” (Coulter, Persson and Utas 
2008: 5). This was the case of the first DDR in Liberia in 1997, which failed to 
prevent a further outbreak of conflict. Many authors have formulated theories on how 
to improve the methods of the DDR based on the Liberian experience.
Jennings (2008: 37) makes three major recommendations for developing a DDR 
programme:
∑ Make it minimalist or maximalist from the start
∑ Communicate and manage expectations
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∑ Be flexible about DDR structure; this may include delinking the DD from the 
R.
According to Jennings (2008), in order to fully implement DDR programmes, it is 
necessary to understand their function, how each part of the process works in relation 
to the other parts, and the direct consequences this has for peacekeeping and those 
affected by it. 
However, it is not always clear what is expected from the policymakers in 
order to reintegrate the combatants, nor what needs to be considered, such as the 
duration, the timing, the consistency, and the long- and short-term consequences the 
process has on those involved. Jennings refers to the “maximalist and minimalist 
response to reintegration” (Jennings 2008: 6) and suggests that the response should 
vary according to the circumstances, but be constant in each mission. Since the 
concept of reintegration is so general and includes many processes, such as 
demilitarisation, employment, acceptance by society and education, it can, she argues, 
be “interpreted and operationalized either broadly or narrowly” (Jennings 2008: 6).
The full process can be seen from different points of view but what is 
important is to ensure that everyone involved shares the same expectations. 
Whichever approach is taken, there must be a clear and concise plan from the 
beginning of the process based on what resources and benefits are available; 
otherwise, there is the risk of confusion, frustration and impatience as well as of 
outbreaks of dissatisfaction and even of violence – such as, for example, the riots that 
broke out in December 2003 outside Monrovia after inadequate communication about 
the benefits that would be received from the DDR programme. 
From the point of view of my work, this concept expressed by Jennings is 
fundamental when it comes to understanding the failure of the international 
community to fulfil the expectations of ex-combatants. The frustration and impatience 
created by false expectations led to dissatisfaction. This discontent has sometimes 
been caused by the DDR process, which can inhibit the former fighters’ reintegration 
as it can highlight the “separateness” between the non-combatant and the fighter. This 
disparity between the two groups and the consequent problematic relationships is the 
central element of my research – which involves the creation of different networks 
exclusively for ex-combatants. The detachment from community is a major issue in 
the regrouping of soldiers dismissed from their armies. The loss of the bonds they had 
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before joining up, and the loss of their status as soldiers, pushes them to associate 
with others who have the same needs, which leads to the birth of a new social group. 
We will analyse these factors in depth in the next chapter.
In the meantime it is important to note how the mechanism of dividing fighters 
and civilians was highly criticised by several authors (see Coulter, Persson and Utas 
2008; Jennings 2008; Munive 2010). The possession of a weapon was the only way to 
prove enrolment in the factions. Specht (2006), analysing female demobilisation, 
highlighted how difficult it was for the female fighters to hand in weapons compared 
with the male soldiers. The situation was made worse by the fact that many 
commanders excluded from the list combatants from their own units, preventing them 
from receiving payment (Solheim 2003). According to Coulter, Persson and Utas 
(2008), while the method was successful in several parts of the world, in Liberia it 
was less effective due to the complexity of determining the distinction between non-
combatants and fighters. In some cases the combatants would deliberately decide to 
not participate in the DDR. One of the reasons was “that they did not trust the process 
to help them, or that they were afraid of repercussions and social stigma if they were 
identified as ex-fighters” (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008: 24). The unclear division 
between the categories was among the reasons for many difficulties during the 
implementation of the reintegration process. However, even if many fighters avoided 
the DDR, the economic reward for handing in weapons and the promised allowances 
attracted a higher than expected number of former fighters to enrol. This, according to 
Jennings (2008), accentuated the problems created by the lack of planning since 
resources were not used efficiently. The consequence was of a “dangerous 
disconnection” (Jennings 2008: 23) between disarmament and reintegration. The 
system was exploited and abused by the commanders, which in turn made it more 
difficult to plan and implement a fully functioning and cohesive system of 
reintegration. This makes it difficult to assess and improve the effectiveness of the 
programme. 
To develop such effectiveness, Jennings recommends that the structure of the 
DDR be flexible in order to separate, or “delink”, the DD from the R phase, with the 
scope to maximise the outcome; she suggests ways in which this would achieve 
greater results for those involved. This necessity arises from the fact that the R phase 
is often seen as the soft, development part of DDR programmes and as part of a 
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“security first” package for a short-term solution, instead of as an instrument for long-
term recovery (Muggah 2004). Jennings highlights how the funding the DDR receives 
affects the sequencing of the DDR process. The expenses for the DD are covered in a 
consolidated budget coming from the peacekeeping mission, while funding for the 
reintegration part relies on the voluntary contributions of donors. This form of 
accountancy shows the priority given to the rehabilitation process of the former 
fighters.  
The nature of the two different components, DD and R, explains why there are 
differences in treatment of the various elements constituting the DDR process. While 
the DD aspect reflects the immediate need to respond to problems of security and 
stability, the R component is a response to the need for a more long-term socio-
economic process. Jennings (2008: 13) notes that the security-driven nature of the 
reintegration process has changed over the years, and writes about the relationship 
between security and development. It is necessary to distinguish reintegration as a 
development tool and as a security tool, as the two forms do not always complement 
one another. A response to this situation was the decision in 2005, after the UN SG 
report, to insert into the funding of the DDR the Reinsertion component, based on the 
same precepts as those found in the overall DDR vision, in terms of a strategy for 
addressing security issues, to be solved immediately. The idea is that a post-war state 
of emergency needs a “painkiller” solution for buying time so that a more adequate 
strategy can be elaborated. Following this line of thought, reinsertion is a form of 
intermediate assistance designed to help the beneficiaries, in this case former fighters 
and their families, in their basic needs such as small tools, food, clothes, general 
allowances and so on.
This practice of delinking the two processes, according to Jennings, also 
recognises the needs of both the non-combatants and the former fighters alike, and 
can be used as a tool to control stigmatisation and discrimination between groups in 
the community and in society as a whole. 
Jennings (2008) suggests considering each of the DDR participants separately 
and that a form of distribution of different benefits, related to the group they belong to 
in terms of gender, education, rank, ethnicity, etc, should be developed. This 
suggestion arises from the assumption that there is almost no difference between 
former fighters and non-combatants in terms of social or economic development. The 
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eventual differentiation of treatment in the DDR programmes can create resentment in 
society towards the former fighters.
The mechanism established by the peacekeeping operation was designed to 
include all the warring factions in the programmes of Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration, but did not fully consider the future implications of creating two 
opposite groups: former fighters and civilians. The roots of this partition can be 
found, of course, before and during the fighting, but with a thin line of separation, 
since practitioners have found it difficult to categorise neatly those involved in and 
those affected by the conflict. There has never been a pure and clear border between 
victims and perpetrators, since most of the victims became perpetrators themselves. 
As Ellis (1999) observes, 
There appears to have been a large number of people who took up arms at 
some stage of the war, but who may have been victims at other times ... Even 
hard-core fighters seem to have remained attached to wider social 
communities. (Ellis 1999: 133)
Some identity tools explained in the following paragraphs will enable this thesis to 
deal with this problem of categorisation. It is the belief of the researcher that the 
situation in Liberia changed fundamentally with the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003 and the establishment of the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL) in the same year (UNSC 2003). All the peacekeeping 
mechanisms put in place by the UN operation were meant to lead the country from 
conflict to stability. One step in providing a secure and stable environment in a 
country post-conflict is to pacify the factions involved in the conflict through 
demilitarisation of forces (DPKO 2008). Best practice in these situations is the 
establishment of DDR programmes. All the three components of DDR –disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration – are designed to have an effect on the status and 
networks of the soldiers (DPKO 2000). While disarmament intends to carry the 
soldiers from military to civilian status, demobilisation breaks the bonds of the chain 
of command and the “war networks”.  All these changes directly affect identity. As 
Jenkins (1996: 4) claims, identity is not “just there”; it must always be established and
it is in continuous evolution. 
The establishment of UNMIL was intended to
support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; 
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protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian 
and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, 
including national police training and formation of a new, restructured 
military. (UN 2003)
The authorised strength of UNMIL was up to 15,000 military personnel, 
including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian 
police officers, including units to assist in the maintenance of law and order 
throughout Liberia, and the appropriate civilian component (SC 2003). 
Alongside the establishment of UNMIL, the CPA led to two other significant 
events. The first was the establishment of a transitional government, the National 
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). This two-year authority was followed 
by elections on 11 October 2005 (and the election of Africa’s first woman president), 
as well as the implementation of a national process of DDRR for the combatants of 
the three warring factions. 
However this second task (the implementation of the DDR) was not as simple 
and quick as had been hoped. The incomplete framework for the process within the 
CPA, where it is represented by only one page in the document, with no timetable or 
specific standards, slowed down the implementation of the DDRR programme. 
According to the DDR manual (DPKO 2000), certain factors are essential in the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. The absence of some of them 
from the agreement must be considered in order to explain what went wrong in the 
Liberian process. Some key elements that should have been specified in the peace 
agreement, such as the timeframe and the methods of disposing of collected weapons 
and ammunition, were missing from the document. In addition, the functions and 
responsibility of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) – established under the CPA, which was 
to provide policy guidance to a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) for coordinating 
DDRR activities – were not clear. This lack of clarity and detail led to chaos. In order 
to address the confusion, in October 2003 a multidisciplinary team composed of 
United Nations officials, donors and NGOs developed an action plan (NCDDRR 
2003) to fill the gaps in the implementation of the DDRR, specifying the institutional 
framework, operational strategy and policy guidelines to be followed. 
Disarmament started in December 2003 at Camp Schiefflin in Monrovia, and 
29
ended with the reintegration process, and its formal closure by President Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf on 21 July 2009. The core purpose of the DDDR was to contribute to 
security and stability in post-conflict Liberia so that recovery and development could 
take place. It was an inclusive programme, using the functions of the UN agencies as 
well as international and local NGOs. As stated above, the policy guidelines for the 
programme were outlined in the action plan (UN 2003), which included a strategic 
framework, developed by a multidisciplinary team a few months after the signing of 
the CPA. In the initial process of designing and implementing the DDRR programme, 
a taskforce was established which included key stakeholders in the country as well as 
local organisations and special interest groups. This interim taskforce was composed 
of the UNDP, UNMIL, OCHA, USAID, UNICEF and World Vision and, after a series 
of consultations, produced a comprehensive document that guided the DDRR process 
during subsequent years (UN 2003). 
As a result of this action plan, the first move was to create a JIU that had to 
follow the policy guidance given by the NCDDRR and had primary responsibility for 
the implementation of the programme. The JIU was composed of the DDRR unit that 
wrote the action plan, the UNDP and the NTGL. The programme dealt with the 
problems which arose when former fighters were left without a livelihood or support 
networks other than their former comrades during the transition from conflict to 
peace. By removing their weapons and taking them out of a military context, the 
DDDR programme aimed to integrate them socially and economically into society. 
By directly including the former fighters in the country’s national development and 
reconciliation through humanitarian assistance, restoration of order in society, 
economic growth and development and comprehensive reintegration, long-term peace 
and security could be achieved in Liberia (UNDP 2006).
The operational framework worked as an umbrella for the four parts of the 
programme. Disarmament and demobilisation of the fighters took place at cantonment 
sites in the respective areas of the three main armed factions who signed the CPA. 
This phase of the process started in Monrovia on 7 December 2003. Only a small part 
of the peacekeeping force, totalling just 5,000, was deployed in Liberia at the time 
(UNDP 2006). This first phase took place at Camp Schiefflin, where nine people died 
after some former fighters lost their patience as they waited to be registered, and 
started a riot. After a period of regrouping and changing some aspects of the 
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disarmament, the process only started in the counties away from Monrovia on 15 
April 2004, by which time the full UNMIL force of 15,000 was deployed. The DD 
phase was officially completed countrywide on 4 November 2004; around 103,000 
fighters had been disarmed and some 101,500 demobilised (UNDP 2006). The 
numbers differ in various reports, if only slightly. The difference is accounted for by 
the number of validated participants versus those screened at Camp Schiefflin (when 
the database was not functioning). There were possibly unaccounted groups from the 
Schiefflin operations in December 2003 and also a small number of cases of 
spontaneous reintegration.
The Disarmament and Demobilisation procedure involved collecting weapons, 
documentation, the control and disposal of arms, the formal discharge of active 
combatants from the chains of command and armed groups and, in certain cases, 
counselling. A second stage of demobilisation included the support package provided 
to demobilised soldiers under what was termed “reinsertion”. The requisite for any 
Liberian to enter this process was the handing-over of a weapon; after discharge from 
the cantonment sites and transportation to their communities, the former soldiers 
received the first half of a Transitional Safety-net Allowance (TSA) of US$150 and a 
one-month food ration (NCDDRR 2004). The second payment of the TSA, of the 
same amount, was paid after a three-month gap, at the ex-soldier’s preferred area of 
settlement. Originally, the stay in the cantonment sites for demobilisation was planned 
to be 30 days, while that for disarmament lasted just a few hours. The huge number of 
participants in the process – three times what had been anticipated – led to the 
decision to set a much shorter stay of five days per person during the actual 
implementation phase. In practice, this eventually lengthened to between five and 14 
days (NCDDRR 2004). The brevity of the stay meant that an important part of the 
psycho-social counselling was not carried out in a coherent manner. This is an 
important starting point for part of my hypothesis. The abrupt change in the Liberian 
situation was not adequately understood by the fighters, who had no help and only a 
short time to get used to the new social circumstances. Another feature lacking in the 
DDRR programme was the rehabilitation process which, according to the final report 
of UNDP (2006), was never developed for adults and simply got lost in the operation.
Reintegration projects started in June 2004, six months before the end of the 
DD phase. About 98,000 (UNDP 2006) (this number also varies slightly between 
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reports) demobilised former fighters received reintegration assistance in the form of 
vocational training and formal education. According to the definition of reintegration 
in the mid-term reports on the DDRR programme by UNDP, “Reintegration is the 
process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable 
employment and income ...” (UNDP 2006: 4). This assumption that reintegration is 
about the former soldiers regaining civilian status is another fundamental issue. 
1.3 The range of relevant literature about reintegration and marginalisation 
processes in Liberia
The previous paragraphs demonstrate how a civil war broke out, devastating 
Liberia and leading to widespread destruction and thousands of migrants, fleeing their 
homes and seeking food and a safe place to rest before moving on again. What began 
as a war of revenge for ethnic reasons concluded as a war without rules and little 
room for compassion. The Liberian context, especially focusing on the events that 
preceded the peace agreements, suggests that discrimination and marginalisation was 
already part of the Liberian problem. As the research is focused on the relationship 
between civilians and ex-combatants after the conclusion of the conflict, some 
paragraphs provided an insight into the events of the peace process rather than the 
conflict itself. 
Having recognised the presence of marginalisation in Liberian society it is time 
now to review some research projects closely related to this topic. While the 
following paragraphs summarise and bring together the range of literature present in 
the field presenting different methodologies and purposes, Chapter 2 relates some of 
the ideas of the present literature to the thesis in order to compose an accurate 
theoretical framework.
1.3.1 Assessing the major research trends and area of interest of the current 
literature 
Since the research problems identified after my first visit to Liberia concerned 
the relationship between the ex-combatants and civilians and its effect either on the 
reintegration or marginalisation of ex-combatants, I decided to begin with a critical 
review of the literature that has been produced about these two areas of interest.  
While for the marginalisation process my thesis takes into consideration a substantial 
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part of the literature on West Africa, regarding the reintegration of the ex-combatants 
the thesis centres attention on the studies focusing only on Liberia, in order to 
accurately position this work within a wider disciplinary discussion. This decision 
also ensures that the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the Liberian process are 
respected. This is due to the distinctiveness of the Liberian social political and 
historical background and the uniqueness of the country’s DDRR programmes. 
With the intention of developing a constructive analysis of the body of current 
knowledge, this thesis brings together the multiplicity of concepts into a few key 
themes grouped according to methodology and purpose of the research. In term of 
methodology, the trend of many studies has been based on surveys focusing on 
numbers and statistics (Pugel 2006; Bøas and Hatløy 2008; Hill, Taylor and Termin 
2008). According to this methodology, former fighters are mostly considered as mere 
numbers or statistics for the measurement of the success or failure of the operations in 
action. How many former fighters have been disarmed? How many of them passed 
through the reintegration process? How many of them gained employment? ‘How 
many…?’ was the usual question for which answers were sought. A most radical 
position of these studies is represented by a donor-driven literature (HRW 1995, 1997; 
NCDDRR 2003, 2004; UNDP 2006; UNOWA 2005) “that has tended to abstract the 
challenge of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration from their political and 
historical context” (Berdal and Ucko 2009: 11) producing reports or publications. In 
terms of purpose this literature, born contemporaneously with the conflict, answers 
the need of the international groups funding the reintegration programmes to 
investigate results, in terms of quantity and time. Those providing services to the 
major donors, such as UN agencies, NGOs, vocational training centres, schools and 
so on, concentrated mainly on quantitative methods of research. The emergence of a 
new category of researchers enquiring about Liberia during and after the war 
corroborates the theory of a shift of the related literature to a more technical and 
quantitative approach. As Utas (2004b: 210) pointed out, formerly traditional 
researchers in Liberia have remained silent on the topic of war, while in recent years 
“fast food” research has emerged along with emergency aid. The long-term approach 
has been overwhelmed by a more “eat and go” methodology. 
These studies have succeeded in instructing and guiding practitioners, but they 
have been of limited use in assisting further analysis. In the segment of literature also 
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using quantitative methodology, a large part (Munive 2010; Jennings 2007, 2008; 
Utas 2003) looks for a more comprehensive investigation of the phenomena with a 
purpose different from that of the reports. The tendency of these works is to put the 
former fighters in the front line of enquiry, asking them directly about their difficulties 
and what they have to say about their own reintegration. This approach produced 
remarkable results, especially in Sierra Leone, giving the chance for a comparative 
analysis in Liberia (see Humphreys and Weinstein 2005). Shifting attention from the 
former fighters’ reintegration to marginalisation, a significant tendency of the 
literature on West Africa is to relate the group of excluded young people to conflict 
(see Reno 1993; Ellis 1995; Utas 2003; Richards 1995). Part of this literature looked 
to the youth as a marginal group of “lumpens” (Abdullah and Bangura 1997) 
responsible for the instability of certain Mano River countries. An opposing view, part 
of the literature such as Bøas and Hatløy (2006) that researches the young former 
fighters’ background, sees them as ordinary people. These differing approaches 
represent the central part of the theoretical framework in Chapter 2.
The above definition of some areas of interest and research trends is intended 
to classify the current literature into some recognisable clusters. The categorisation of 
the works through their methodology and purpose helps to bring together the major 
themes of the present literature. In order to stake out the positions that are relevant for 
the debate of this work, the following paragraphs contain a critical review of these 
clusters.
1.3.2 Previous qualitative and quantitative methodologies used for understanding 
the ex-combatants’ point of view
The available literature on reintegration on Liberia can be divided into two 
distinct kinds of sources, according to their purpose. On the one hand, there is the 
enormous production of reports (HRW 1995, 1997; NCDDRR 2003, 2004; UNDP 
2006; UNOWA 2005) generated by professionals in peace-support operations for 
technical purposes; on the other hand, there are publications with a theoretical 
purpose, produced mostly by academic researchers (Pugel 2006; Bøas and Hatløy 
2008; Hill, Taylor and Termin 2008; Jennings 2007, 2008). This clear division in 
terms of sources reflects an obvious correspondence in terms of methodology. While 
the technical sources are the result of quantitative methodologies, the theoretical 
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sources favour the utilisation of qualitative analysis with a variable inclusion of 
quantitative methodology. The technical sources serve their purpose, gathering 
information from the field through surveys and reporting them faithfully on paper. 
Not much analysis is done in these reports and critical engagement is lacking. The 
paucity of analytical comparison renders this kind of source less significant for 
academic purposes.  
On the other hand a significant role for academic debate has been played by 
the other part of the literature that serves more theoretical purposes. A significant part 
of this literature echoes the voices of former fighters based on the survey conducted 
by Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein (2004) in Sierra Leone. Some 
researchers focused their studies on what the former fighters had to say about their 
own reintegration and how they saw themselves in the full process. The purpose of 
their study was to give:
… a systematic, quantitative and representative assessment of the dynamics 
of the conflict and the post-conflict period. It provides a key source of 
information that can help contribute to a more complete history of the 
conflict, evaluate the prospects for continued peace, and influence 
appropriate policies for intervention and post-conflict reconstruction in 
Sierra Leone and other regions of civil conflict. (Humphreys and Weinstein 
2004: 8)
The target population surveyed was those who had been active in a warring 
faction for more than one month, regardless of whether or not they participated in the 
DDR process. 1,000 interviewees were former fighters and 250 had not taken part in 
the war but had been living in the same area as the former fighters. The outcomes 
inspired a number of papers based on empirical analysis which focused on the actual 
perspective and motivations of the former fighters. These investigations demonstrated 
that the most effective way to analyse the degree of acceptance of former fighters by 
both individuals and communities is to question the former fighters directly.
Pugel (2006) adopts the same research strategy in Liberia but adds a few steps. 
With the consent of Humphreys and Weinstein, he complemented their study in 
collaboration with UNDP, using a format similar to those used in Sierra Leone. The 
survey was conducted on a random sample of 590 former fighters with the purpose of 
measuring reconciliation and reintegration in Liberia. The aim was to collect socio-
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economic information on the lives of the interviewees during and after the war in 
order to study their perceptions of reintegration. 
In the same line of research, studies in Liberia have also been conducted by 
Hill, Taylor and Termin (2008), who proposed a new perspective for analysis of the 
reintegration process from the point of view of the former fighters. Their research was 
based on a survey, with some 1,400 interviews, conducted in the Lofa region and in 
Monrovia in March and April 2007. A total of 1,024 interviews with former fighters 
were completed in the rural area of Voinjama and another 398 interviews in the urban 
area of Monrovia. The primary investigation generated two interesting reports: 
Helping Ex-Combatants Help Themselves: Understanding Ex-Combatant Economic 
Reintegration in Lofa County, Liberia (February 2008) and Would You Fight Again? 
Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration (September 2008). 
The primary investigation and the two subsequent reports analyse how the 
former fighters themselves saw their own reintegration and their future opportunities. 
The results pointed to both local and national priorities for their socio-economic 
insertion into the community. The main focus of these two works is on the probability 
and potential causes of former fighters returning to fight, so that the chances of them 
rejoining the warring factions for a possible new conflict could be measured. Both 
pieces of research based on the same survey, focus on understanding the “economic 
reasons and the psycho-social dynamics that affect [the ex-combatants’] ability to re-
build (or in the case of youth ex-combatants, build for the first time) sustainable 
livelihoods based on licit activities and to reintegrate into their communities” (Hill et 
al. 2008: 10). The three foci of the research are: economic reintegration, social 
reintegration and motivations to return to war.  
Other important works using quantitative research and contribution to this 
field are Bøas and Hatløy (2006, 2008). The 2006 work gives a good insight into the 
conditions for youth in Lofa after the end of the conflict. This work does not include 
much about former fighters, but some pertinent points may be extrapolated for the 
purposes of the current study. It is, indeed, of note that only 5% of the respondents 
who said they had taken part in a faction had returned to their community; the authors 
suggest that many were displaced in Monrovia (Bøas and Hatløy 2006: 32). This 
finding indicated that research in the urban area of Monrovia needs to take into 
account that a large number of former fighters had not gone back to their home areas 
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and thus had not tried to recover the status they had before the war. Such 
displacement is one of the main aspects of the creation of new identities, especially in 
the case of youths who had lacked the time to acquire and institutionalise their 
behaviour or personality before the conflict.
Some of the sources with a theoretical purpose did not use any kind of 
quantitative research. For some authors, trying to understand the behaviour of the 
former fighters without analysing the social impact of their reintegration is like 
building a house without starting with the foundations. While it is an essential part of 
the research of some authors to examine the conditions of the fighters before the war, 
my research is concerned with the process they passed through at the end of the 
conflict, which led to the characteristics of their current status. The most relevant 
work based on the direct experience of former fighters rather than being structured as 
a survey is Utas (2003). The central focus of Utas’ study is on “the experiences, 
motivations, and reflections of young combatants who fought for a variety of rebel 
factions” (Utas 2003: 2). This work, which has an ethnographic approach, analyses 
the category of youth and how the first civil war affected their lives. Some important 
aspects of youth identity analysed by Utas inspired my work. One of the central 
examples is the initiation to adulthood and recognition as fighters. This element 
helped me to define the relevance of the status of fighter attained by young soldiers. 
Utas (2003) can be seen as a starting point for my work but with a different focus. 
One of the main differences is the timing. The reintegration process analysed in my 
work, after the establishment of UNMIL in 2003, is in a totally different context to 
that of 1997 when Taylor’s shadow was predominant in Liberia. Another author who 
avoids quantitative analysis is Jennings (2008) who, in analysing the Liberian DDR 
implementation in general, starts from the Bøas and Hatløy (2006) survey in order to 
develop a new point of view. Jennings’ works are relevant in understanding the 
introduction of the issue of identity in order to understand the reintegration of former 
fighters.  
The foregoing assessment of the most relevant projects on reintegration in 
Liberia according to methodology and purpose has two aims – firstly, to explain the 
choice of methodology used by this thesis and expressed in the following paragraphs; 
and secondly to lay the basis for developing in Chapter 2 further analysis around the 
ideas expressed in these works.
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1.3.3 Marginalisation and conflict in West Africa
The second topic related to this thesis is the marginalisation process associated with 
conflict. Dealing with marginalisation and conflict in West Africa means dealing with 
the controversial and often “silent” group of youth (see Munive 2010; Abdullah and 
Bangura 1997; Peters and Richards 1998). Indeed, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the 
matter of security in post-conflict reconstruction is strictly linked with the problem of 
youth marginalisation (see Fayemi 2004; Amadu et al. 2009; Shola 2006). When it 
comes to youngster exclusion in the Mano River countries, an extended and well-
developed debate is addressed by Richards (1995, 1996, 2005), Utas (2003, 2004, 
2005, 2007, 2008), Peters (2004, 2006, 2007), Munive (2010, 2010b, 2011) and Vigh 
(2006). All the authors investigate the relationship between youth identity and 
conflict, developing different ideas but they all agree on the fact that the 
marginalisation of young people has been one of the reasons for the outbreak of 
conflict in West Africa. However, this definition of youth is not built on a logical 
classification based on age and does not denote a fixed demographic group (Boeck 
and Honwana 2005). It means that someone, say, in his forties who also has a problem 
of social and political integration could be considered part of the youth cohort (Utas 
2009: 9). It is a social age.
When it comes to the relationship with conflict, according to Utas (2003, 
2008), young people’s sense of being excluded from society represented the “social 
glue” for a significant group of citizens and the reason for the war in Liberia. In the 
same context Richards (1995) attributes the participation of youth in the conflict in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia to a “crisis of youth” generated by the frustration of a 
generation caught between traditional society and modernity. This situation was 
exacerbated by the abuses perpetrated by the Liberian elite on the young people, 
especially in the countryside. Exploitation for labour, and the lack of opportunities for 
youngsters, offered fertile ground for local warlords to raise insurgencies. In many 
cases these insurgencies are triggered by the limited access to land caused by the 
failure to introduce appropriate agricultural reform (Chauveau and Richards 2008)
A similar opinion is held by Peters, who also collaborated with Richards in 
this area (Peters and Richards 1998, 1998b). According to him
The root causes of the war, according to many ex-combatants, are located in 
the lack of education and jobs, and the failure or unwillingness of the ruling 
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elite – foremost at village level – to help and include, rather than exploit and 
exclude, the vulnerable and needy, particularly the young. (Peters 2007: 37)
Munive (2011) moves on from the starting point of the struggle for land of the 
youth described by Peters and Richards (1998, 1998b) and Chauveau and Richards 
(2008). The authors link the armed mobilisation of the youth to their exclusion from 
the social context. Youth unemployment (Munive 2010) and the issue of youth labour 
deployment (Munive 2011) are key issues in understanding the Liberian conflict. In 
addition, Munive (2011) stresses how acknowledging the consequences of youth 
mobilisation is key to better reintegration of ex-combatants.
All the above-mentioned literature agrees that large numbers of marginalised 
youth probably contributed to the wars in West Africa and in particular in Liberia; and 
that the conflict arose mostly from the alienation of youth generated by the lack of 
opportunities and denial of access to social and political life. However, when 
considering the background of this group there are two ways of looking at it. The 
classification “youth” has often been seen in different ways.  Sometimes they are 
portrayed as a pro-active community ready to participate in political, social and 
economic development; at other times they are just a troubled, vulnerable and 
excluded group searching for an identity. This dualistic representation is well 
expressed by the paradox of “makers and breakers” in Boeck and Honwana (2005). 
As makers, youth contribute to the progress of society and at the same time they are 
shaped by it. As breakers, they violate the social rules, also leading to conflict, as in 
the case of Liberia. 
In order to position youth in one category or the other, some of the literature 
on West Africa is primarily concerned with the reasons for them joining the factions. 
Based on this, some authors sought to examine the fighters’ previous education, their 
families and community acceptance, their employment, and criminal behaviour, if 
any. Part of this literature (Abdullah 1998; Mkandawire 2002; HRW 2005; Collier 
1994), especially that on Mano River countries, seems to regard those who took part 
in the conflict as breakers.  According to the UNOWA report (2005), the main reasons 
for youth engagement in the conflict were unemployment or idleness, commonly 
linked to a background of criminal behaviour or uprooted youth, as in Abdullah 
(1998) and Mkandawire (2002). Dufka, in her report for Human Rights Watch (HRW 
2005), analyses the situation of group fighters who identified themselves as regional 
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warriors involved in one or more factions, fighting in different countries in the region. 
A military source cited in the report portrays them as follows:
These guys form part of a regional militia I call the insurgent diasporas. 
They float in and out of wars and operate as they wish. They have no-one to 
tell them where, when and how to behave. They’ve been incorporated into 
militias and armies all over the place – Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire – and are 
really the most dangerous tool that any government or rebel army can have. 
(HRW 2005: 11)
In the HRW (2005) report, most combatants admitted that looting or the desire for 
material gain or wealth were the main reasons they joined up. The report concludes, 
however, that it was mostly crippling poverty and hopelessness that incited people to 
take the decision to risk their lives by joining one armed force or another.
The report of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA 2005) came 
up with similar results. The report sees unemployment as the central factor in the 
economic and political insecurity of West Africa. 
“Youths who are able-bodied but unskilled, jobless and alienated, have been 
ready to take up arms in exchange for small amounts of money – together 
with the promise of recognition, looting and ‘wives’ – and are more likely to 
be drawn into the influence of warring factions or criminal gangs to gain this 
‘empowerment’”. (UNOWA 2005: 11) 
It is stated in the report that the socio-economic situation of youth in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone and the related marginalisation have fuelled the conflicts in the two 
countries and the entire region.
A study by Bøas and Hatløy (2008) asserts primarily that in many cases the 
youth can be considered as makers, rejecting the general analysis of former fighters in 
West Africa as being applicable to Liberia. Bøas and Hatløy (2008), unlike Abdullah 
and others, state that the former fighters did not always behave as “lumpens” or 
“unemployed youths, prone to criminal behaviour, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness and 
gross indiscipline” (Abdullah 1998: 207–208). They assume that “their wartime 
experience may have changed them, their mindset and their behaviour, but there is 
little in their background to single them out as a particular group” (Bøas and Hatløy 
2008: 42). On the topic of youths joining the fighting, Bøas and Hatløy (2008) argue 
that one of the main reasons was to do with issues of security – the need for personal 
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safety and a desire to protect their family. This is in contrast to the suggestion that 
idleness and unemployment were motivations.  The UNOWA report (2005) presented 
this argument and it is apparent that Boas and Hatløy (2008) reject this belief and 
acknowledge that security is more of an important issue for those joining the fighting. 
However, it must be made clear that it should be stated that although the other studies 
do not focus their attention primarily on this belief, does not necessarily mean that 
they do not believe it to be important.  This presents one of the difficulties about 
conducting a literature review on a specific subject, because not all sources are geared 
towards covering every aspect that has been selected by the researcher.  
Bøas and Hatløy (2008) assert that the youths who decided to join the fighting 
had not been marginalised in absolute terms before the outbreak of hostilities, or that 
they had not been marginalised any more than their peers who did not join up, who 
had been experiencing the same or similar kinds of treatment. They also assert that 
enrolment in the various factions in the Liberian civil war took place out of free will, 
even though most of the combatants were poor and did not have a wide variety of
options. This, however, is not an explanation but an observation. 
Statistics in Bøas and Hatløy (2008)’s work indicate that most civilians joined 
the armed groups for security reasons. It is, therefore, probable that people’s decision 
to resume fighting with a different group was made in order to protect themselves and 
their families, livelihoods and local communities. It is unlikely that they were forced 
to join different warring factions at this stage. Evidence for this can be found in the 
case of people in the Mandingo towns along the Guinean border in Lofa County. Here 
people supported ULIMO-K in the first part of the Liberian civil war (1990–96), and 
LURD in the latter phase (1999–2003). Some who fought for ULIMO-K went back 
into the bush in 1997–98 and returned as LURD fighters in 1999 (Bøas and Hatløy 
2008). Others, who had made some money in the first part of the war, returned to their 
home communities, started small enterprises, and then rejoined a faction at a later 
stage, either to protect their businesses, or in an attempt to make even more money 
from the war (Ellis 1995, 1999). 
Based on these findings, Bøas and Hatløy (2008) conclude that most of the 
people who joined the warring factions did so voluntarily, based on personal reasons, 
and not because of marginalisation or coercion. In every society, whether in conflict 
or not, the individual often takes decisions under some level of coercion. There is 
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normally, however, a range of possibilities and the “ability to evaluate alternative 
coping strategies” (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 37). They argue that similar social and 
economic conditions existed for the youths who joined the factions as for those who 
did not get involved in the conflict. 
The finding that most of the enrolments took place voluntarily or out of free 
will is in line with Harris (1999), who says that children and young people are not 
always forced into hostilities. He takes Liberia as an example, stating that, judging 
from his experience, they are among the first to join the factions, for a broad range of 
motivations – whether economic (looking for some source of sustenance); security 
(the belief that the armies can protect them or their families), or revenge (for some 
atrocity perpetrated by other factions) (Bøas and Hatløy 2008). Harris (1999) argues 
that a large section of the population, such as young people, were already alienated 
from the social system, and he does not distinguish them from those involved in the 
war. The situation changes, however, when we look at those who have engaged in 
fighting and who, in the anarchy of a post-conflict situation, may turn to pillaging and 
armed gangs, as in Liberia (Harris 1999). Therefore, the two works on the subject 
agree and present the viewpoint that the decision to join the fighting is often based on 
security issues and not through force.  This is argued against by Kieh (2008)’s work 
that states that a large majority of soldiers, particularly child soldiers were forced to 
join the conflict.  Here it is apparent that the literature should acknowledge the 
difference between the two debates, with those of a certain age displaying a number 
of reasons why they chose to join but more often than not, children were forced to 
join (Kieh, 2008). 
The literature notes that child soldiers had little choice and were often forced 
to join the conflict. Bøas and Hatløy (2006) deal in depth with the topic of child 
abduction in a report on a survey of 479 children between the ages of 10 and 18, 
carried out in November 2005. The authors point to pre-conceptions that these 
children had mostly been involved in the war because they had been forced. However, 
abandoning these pre-conceptions and avoiding over-simplification, we can try to 
understand the source of the problem and the reasons, other than force, why they got 
involved in the conflict in the first place. It will then be possible to develop theories 
and practices to improve social and economic conditions in general. This can help in 
the reintegration process, to reduce and combat child labour, and to improve the 
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current social and economic conditions of youths (Bøas and Hatløy 2006). 
According to these points of view most of the former fighters came from 
stable family backgrounds, but it is possible that they were influenced by outside 
forces, having left the family and community surroundings and been subjected to the 
harshness of the war. As a result, and not unexpectedly, it is possible that they may 
have become involved in crime. Collier (1994) is of the same opinion, stating that the 
former fighters who are unskilled have “comparative advantage in criminal activities” 
(Collier 1994: 344). Following this theory, Collier demonstrated that the former 
fighters cannot go back to normal civilian life because of their lack of skills and that 
the unemployment can be a cause of destabilisation
It is clear that there is a discrepancy between former fighters with a more 
normal background, as described by Bøas and Hatløy (2008) and the warriors deeply 
affected by poverty and discrimination as described by Abdullah (1998). Those 
described by HRW (2005) and Abdullah (1998) mostly indicated the symptoms of the 
marginalised part of society: unemployment or under-employment, struggling for 
daily survival, vulnerability to exploitation, and so on.  This is a key part of the 
analysis and assesses that certain former fighters are more susceptible to becoming 
marginalised depending on their background, even before joining the army and the 
identity change that they might experience. 
1.3.4 Observations on the current literature and development of current 
methodology
The major foci of the literature focusing on reintegration analysed above, 
including especially technical reports and working papers from the UN, government 
agencies and research groups, are the result of a methodological approach based on 
quantitative data from surveys. However, research about ways of effectively 
addressing the difficulties and constraints that the reintegration process is likely to 
confront can be characterised as inadequate. Such studies seem to lack a deep and 
extensive analysis in terms of explaining the complex dynamics which derive from 
the interaction between conflict management strategies and their impact on the local 
population. It is interesting to see how these same authors, using the quantitative 
approach, have started to notice the need for further investigations.
Some authors, not involved directly in studies in Liberia, such as Tatsuo 
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Yamane, who conducted research into peacekeeping and peacebuilding in various 
African countries, affirm that not much research has been conducted on DDR as 
related to the reintegration of former fighters in general (Tatsuo & Yamane 2007). 
Specifically in Liberia, Hill, Taylor and Temin (2008: 10), who conducted an overall 
survey with CHF International and published the outcomes in a special report of the 
United States Institute of Peace, state: “There is a relatively thin body of literature that 
looks critically at factors affecting the economic and social reintegration of ex-
combatants”. They consider that most of the studies carried out in Liberia are focused 
on the success of vocational training and the statistics for the former fighters 
participating in it; and that, apart from that, little research is centred on the economic 
and social reinsertion of the former fighters, based on how they see themselves in the 
process as a whole. A similar view is expressed by Jennings (2008), where one of the 
problems in understanding how DDR is acting at a micro-level is the lack of studies 
into how it is implemented “on the ground”. The author also suggests that 
reintegration in general is still under-researched and under-resourced compared with a 
large volume of work dealing with the demobilisation and disarmament process. 
Regarding literature on DDR, the writer also differentiates between the large 
volume of operational works and more analytical studies. The first, considered by 
Jennings (2008) as “gray literature”, consists of technical guides and reports of 
programme implementation, while the second consists of those works where the main 
aim is to analyse in a critical way the effects produced by the DDR process in specific 
contexts on the ground. Pugel (2006), similarly based on a broad survey of former 
fighters, also stresses that DDR programmes have been studied with positive 
outcomes at the macro level but little has been done to validate this at the micro level. 
It appears that many of the major researchers on reintegration have been pointing out 
the need for additional research in the field, which might address some of the gaps. 
This thesis tries to fill some of these gaps using a different approach, 
especially regarding the methodology. Most of the studies are based on large-scale 
surveys with questionnaires and short, open-ended interviews. This quantitative 
approach leaves little scope for qualitative interpretation. For this study I conducted 
open-ended interviews and focus groups to examine the social aspects of being a 
former fighter in Liberian society, rather than gathering statistics on how former 
fighters view the reintegration process. In terms of purpose, this study is different 
44
from surveys commissioned or funded by non-state actors because it aims to embrace 
a larger target audience than just the technicians in the field. 
Most of the literature on youth marginalisation and conflict in West Africa, as 
seen above, has focused on the period before the war and what caused youth to 
mobilise for conflict. The only relevant work with a post-conflict setting was Utas 
(2003), focused on the end of the first phase of the end of the Liberian civil war, 
which established a definite need for a follow-up after the end of the second phase of 
the war. Not much literature has described how the evolving state of the 
marginalisation process after the end of the conflict affects ex-combatants as a 
specific group of the population. There is a potential gap of literature dealing with 
how youth marginalisation evolved after the end of the conflict. There is hence a need 
to narrow the area of interest to the period after the war and to ex-combatants. 
1.4 Personal conversations with former fighters: the appropriate methodology 
in a military environment
“Methodology is a rather neglected topic in studies of under-age combatants” (Utas 
2004b). According to Utas (2004b), the quantitative approach and short-term 
fieldwork are the methodological keys for much research. In a large number of cases 
this approach responds to the purpose of the technical sources cited in the paragraph 
above. Like the studies on young combatants, analysis of the methodologies used to 
study the reintegration process of former fighters after conflicts in many countries 
reveals the extent to which they are depersonalised – in other words, treated as 
“numbers”. Liberia is a perfect example of this.
This happens mostly because the rehabilitation and reintegration process after 
war is implemented in an armed environment characterised by military involvement, 
which favours the use of reports and surveys as the methodology for gaining 
information. Most modern peacekeeping operations involve DDR programmes in 
their mandate. So did the CPA signed in Accra after the end of the Liberian war as a 
central part of the UN peacekeeping operation. Most of the research in the field took 
place in a military environment (see Utas 2003; Jennings 2007; Munive 2010). This 
military setting characterised most of the works’ methodology, and particularly those 
linked to reports on numbers and goals (see Pugel 2006; Bøas and Hatløy 2008; Hill, 
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Taylor and Temin 2008). Whilst my fieldwork was also in a military environment, the 
research I conducted is based on qualitative data including sociological elements and 
long-term fieldwork and recurrent revision. I dispensed with the use of quantitative 
surveys and carried out personal conversations face to face that would reveal the 
former fighters’ feelings and attitudes in a more rounded and richer way.  This 
methodological approach aims to give a voice to the ex-soldiers and whether or not 
they perceive themselves as part of society. 
The study thus analyses the day-to-day integration of the ex-soldiers in 
Liberian social and economic circles, adding scientific credibility to the research by 
using a rigorous methodology.  Since the interaction between former fighters and 
civilians is the core of this research, the decision to use qualitative methods was made 
with the aim of giving space to what has been neglected in other similar 
investigations: the voices of the ex-combatants. Listening to the words of the former 
fighters responds to the intention of describing the development of the reintegration 
process in the way it was conceived and realised in Liberia, rather than explaining it. 
The only way to achieve this is to understand the concept of reintegration process 
through the comments of the ex-combatants, collecting as many of their opinions as 
possible. 
With this in mind, my role during data collection was to look at the occurrence 
of events “from the outside”, grasping the subjective consciousness of human 
conduct. During the research I first had to play the role of an observer as a social 
participant and then to replicate the reality of those with whom I had interacted, in 
social terms. The full first phase of the fieldwork consisted of observing the 
interaction between former fighters and the local population. The second part of the 
composition of the thesis was the interpretation of the data and writing the thesis. 
Indeed, in interpretative social science the task of the scientist is not to impose an 
“outside” view of the phenomenon but to interpret it through an “inside” experience 
of the observer himself. Hence, the aim of this methodology was to report the stories 
of the social interaction of the former fighters with external society, describing 
through their voices the daily struggle for reinstatement in a normal life involving 
social activity. 
Since the subjective description of social interaction cannot be measured in 
terms of numbers and statistics, I avoided the use of surveys and questionnaires. 
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Interpretivism, indeed, is not suited to the quantitative approach, but rather the 
qualitative method, which serves to define the choices that led to certain behaviours 
(Blaikie 2000). When I approached the phenomenon of the reintegration of the former 
fighter I was not interested in the number of ex-combatants that declared they were 
reintegrated into society, but the reason behind those declarations. The only way to do 
that was to hear the motivations for their decision to stay among others or to become 
isolated, focusing on their feelings instead of the numbers and statistical patterns that 
they may give rise to.
During the observation phase I planned to capture the “subjectively intended 
meanings” of the research participants by maintaining an “objectifying attitude” (see 
Harrington 2000: 728). At the end of the observation process, my intention was to 
portray a landscape where the ex-combatants could recognise themselves and, further, 
to reproduce their reality in the appropriate social formats. To generate this kind of 
understanding through interpretation, I wanted to reproduce the social phenomenon 
with as much of an inside view as possible. This method must avoid altering the 
social actors’ world by altering their reality. The only way to remain faithful to the 
facts is to allow the observed actors to speak for themselves, and to maintain the role 
of observer with the task of accurately decoding their statements in social terms. 
Avoiding the euphemism of being a “faithful reporter”, I accepted the post-positivists’ 
point of view (see Trochim 2001) that no individual can ever be truly objective and 
unbiased in their views of an experience and hence of the world; all personal 
viewpoints are biased to an extent. 
The following paragraphs address technical issues concerning the 
investigation such as how, where, when and which. I structured the fieldwork seeking 
an understanding of the concept of reintegration among the former fighters by means 
of description and exploration of the social reality of their lives. I also discuss in this 
section how I decided where to conduct the interviews, and the particular reasons for 
these choices are discussed setting the limits and boundaries of the study. I also tackle 
the matter of timing and timeline as practical application of the research strategy 
during the fieldwork, detailing the procedures of data collection as personal 
conversations.
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1.4.1 Fieldwork: timeline, places and methods to avoid “victimcy”
In defining the research timeline it is necessary to consider the two main formats: 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. In a longitudinal study, the focus is spread 
over a wider spectrum of time (usually many decades); many variables are involved 
and changes that occur over time are taken into account before concrete conclusions 
are drawn. In a cross-sectional study, the entire focus of the research is confined to a 
single timeframe (Trochim 2001). Only a segment of the entire spectrum of the 
subject being studied or measured is concentrated on. Due to the relatively short 
period of my research (five years) we can consider this research to be in the cross-
sectional format. 
In this timeframe I visited Liberia four times between 2005 and 2009 in order 
to collect specific data. The total fieldwork was of seventeen months, with intervals of 
a few months between each visit, lasting between three and six months. However 
before going out into the field, the first step in the research included a year in 
Edinburgh where I familiarised myself with data collection and analysis methods. 
During this first year I designed a fieldwork strategy that could allow the collection of 
data regarding all the actors involved in the reintegration process of the ex-
combatants. At that stage I identified two major groups involved in the process. In one 
group are actors not directly or personally affected by the actions, those who are 
responsible for designing strategies and policies for the full process but do not 
experience the consequences.  In this group I place mostly collective bodies such as 
the United Nations and its agencies, NGOs, civil-society organisations (CSOs), 
government entities, etc. The other group is formed by the individuals directly 
affected by the process such as the communities, the civilians and the ex-combatants. 
Clearly, each of them plays a different role and operates at a different level of 
the reintegration process. If we consider the process with a hierarchal approach we 
find at the top of the structure the first group. This party represents the bureaucratic 
machinery for the coordination of the whole process. They lay down the policies, the 
economic directives and the guidelines for the practical implementation of the 
reintegration process. At a lower level is the second group who, even if the main 
subject of the process, just suffer the process without any involvement in decision-
making. 
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Throughout the period in Edinburgh I set up the future fieldwork in Liberia in 
accordance to this division. My first visit was in 2005, between September and 
December (four months), and was taken up with familiarising myself with the 
environment, the context and the people. For this period I decided to start gathering 
information about the first group. The method was to hold formal interviews. I 
interviewed the main members of staff of institutions and organisations involved in 
the Disarmament and Demobilisation process that was ongoing by that period. The 
main goal of this sequence of interviews was to get information to delineate the main 
successes and failures of the work already done, and to identify the strengths and the
weaknesses of the work still in progress. This approach was totally separate and just 
for background purposes. 
By contrast, I decided to interact with the second group in a more informal 
way. During this phase of the research, I collaborated also with a local association of 
ex-combatants which was running an independent reintegration agenda for around 
200 former fighters in the Margibi area. I was mostly based in Monrovia, where I was 
carrying out part of the fieldwork, and I travelled every day to a small area in Margibi 
County, called the Schiefflin Community. The travel time was around one hour each 
way but, if only a short distance apart, the two locations were completely different, 
one rural and the other urban. This association was not part of the formal mechanism 
of the peacekeeping operation and not orientated only around former fighters. The 
group was completely informal and joined together all war players: victims and 
perpetrators. I took an active part in this association during the three visits followed 
the first in 2005.  In fact I visited Liberia again between May and October 2006 (six 
months), June and August 2007 (three months) and finally, after a break of more than 
one and half years, between May and August 2009 (four months). 
This long-lasting collaboration with a local entity that was a spontaneous part 
of Liberian civil society and not linked with the international organisations gave me 
the opportunity to be accepted on a different level by the former fighters. Acceptance 
and trust were developed meticulously through participation and presence; suddenly I 
found that I had become “part of the landscape”. There was no pre-planning in this, as 
this kind of development happens unexpectedly or through unplanned situations (see 
Utas 2004b). I developed further relationships with other former fighters not taking 
part in the association. The whole “trust building approach” was set up with the 
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purpose to avoid the ‘victimcy’ problem. With the term “victimcy” Utas (2004b: 211) 
defines the attitude of the “respondents expressing their individual agency by 
representing themselves as powerless victims”. It is a form of defence that allows the 
respondents to hide themselves behind a curtain of false stories that can in some cases 
mislead researchers. This situation is common in post-conflict environments 
especially if the focus of the work is those during the reintegration processes who live 
at the margins of the society, which in many cases pushes them to their isolation. 
These people tend most of the time to picture their circumstances in a more colourful 
way than was the reality.  Victimcy can in these cases compromise the validity or 
authenticity of the research. Even the slightest error can invalidate the entire research. 
For any form of qualitative data, authenticity lies in the integrity, depth and 
capacity of the data collected, along with the targeted sample and an unbiased 
approach. However, it should be noted that, over the years, many diverse 
methodologies have been recommended for quantitative data analysis, but no 
universally accepted strategy has been designed for qualitative data analysis 
(Saunders et al. 2003). I decided therefore to begin from the safe understanding that 
in order to avoid the problem of victimcy it is necessary to gain real acceptance that in 
many cases derives only from long-term fieldwork. Since the time spent on the field 
during my visits was often long and the interval between the visits was quite short, I 
decided to use progressive and systematic approaches to integrate myself in the ex-
combatants’ communities. This was planned with the aim, through participant 
observation and informal conversations, of describing the social reality from the point 
of view of the former fighters.  Listening directly to them and trying to be fully 
accepted implied of course avoiding the use of surveys. This was because many ex-
combatants had been involved in paper-based surveys previously in the 
demobilisation exercises with “strangers” they often did not trust. In these cases 
victimcy may often have compromised part of the information due to the formal 
relationship with the researchers. My aim was instead to elicit information from the 
former fighters without affecting my relationship with them and without creating any 
distance between us.
The only way to gain this kind of acceptance from the former fighters was 
through real participation. I decided so to spend time at their meeting places, their 
formal and informal work places and inside the organisations they created. I aimed to 
50
“see and feel” the everyday activities of the former fighters through a process 
involving a complex range of actions that helped me to perceive their social reality 
from different points of view. The involvement in their day-to-day activities opened a 
“gate” of acceptance that allowed me to become part of a system that permitted me to 
be constantly in contact with the ex-combatants. This “gate” of acceptance meant that 
I became a trusted person, with entry to their networks. 
Nevertheless the first period was quite problematic since the process of social 
adaptation in a country locked in more than 15 years of isolation due to civil war was 
not easy. My white Caucasian background was also an issue. In most of the country, 
including the capital city, the sight of a white man aroused the curiosity of the 
majority of the population, especially those in their 20s or younger. The recent war 
and the closure of Liberia’s frontiers for most of the previous 15 years did not allow 
many non-Liberians, and especially “whites”, to enter Liberia. For obvious historical 
reasons, people assumed I was American before knowing my nationality, and this led 
to presumptions that were difficult to remove. I overcame this initial barrier with the 
help of a “loyal associate”. The choice of this term is quite unusual, but suited to the 
situation. This individual played many roles during my stay in Liberia. He was a 
guide, assistant and adviser; he sometimes held me back, making me considering 
ideas and theories from different points of view; but more than anything he was a 
loyal support for this research. The role played by this individual could not be fully 
understood if he would be considered simply as a “fieldwork assistant”. There was no 
formal job interview or employment, no salary (apart from reimbursement of some 
expenses) or hierarchical relationship.
Everything happened spontaneously when I found accommodation in a hotel 
in Monrovia. The woman who owned the hotel named Watta Modad was the centre of 
a variety of activities, from political to humanitarian, and had a range of interests and 
connections in different fields. Among her long list of interests, she collaborated in 
January 2005 with Paul Richards and Steven Archibald on research for the World 
Bank in Liberia (WB 2005). She introduced me to one of her nephews, the loyal 
associate who proved reliable and useful throughout my fieldwork. The war had not 
spared him. He fought and had lost both his parents and other family members during 
the fighting, while other family members were displaced. This experience gave him a 
strong will to lend a hand in my effort to understand the Liberian situation. He had 
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benefited from a privileged high-school education, which is unusual in Liberia, and 
was enrolled at the University of Liberia. Born in Monrovia, where he has lived for 
most of his life, he also had the experience of being a refugee in Sierra Leone for 
several months. He also had some experience as a journalist’s assistant and worked 
for his aunt gaining substantial knowledge of the UN programmes for the 
reintegration of the ex-combatants. He introduced and led me through the former 
fighters’ networks and on some occasions also the underground world. Thanks to his 
presence, in a short period of few months I passed from being tagged “white man” to 
“white nigga”. 
I visited different counties and spent a month in Sanniquellie in Nimba county.  
The “gate of acceptance” was open but having established this relationship based on 
trust, I could not create a barrier between me and them by formalising the interviews 
with a structured framework. I thus adopted, as a means of data collection, the method 
of unstructured and informal interviews, which, for most of the time, reduced the 
sharp differences between us. My target was individuals, work groups and
organisations made up of ex-combatants. The conversations were on a one-to-one 
level or conducted in groups. Depending on the situation, all the conversations were 
held in public places or places chosen by them, so as to ensure a safe and comfortable 
environment, such as in local bars, sometimes also sharing some palm wine. The 
majority of the participants were already familiar with my presence within their closer 
networks and did not see me in an official capacity. None of the conversations was 
arranged by appointment; they were of a more spontaneous nature, so as to create a 
trusting atmosphere and encourage people to confide in me. I always carried an audio-
recorder; in some cases it was hidden (I always asked for permission to use the 
material after the conversations were over), in others overt. Over time the participants 
became so accustomed to me recording our conversations that they no longer took any 
notice and began to speak more freely. Most of the conversations quoted in this thesis 
come from audio-recorded material. The conversations are presented in the thesis as 
“pers. comm.” (personal comments), while the formal interviews are presented as 
“interviews”. 
The selection of comments to use for the research was partly pragmatic and 
partly the result of fulfilling criteria planned during the design of my research in 
Edinburgh. For the purpose of restricting the area of interest I decided to select 
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conversations held in certain districts based on their grouping in urban and semi-
urban areas. I decided to leave the rural areas aside because the data might be too 
contradictory for my purpose. For the first and only time in my research, decided my 
target selection based on information from the much-criticised quantitative data. I 
needed a starting point and I decided to screen some statistics to point out the right 
direction. According to the NCDDRR (2004) report, Montserrado county as an urban 
area and Margibi county as a semi-urban area were in fact among the preferred places 
for resettlement and reintegration of demobilised soldiers. The report, which by that 
time had surveyed 83,601 ex-combatants, pointed out that 50% of those interviewed 
chose Margibi and Montserrado counties as the final destination for their 
demobilisation. Furthermore, some 48.13% of interviewees indicated the two counties 
as their preferred place for resettlement during the reintegration activities. Based on 
this initial information I decided to focus my fieldwork on these two areas.
In selecting the comments I also gave some importance to statistics when 
choosing the age of the participants. As it was my intention not to reproduce any 
particular model but, rather, to reflect on the range of processes and behaviours of the 
subjects of study, I did not restrict the representative sample just to an age range, but I 
took it into consideration.  I tried, where possible, to adhere to the age ratio of the 
figures produced by the Disarmament and Demobilisation programme. The survey 
conducted during the DD process showed that those aged between 20 and 30 
represented 63% of the entire number of former fighters (NCDDRR 2004). I decided 
therefore to target individuals and groups mostly aged between 20 and 30 years. In 
none of the cases did I ask a participant to present a former fighter’s ID card, for two 
reasons in particular. First, many former fighters had not passed through the DDR 
programme so as to get the ID, or did not want to carry the ID with them.  Secondly, 
asking for identification would have broken the trust created. The only way to identify 
them as former fighters was confirmation by other members of the community or 
close networks.
1.4.2 Methodological comparative analysis with Utas
Carrying out research in the field I finally came to a point where I considered 
comparative analysis an essential step for portraying the methodology used. 
Comparison is, in fact, an unavoidable step in social science to fully describe the 
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object of the research: “the fundamental point is that all description involves a 
comparison of the object described with something else” (Bechhofer and Paterson 
2000: 6). In order to understand fully the reasons for some methodological choices I 
decided to contrast my work with a previous one. Considering qualitative data as the 
hub of my research, the most relevant work on ex-combatants in Liberia using this 
approach was Utas (2003).  This work is an “ethnography of youth in Liberia and of 
how their lives became affected by a civil war which raged in the country between 
1990 and 1997” (Utas 2003: abstract). The central focus of the study is on “the 
experiences, motivations, and reflections of young combatants who fought for a 
variety of rebel factions” (Utas 2003: abstract).  Utas’ fieldwork was conducted 
among young ex-combatants between December 1997 and November 1998 (Utas 
2003). However, my study should not in any way be considered a secondary analysis 
or a replication of Utas’ work, either in terms of findings or of methodology. 
My thesis clearly cannot be considered a secondary analysis. This would 
involve the use of the same existing data, collected for the purposes of a prior study, 
in order to pursue a research interest which is distinct from the original (Hinds, Vogel 
and Clarke-Steffen 1997). This is not so in the case of my work since all the data were 
collected by me. In term of replication, research such as Pugel (2006) and its 
replication of Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein’s work in Sierra Leone 
“heavily relied” upon the methodology used in the original work. My research instead 
used the methodology based on the requirements on the ground rather than a planned 
reproduction of Utas’. Even if I agree completely on the type of data collection 
labeled by Utas (2003: 9) as “deep hanging out with Liberian youth ex-combatants”, I 
used it more as a philosophical attitude than a proper methodology. I planned my 
contribution to the ex-combatants’ associations and networks through real 
participation in their activities of any kind. I organised and participated in activities 
ranging from political debates to basketball matches and in many other cases also 
took part in more spontaneous events, such as drinking with the ex-combatants in 
bars. 
All this was due especially to the different timing of the research. I analyse the 
reintegration process of demobilised soldiers during the UNMIL operation established 
in 2003, in a totally different context to that of 1997 when Taylor’s shadow was 
predominant in Liberia. The atmosphere and environment during my research were 
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more relaxed, secure and free than during Utas’ fieldwork. A secure environment 
completely changes data collection methods. For example I never felt that the local 
authorities or others might confiscate my material and I never had issues concerning 
my personal security. Even during several visits to the Guthrie Rubber Plantation, a 
cultivated rubber area seized and controlled by ex-combatants, I did not feel any 
danger. My last visit to the plantation was only the day before the military’s deadline 
for the ex-combatants to leave the place. Most of them were packing their possessions 
and were getting ready to depart, with a pointed “no comment” in their eyes; others 
were thinking of fighting to hold the government back. I approached some of the 
leaders and, despite their anger, was able to have conversations with no 
complications. This was due to the change of climate brought about by the 2003 
peacekeeping operation. The organisations I was participating in were mostly 
demobilised and their members no longer recognised the military hierarchy. That was 
why I did not experience the exclusion from a network when a new leader overthrows 
the previous one, as happened to Utas in the “Palace”. Moreover, although I did not 
share common ground with the former fighters by having been – like Utas – in Liberia 
on “April 6” [1996], I was often seen as one of them because I had served in the army 
(1-year national service was compulsory in Italy until 2000), and I did not have to 
pretend to be an ex-soldier like them. Finally I can confirm that the new secure 
context I was operating in deeply influenced the difference between Utas’ research 
methods and mine. 
1.4.3 Terminology
Some terms used in this thesis have different meanings depending on the context they 
are used in, so it is necessary to clarify them by giving them specific meanings. 
The first definition concerns two terms used throughout this work: former 
fighter and ex-combatant. These terms are interchangeable with no distinction.  Both 
expressions imply a person who took part in the conflict at any stage of his or her life, 
anyone who joined the factions to fight or to support fighting in any kind of way. 
Therefore, there is no differentiation between those who were forced to join the war 
and those who willingly decided to take part; nor between those who fought in the 
field and those who worked in the camp kitchens; and there is no differentiation based 
on gender, age or ethnic group. None of these characteristics is important in the 
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context of my thesis. They refer to anyone who took part in the conflict, regardless of
which faction. 
Sometimes synonyms such as warrior, soldier, rebel or combatant are used 
with no difference, leaving aside in this case the distinction between the terms made 
by Moran (1995). According to Moran (1995) the semantic use of the term “soldier” 
indicates the first step of a chronological evolution of the ideal of fighters.  When the 
figure of soldier has been discredited by corrupt and coward behaviour, the ideal of 
fighters changed to different models: warriors, commando and so on. The soldier
represents square zero of the model of fighters during the journey of identity 
evolution (Moran 1995), but I do not subscribe to this terminology.
The expression “neglected veteran” is used to identify the category of former 
fighters experiencing particular feelings after the end of the conflict by not feeling 
fully reintegrated. Everyone who took part in the war was a fighter or a combatant, 
but certain specific emotions generated after the end of the conflict, such as 
abandonment, rejection, marginalisation and discrimination – which will be analysed 
in the following chapters – mark a distinctive group, the “neglected veterans”. 
Nevertheless, the term “former fighter” also refers to both groups, where a distinction 
between them is not required.  
Another term that is widely used in my work is “web of connections”; it 
includes all the implications of three other key terms: status, identity and networks. 
The meaning of “status” is no different to that in everyday use: an individual’s social 
standing or position in society relative to that of other people. The term also denotes 
the relation of power between the individual and other people, and the individual’s 
ranking in society. In many cases status is not static, and changes depending on 
actions and general events. More specifically, the concept of status focuses on two 
different moments in the lives of former fighters: the dissolution of the previous status 
of fighters with the end of the war, and the acquisition of a new status in the 
aftermath. Another important term is “war network”, which refers to the whole 
spectrum of the social and economic relationships of the former fighters during the 
conflict. Status and network are connected with another important concept: identity. 
The identification process of the former fighters in this thesis is focused on their 
perception of how others see them – in other words, their own perception of their 
identity within society. This identity is not a heritage from the past but is transformed 
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within a different, changed environment. Status, attitudes, relationships, networks and 
other conditions that arise after the end of the war together help to transform the 
previous identity. 
1.5 Conclusion
This introductory chapter served to set the boundaries of this thesis 
historically, methodologically and in the universe of literature. First of all the research 
problems identified during the initial phase of the research led the discussion on two 
major areas of interest: the reintegration process and youth marginalisation. A critical
look at the existing research attempted to understand what other scholars have been 
writing on these topics, clustering them according to their methodologies and the 
purposes of their work. Part of the chapter was devoted to analysing the approach in 
the literature to the phenomenon of the former fighters. Most of the previous works on 
this topic are survey-based, using quantitative data as a basis for the elaboration of 
theories. It will be the principal intent of the next chapter on the theoretical 
framework to relate the specific thesis of some of these works to my research.
The second part of the chapter, regarding the series of events that led Liberia 
to the CPA that established peace in 2003, described the marginalisation and 
discrimination experienced by part of the Liberian population during their history. The 
series of conflicts followed by the ceasefire exacerbated a situation that was already at 
the limit. Understanding these events is essential in evaluating the effects on the 
personality and behaviour of the former fighters. Finally, the last part of the chapter 
explained the tools and the methodology applied in the research and the fieldwork.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical foundations of the marginalisation 
and reintegration processes
2.1 Introduction
Most of the time when there is meeting in our town and me or some of my 
friends who fight the war get up to talk our own ideas, the big community 
people and some others will not even give me the chance to talk. Sometimes 
they will say that this is no war business. When I get vexed and say 
something bad, they will say: “Ah! That the same thing we were saying, this 
man still get war business inside him”. (Paye 2009, pers. comm., 20 May)
The difficult relationship between former fighters and civilians after the war and 
summarised in Paye’s words was the starting point of the research problems identified 
in Chapter 1 (How did the relationship between civilians and ex-combatants influence 
the success or failure of the reintegration process?). After analysing the historical 
background and the relevant literature it is time to relate these research problems to 
the existing theories. However we have firstly to understand what success or failure of 
the reintegration process actually means.
We have learnt in the previous chapter to treat marginalisation and 
reintegration as two different processes at opposite ends of the scale. The analysis of 
Liberian history showed us how marginalisation and discrimination are part of the 
country’s past but took on different connotations depending on the period. While 
during earlier periods the marginalisation process was more ethnic-centred, during the 
last conflicts ethnicity lost its importance giving space to new kind orientated on 
social age. With the end of the war in 2003 the international community tried to find a 
solution to this long-lasting marginalisation process through a conflict resolution 
mechanism called the reintegration process. This instrument, part of the DDR 
programme, was directed at those who were marginalised for ethnic, religious or 
social age reasons and decided to turn to fighting. When successful those who were 
marginalised would find a place in society; in case of partial or total failure the 
marginalisation would continue, either in the same form or evolving into a different 
kind. 
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In order to analyse the result of the reintegration process in the following 
chapters, this chapter frames the major theories in the field. While the first paragraphs 
focus on marginalisation and conflict, the second part of the chapter explains the link 
between reintegration and identity.
2.2 Different theories on marginalisation and conflict in Liberia: ethnicity and 
youth 
In Chapter 1 the research referred to marginalisation as a process. A relevant 
definition states that:
Socio-economic marginality is a condition of socio-spatial structure and 
process in which components of society and space in a territorial unit are 
observed to lag behind an expected level of performance in economic, 
political and social well being compared with average condition in the 
territory as a whole. (Sommers et al., 1999: 7)
In this case marginality is seen as a dynamic concept. The central subjects of 
this process are the individuals, or rather, for the purpose of this thesis, classes of 
individuals: the social categories. The social interaction between the categories 
represents the central debate to address the research problem of how relationships 
between Liberians changed after the war. In the following paragraphs I describe the 
various social categories that have experienced marginalisation in Liberia in line with 
the characteristics of the groups and the social interaction between them.
2.2.1 Some discriminative causes of the conflict: ethnicity, 
“warlordism”/“factionalism” 
The literature notes that there are a remarkable number of theories about 
marginalisation involve the investigation of the causes of conflict with the purpose of 
understanding the actors involved in the conflict and their varying motivations for 
joining the fight. The motives for war range in the literature from ethnic and 
warlordism tensions (Badru 2010; Ballah and Abrokwaa 2003), another in terms of 
greed or grievance (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), and others as the result 
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of youth exclusion (Richards 1995; Utas 2003; Peters, Richards and Vlassenroot 
2003). This thesis takes into account the different theories presented but also 
highlights that certain studies such as that by Kieh (2009) highlight that there was not 
one single motive for war. His thesis states that “neither the ethnic, greed-grievance 
nor any single variable-based theoretical framework can provide the analytical animus 
to explain the causes of the war”, but only an integrative model.  In this manner, 
Kieh’s work attempts to explain that there cannot be any single motive for war and 
that a range of factors combine to explain the causes of an outbreak of war.  This 
underlines a key debate in the literature but it should be stated that Kieh’s work is 
perhaps the most reliable because war is rarely fought over a single factor and there 
are usually a myriad of factors involved (Collier & Sambanis, 2005). 
This viewpoint of Kieh is argued against by the literature that focuses on the 
nature of ethnicity as a key reason for warfare in Liberia.  This reflects the difference 
in opinion and theoretical perspective that has been taken on warfare depending on 
the stance of the commentator. According to Badru (2010) the rule of law in Liberia 
has been undermined for years by the rule of guns.  Ethnicity played a central but not 
exclusive role in this process of destabilisation. “Warlordism” (see Reno 1998; Harris 
1999) and “factionalism” (see Outram 1997) have also played an important role in the 
tactic of divide and rule applied at different stages and by different actors in Liberia. 
While ethnicity was a predominant element of separation during the first phase of 
state formation (Badru 2010), warlordism /factionalism took the lead in a second 
phase of the war. The pragmatic application of this strategy is seen in the segregation 
of part of the population by a ruling elite, producing mostly discrimination and 
eventually marginalisation. The historic and political application of the concepts of 
discrimination and marginalisation are linked to the notion of exclusion. According to 
Wucherpfennig et al. (2012: 84), for example, 
“ethnic exclusion is a political strategy enacted by those controlling the state. 
It aims to secure political, cultural, and economic interests by selectively 
excluding parts of the population from access to valuable political and 
economical goods on ethnic grounds.” 
Obviously this exclusion generates security and stability problems, especially because 
it implies seeking revenge from those excluded in order to exploit the lately-acquired 
power (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). An example is the active discrimination against 
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Americo-Liberians following Doe’s coup that put an end to their predominant rule of 
many years, discrimination that lasted until the 1997 elections (Ballah and Abrokwaa 
2003). 
The rebellion of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups against the political 
suppression of the Krahn group represented another clear example of retaliation. 
While the first ethnic antagonism in Liberia before 1980 was between the Americo-
Liberian and the indigenous population, after the Doe coup d’état the ethnic rift 
became one between the Krahn and the Mano and Gio. The attack on governmental 
forces by Taylor’s NFPL in 1989 that triggered the first Liberian civil war made it 
clear that it was ethnic-orientated. The 1992 Taylor attack on Monrovia started what 
Outram (1997) defines as the “second war” (note that many authors still consider this 
as part of the first war). 
The evidence suggests that, possibly from the Second War, but more 
definitely from the ‘Third War’ of 1994–5, ethnic identity gave way to 
factional affiliation as the primary cleavage in the Liberian conflicts. 
(Outram 1997: 361)
The ethnic factor that triggered the Liberian war in 1989 gradually vanished over 
time. While the earlier part of the first Liberian war was characterised by ethnic 
divergences, at the time of the elections of 1997 the war had shifted from issues of 
ethnic identity and was defined more by factional affiliation, which became the “glue” 
for the new groups (Ellis 1995: 183). According to Outram (1997) the ethnic 
dimension of the war gradually lost relevance. 
This gradual shift from ethnic to factional cleavage was a consequence of 
some direct economic interests. Liberia was an obvious example of the fact that 
sometimes ethnicity is an excuse to disguise economic interests (see Gilley 2004; 
Kingma 2001). This line of thought leads to part of Collier and Hoeffler’s thesis of 
“greed and grievance”, focusing more on greed as a motivational cause for conflict 
(Collier 2000). “The late-twentieth-century wars in Liberia were, like most wars, 
struggles for wealth, power and revenge” (Whitehead 2004: 23). The economic 
agenda represented the central focus of the ruling elite of warlords excluding the rest 
of the population. 
The abandonment of ethnicity as a reason for fighting, following the rules of 
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“warlordism”, gradually detached the combatants from the ethnic dimension and 
made them assume a factional identity. On the ground, the identification of 
individuals as friend or foe seemed to be no longer based on tests of ethnic identity. 
Instead the possession of any item linking an individual, whether voluntarily or 
otherwise, to a faction became the main means of identification: such as identity cards 
issued by the NPFL’s National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government, or a t-
shirt bearing an NPFL slogan (Outram 1997). The rise of this new 
warlordism/factionalism introduced a new kind of discrimination in Liberia: “killing 
often appears to have been aimed at murdering any conceivable supporter of opposing 
factions, including those who have merely remained in place when an opposing 
faction has taken the area” (Outram 1997: 362). The discrimination in these cases was 
mostly leading to extreme violence and murdering. 
However, ethnicity and warlordism/factionalism were not the only causes that 
lead to discriminatory behaviour and conflict. Religion and secret societies represent 
another element that played a central role as a cause of marginalisation (Ellis 1999). 
In the Liberian context, religious factors and the beliefs of the people, which are 
connected with the chieftaincies of the various indigenous communities, should not be 
underestimated. There was a degree of central political power that dominated the local 
villages without any problem of chieftaincy, but the government never controlled the 
secret societies, which played an important role in the transmission of traditional lore 
in “the bush” (Pham 2004). Ellis describes the “rituals of the initiation societies as the 
mainstays of public order in much of Liberia in pre-republican times and that 
survives, in radically altered form, throughout the twentieth century” (Ellis 1999). 
Even though Liberia was founded by Christian leaders, when it was time to rewrite 
the constitution in 1985, it was decided to recognise that Liberia was a multi-religious 
country, to leave religious differences outside state affairs, and to try to separate the 
state from the church.  Even if most Liberians are categorised as Muslim or Catholic, 
there is a strong element of supernatural beliefs. “During the fighting, members of the 
various factions often wore religious objects, such as amulets, believing that this 
could make them invulnerable to bullets” (Whitehead 2004). Secret societies or 
sodalities, known as Poro (for men) and Sande (for women), have, for at least four or 
five centuries, played an important governance role in Liberia, especially in the 
countryside, and initiate their members into adulthood around the time of puberty 
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(Ellis 2004). This socio-religious interplay is a strong feature of Liberian life, where 
ancient secret organisations and “new”, introduced religions blend in a single body, 
and where traditional practices and beliefs are used as an instrument for political 
control.  
2.2.2 Other discriminative causes of conflict: youth marginalisation
Warlordism/factionalism, with their economic implications of benefitting only 
the elite, did not provide sufficient reason to justify the will of thousands of young 
Liberians to join the factions. If ethnic marginalisation also ceased to be the central 
cause for the conflict, what was the alternative reason that moved a large number of 
Liberian to join the war? 
The work of Richards (1996) avoids explaining the Liberian conflict as a 
purely “barbarian” and “tribal” post-colonial conflict. Richards (1995: 141) excludes 
ethnicity as triggering the conflict, seeing it as “an opportunity, rather than a cause of 
rebellion in Liberia”. The author describes the conflict in terms of a modernity crisis 
for youth resulting from lack of opportunities. The marginalisation of youth is in fact 
for many scholars (Richards 1995; Utas 2003; Peters, Richards and Vlassenroot 2003; 
Munive 2010b) an essential element for understanding the reasons for the Liberian 
conflict. In general terms, “youth” refers to a social age-range of transitional years 
between childhood and adulthood, which are usually marked by certain rites of 
passage or other defining events such as gaining employment and/or raising a family. 
However, the transition from childhood to adulthood is not fixed and stable (Boyden 
2007; Christiansen, Utas and Vigh 2006; de Boeck and Honwana 2005; Munive 
2010b: 36). 
Youth is not defined by standard age but by social position since it is in some 
ways a socially constructed category.  According to Abbink (2005) this category has 
no exact demarcation in terms of age limits (see also d'Almeida-Topor 1992). For 
research purposes the age range of the category can be considered between 14 and 35 
years. Below this age range individuals are considered children and over it they can 
be considered middle-aged since they have surrendered the aspirations and ambitions 
of their youth. Within this age bracket are all the individuals who have not had proper 
education, have not obtained a job and have not accomplished their ambition of a 
family or an appropriate social position. The members of this category all share 
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feelings of exclusion and powerlessness that face the biologically younger 
individuals, delaying their entry into adulthood (Abbink 2005).
The term “youth” implies matters of “liminality and marginality” rather than 
age. Moreover, the marginalised status of the youth stimulated their participation in 
the Liberian war. The youngsters in Liberia exhibited inadequate participation in their 
communities, being under the control of the elders and leaving them with limited 
control or agency over their lives (Maclay and Özerdem 2010).  Feeling the pressure 
of this “bullying” situation, many youths saw in the war the opportunity to obtain 
some degree of emancipation and independence (Utas 2008). 
In the words of Richards (2005: 571), “the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
have been linked to the condition of urbanized youth”. The model of the war as being 
the result of urban criminal gangs has been replaced by the agrarian rebellion of rural 
youth. Whilst the socio-geographical context was different, rural youth considered 
themselves in the same way as the marginalised urban youth that Sommers (2003: 1) 
defines as “a demographic majority that sees itself as an outcast minority”. This hectic 
situation was at the edge and the conflict in Liberia was a consequence of the failure 
to address the agrarian tension of the post-colonial era, mainly damaging 
intergenerational cohesion (Richards 2005). Youngsters’ perception of the local 
systems was chiefly one of exploitation, providing fertile ground for the rebels to 
plant insurgencies.  According to Richards (2005) then, the exclusion of youth from 
land tenure in the rural areas was one of the characteristics of youth marginalisation. 
The failing patrimonial state in Liberia was a replication of the situation in Sierra 
Leone, which could not cope with the needs of the youngsters who rapidly perceived 
the conflicts between state and rebels as an alternative solution for their “future” 
(Richards 1996).
Sharing some of these ideas Utas (2003: 15) says that:
young people also saw it [the war] as a youth revolution, a possibility to get 
rid of an elitist urban leadership made up of autocrats who showed little 
concern for both the young people of Liberia, and the local gerontocratic 
leadership. In this way, war was fought by marginalised youth who saw 
hostilities as possibly the only opportunity for them to experience mobility 
from the margins, into the centre of politics and [the] economy.
The author’s image of the war was as a reaction by the youth to the lack of 
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opportunities that permitted them to take possession of their own agency by taking up 
weapons. This prospect was enough for the young people of Liberia to push them to 
join the factions in order to seek upward mobility on the social ladder. 
The “deficient inter-generational mobility” that Vigh (2006: 105) seems to 
find common in Western African societies is the dilemma that many youth face in 
Liberia and similar countries. The unfeasibility of the “social becoming” represents 
the root of the youth crisis in Liberia. To describe social becoming, Vigh (2006) 
introduces the concept of “navigation”, as the choices taken in order to increase their 
life prospects. This notion implies a movement towards a better social and economic 
position as construction and realisation of the social being.  Vigh (2006) describes 
this movement as the connection between agency and social forces. Richards and 
Peters (1998) also give special attention to agency, using the “voice” of the former 
fighters as a tool to illustrate the experiences of war. The subjectivity of the 
description of the events allows a clear understanding, with no intermediaries, of the 
opinions of the young ex-combatants. My thesis uses the same methodology, leaving 
to the “voice” of the ex-combatants the opportunity to describe their own impression 
of the actual situation.
Accepting that youth dissatisfaction is among the main causes of the conflict 
in Liberia, there are according to Peters and Richards (1998) two reactions to this. 
One is to categorise the young soldiers with poorly educated background as “bandits” 
or “vermin”.  The opposite reaction is to see them as “victims”.  In this perspective 
many scholars consider the youth background as the main variable for this 
categorisation. The low educational level of young rural combatants often worked as 
a discriminative characteristic to label the young fighters as “barbarians”. Analysing 
the background of ex-combatants in several war environments, Collier (2000) 
suggests that there is more chance of a conflict in the presence of poorly educated 
youth than in ethnic tensions and repressive regimes. 
Interesting research on the importance of the soldiers’ background was also 
carried out by Geoff Harris (1999). This work relates personal skills to criminality 
and rehabilitation, and explains how detachment from community and the absence of 
skills (developed before joining the armies) leads to a failure in reintegration. Harris 
presents in his work a survey conducted among soldiers in Uganda and Ethiopia 
before demobilisation and complements it with some sociological investigation. The 
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work stresses how one-third of them had no education and the majority had not been 
economically self-sufficient before their recruitment. 
Many researchers in Liberia also support the thesis that there is a relationship 
between poor education, unemployment and the reason for joining the conflict. Indeed 
the majority of youth seeking education and employment, in a context like Sierra 
Leone, faced problems due to the political and economic situation in the country 
(McIntyre and Thusi 2003). The options were not many and choices were made with 
full awareness. Voicing very different opinions to other scholars, Richards (1996) 
notes that young people were not acting as loose molecules, as in Kaplan’s (1994) 
theory, but in many cases chose to fight of their own free will. This is because 
weapon training pays quicker dividends than school ever did; soon the AK47 brings 
food, money, a warm bath and instant adult respect (Peters and Richards 1998: 187). 
Richards disagrees with Kaplan’s vision of the conflict as a consequence of the social 
atavism, youth delinquency and environmental depletion (Rashid 2004: 66), giving a 
new interpretation of the Mano river battles. The youths taking part in the conflicts in 
western Africa were more than just uprooted illiterate adolescents. Richards claims 
that there were also a core group of unsatisfied intellectuals (Richards 1996). Richards 
therefore positions himself in contrast to the prevalent vision in the literature of a 
major group of academics leaded by Abdullah who embraced the idea of lumpen 
youth. The only common ground between both visions was the belief that conflicts 
gained strength through groups of marginal and discontented youth (Keen 2005). For 
Abdullah the war was mainly fuelled by marginal youngsters but for Richards the 
reason for conflict could be associated with youths from any background who were 
excluded from land tenure. The motivation for conflict triggered by a broad feeling of 
discontentment among the youths described by Richards clashes with the general idea 
that just small groups of war prone youngsters started the fighting (for example see 
Bangura 1997). This different point of view was also the major arguments in the 
literature between Richards and Abdullah over the lumpen debate. According to 
Abdullah (2008), in describing lumpen youth, there are many reasons for involvement 
in conflict but a greater number of youngsters involved in violence are the poor and 
uneducated who seem to have less to lose from involvement in violence than their 
counterparts. This rejects outright the claim of Richards that individuals choose to 
fight of their own free will and highlights that a number of factors are inherent in the 
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involvement of youth in warfare. The outcomes of the two scholars are very different 
because they start from two different assumptions. According to Abdullah (1997,
Abdullah & Muana 1998) most of the youths were seen as urban drops-out. On the 
other side Richards describes the young participants in the conflicts as fairly educated 
inhabitants of the rural areas with the aim to start an agrarian revolution (Richards 
1996, Richards et al. 2003). When Abdullah et al. (1997) divide the three groups of 
lumpen youth; he defines those from the villages and the mining areas as drop-outs 
and as being socially disconnected. Their lack of sense of identity with their families 
and communities gave them the perfect alibi for taking part in the conflicts. This is an 
important concept and it should be acknowledged that the debate of the overall 
literature tends to side towards Abdullah’s argument, particularly in terms of the view 
that it is the uneducated that become involved in violence and that their so-called 
choice is not necessarily so (Kieh, 2008). Taking these opposing views into 
consideration this thesis bases its starting points on commonalities from both. Both 
scholars, despite many differences, use the marginalisation of the youth as a point of 
origin for their work. In Liberia this seems to be a vicious circle as the youths 
involved in the war had previously experienced exclusion economically, politically or 
socially and so saw the war as a possible way out. However, after the war they 
experienced further exclusion, with the added dimension of also being excluded from 
the communities. This debate clearly indicates the differences held by scholars in this 
study and through the analysis of the marginalisation of individual former fighters in 
Liberia using the qualitative methodology proposed, it is important to discover whose 
work can be supported by the findings and those that can be rejected.  Abdullah and 
Richards’ ongoing debate is one example of this division over forms of 
marginalisation but the findings tend to support the beliefs of Abdullah, as noted in 
this discussion. 
McLean Hilker and Fraser (2009: 25) discuss how youths may be more 
susceptible to violence because of “their stage of biological, social and psychological 
development” as well as the fact that “lack of opportunities faced by young people 
effectively block or prolong their transition to adulthood and can lead to frustration, 
disillusionment and, in some cases, their engagement in violence”. However, the 
youths involved in the war suffered the added disadvantage of an often violent 
background due to that involvement. This legacy of violence naturally hampers the 
requirements of different communities for inclusion after the war. Although much of 
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the literature supports the notion of inequality or exclusion linked with violence, 
Richards (1996: 34) suggests that the youth in Sierra Leone were expressing a “youth 
crisis” and “reacted to exclusionary neo-patrimonial practices”. It is true that social 
exclusion can create an atmosphere that facilitates violence, but there is also evidence 
that many youths who experience exclusion are not linked to violence. According to 
Abbink (2005) there is an enormous number of unemployed and poor educated youth 
who choose not to join the factions. In fact the author says:
By their sheer numbers, their availability, and their eagerness to take up 
anything that may relieve them of conditions of poverty, idleness or ennui, 
youth are easily recruited by political parties, armed groups or criminal 
networks. … Here the perception that they are all engaged in socially 
undesirable or criminal activities, or are unemployable (youth as lumpen, as 
a lost generation, etc.) is erroneous. (Abbink 2005: 3)
To support this theory, Bøas and Hatløy (2008: 41) highlight some statistics 
about young people in Liberia joining the factions and regarding alternative coping 
strategies. We see that only 11% of the interviewees responded that they had no 
business or nothing to do before the war started; of all those interviewed, 60% said 
they had enrolled in formal education and another 25% reported having been involved 
in some kind of business. 
Statistical analysis by Bøas and Hatløy (2008: 42) brought to light substantial 
differences in living conditions before and after the war. Before the conflict began, 
64% of those interviewed were living with parents and 12% with close relatives. 
Another interesting finding was that 76% of former fighters were living with parents 
or close relatives before the conflict (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 42). This number is 
significant as it indicates that most of the youth had a structured family background 
before becoming involved in the conflict, refuting Abdullah’s theory on “lumpen” and 
uprooted youth. If we analyse the statistics related to employment, we see that before 
the war 11% were unemployed while after the war the rate of unemployment grew to 
44% (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 49). These findings do not give a clear explanation of 
the situation as there are many influencing factors on employment. It is possible to 
attribute the increase in the percentage of those unemployed to external economic 
conditions and the post-conflict economic situation of the country in general.
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2.3 Theories on the reintegration process
Like marginalisation, reintegration must also be considered here as a process. In 
the case of Liberia, because of the post-conflict reconstruction, part of this process is 
characterised by the DDR. Subsequently the subjects involved are divided into only 
two categories: ex-combatants and civilians – recalling the initial inspiration for the 
research problem, the observation of the relationship between the two categories. 
The series of events in the changing and unstable context of Liberia since 
1989 deeply changed the nature of Liberian society. The alternation of peace and war 
regularly affected the Liberian population in terms of relationships, behaviour, 
personality and role in society. In order to analyse these factors I decided to take into 
consideration the transformation of three variables: status, networks and identity, 
which I called together the “web of connections”. 
While analysis of the changes to the status and networks of ex-combatants can 
be carried out without particular assumptions, more attention must be paid to the 
examination of identity transformation. It is necessary in fact to assess some existing 
theories in the field. There are many theories that define the concept of identity. This 
work develops one of the theories that define identity not as a natural given, 
characterised by fixed, supposedly objective criteria, but as a process of choices that 
lead to certain characteristics. This approach to identity as a dynamic (Hall 1992) 
gives this work the fluidity needed in order to analyse an ever-changing social 
experience, such as that of the Liberian former fighters. 
The concept of “identity” is a volatile notion and it is impossible to define it 
empirically. Identity is not “just there”; it must always be established (Jenkins 1996) 
and it is in continuous transformation. The use of identity theories as tools for 
decrypting the reintegration process is essential to understanding the categorisation of 
Liberian society and the reasons for the marginalisation of certain categories.
Regarding the division of Liberians into categories, the state of transition that 
characterised Liberian society, caused by these changing events, made the clear 
identification into one category or the other very difficult. In the case of the former 
fighters, those who were once soldiers may have been civilians at one stage in their 
lives, and vice versa. From my experience on the ground, I understood how difficult it 
is to draw the boundary between the categories of victim and perpetrator. During 
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disarmament and demobilisation, for example, the only method of categorising the 
soldiers was based on the possession or non-possession of a weapon. If someone 
owned or was in possession of arms during the disarmament process, he would 
automatically be included in the class of former fighter and benefit from this status. 
However, in a number of cases, the same individuals had been tortured, kidnapped 
and forced to fight, and may also have been forced to find shelter in a neighbouring 
country. To solve this categorisation problem, this thesis uses the qualitative 
methodology to analyse individuals from the point of view of how they perceive 
themselves – that is, their self-identification. The following paragraphs consider the 
most relevant theories on the reintegration process in Liberia and its connection with 
identity.  Through this method, the study aims to assess how far certain psycho-social 
factors impact on the marginalisation of former soldiers, attempting to evaluate their 
claims within the context of the wider literature and provide conclusive evidence (if 
possible) to support certain claims made by scholars on the subject. 
2.3.1 The former fighters’ “web of connections”
It is clear at this stage that central to this thesis is the relationship between the 
categories of civilians and ex-combatants. We have seen in the paragraph above how 
many scholars found it difficult to divide these two categories due to the inability of 
some individuals to prove their status of fighters, or because of the decision of some 
others not to enrol in the DDR programmes, or even the struggle to separate victims 
from perpetrators. Consequently there is an objective complexity in evaluating their 
relationships. 
To facilitate this task I decided to take into consideration three essential 
variables: status, networks and identity. Together these three form what I identify as 
the web of connections of the former fighters. Their association permits the analysis 
of the relationship between the category of ex-combatants and the rest of the 
population. Analysing the “status” of the members of the category of ex-combatants 
allows evaluation of their social position with respect to the category of civilians. In 
the hierarchical ladder of a society this category can be above or below the other.  The 
problematic status of the former fighters has often hindered the reintegration process 
producing in some cases marginalisation. In fact, 
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“…to a certain extent, marginalisation is a shifting phenomenon, linked to 
social status. So, for example, individuals or groups might enjoy high social 
status at one point in time, but as social change takes place, so they lose this 
status and become marginalised. Similarly, as life cycle stages change, so 
might people’s marginalised position. (Kagan and Burton 2010: 314) 
Analysing the “networks” around members of the category of former fighters allows 
the extent of their interaction with civilians to be measured. In some cases the former 
fighters gathered together after the war, creating new networks. The networks 
produced by this process are mostly the result of exclusion and therefore reflect the 
failure of the reintegration process.
The analysis of the concepts of status and networks does not require the 
review of many theories, and empirical observation of the phenomenon is sufficient. 
On the other hand, a theoretical background must be built around the concept of 
identity. Assessing “identity” among the category of former fighters serves to 
calculate either the intensity of the bonds of the ex-combatants with their peers or the 
limits of their recognition as civilians. Most of the works focusing on conflict in 
Africa and particularly in Liberia focus on analysing groups based on identity issues 
such as social age or ethnicity. 
According to several authors (Young 2002; Clough 1992; Adebayo 1998), 
African society found itself in a state of crisis and disorder at the end of the Cold War. 
1989 marked the start of a gradual reduction of interest in African affairs by the 
superpowers as well as the rest of the international community, and the African 
countries’ international strategic role was diminished (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000). 
Furthermore, that year coincided with the collapse of state institutions in countries 
such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Congo (DRC). Fierce competition over scarce 
natural resources (e.g. diamonds in Sierra Leone) led to conflict and warfare between 
different ethnic groups or militias, which caused instability both within each country 
and in neighbouring countries as well. Since 1989, the majority of conflicts in Africa 
have been domestic (Richards 2005), a fact that has raised the level of difficulty of 
coping with and resolving such disputes, as they have proved to be more intense, 
more violent and more complicated than inter-state conflicts. Analysing these intra-
state conflicts, we can deduce the implied strength of certain collective identities such 
as religion, ethnicity or age. The nature of most of the conflicts involves identity 
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clashes and in-group/out-group discrimination. It seems that in general African 
conflicts are more often mobilised along lines of “identity” than of social class. This 
is because religious, ethnic and social age identities are used by warring factions and 
social movements to fuel the conflicts, based on shared beliefs, values and 
perceptions. 
Crawford Young (2002) discusses the role of collective identity, whether 
ethnic, racial or religious, and if it can help to restore order in Africa. Even though 
religion, race or ethnicity may not be the main contributors to conflict, it is not 
unusual to see war and violence in areas where multiple differences prevail within a 
social context and where there is an underlying clash of cultures, beliefs or values (for 
a more detailed discussion, see Deng 1995). If we develop our understanding of 
African history and state conflict and of the patterns of rationality in violence that 
appears to be simply atavistic, we may come closer to resolving conflicts and 
understanding the causal mechanisms of violence. 
Taking this into consideration and analysing it from the point of view of my 
work, it is not just typical collective identities such as those of religion, race, age or 
ethnicity that can be used to help resolve hostilities or prevent new ones. Some new 
collective identities established after the end of conflict, such as those of former 
fighters or refugees, can also contribute to the restoration of order. According to Coy 
and Woehrle (2000) it is possible to solve identity-based conflicts by constructing 
inclusive identities and establishing a mechanism of identity transformation through a 
positive identity shift. Furthermore, unresolved issues lingering in these new groups 
can also lead to the outbreak of new hostilities and violence and this needs to be 
addressed in a similar way.
When analysing antagonist collective identities it is also relevant to address 
cultural pluralism. In Africa, according to Young (2002), the presence of conflict is 
related more to the general discontent of people in a troubled state and the resources 
available for conflict to thrive in these conditions, than to multiple cultures. The idea 
that the presence of multiple groups can lead to conflict because of in-group/out-
group discrimination is wrong. Cultural pluralism in itself has nothing to do with 
conflict, since countries where conflict does not exist are often as diverse as those 
where conflict is prevalent. Liberia represents an example of this:
The Liberian civil war of 1989 to 1990 was characterized by brutal, ethnic 
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conflict. However, the subsequent civil wars of 1992 to 1993 and 1994 to 
1996 were defined by factional affiliation that was increasingly independent 
of ethnic identity. (Young 2008: abstract)
Also, while the Liberian war cannot be attributed to the clash of opposing ethnic 
identities, identity can still be considered as a strong component in the hostilities. 
Bøas and Hatløy (2008) propose viewing the Liberian fighting as “first and foremost a 
‘war’ about identity; over the question of what it means to be a Liberian, and how the 
polity of the country should be constituted and resources distributed” (Bøas and 
Hatløy 2008: 45). This follows and develops the idea formulated in Bøas’ 2005 study. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, their study is based on a model survey and analyses the 
war itself, so is quite unlike my thesis, but it does introduce the concept of identity in 
Liberia and how it affected the stability of the country. My work differs from this 
since is not particularly concerned with the Liberian conflict itself, but analyses the 
transformation that occurred among the former fighters after the end of it. 
Nevertheless, this work has been useful in my research as a point of departure for 
analysing the reintegration process as part of a path in the transformation of identity.
According to the two researchers, their approach to the Liberian conflict 
differed from that of other academics, being primarily identity-related (and thus 
similar to my approach). They do, however, stress that there are many different ways 
to analyse the relation of identity to the Liberian civil war (Bøas and Hatløy 2008), 
including Utas’ (2003) youth perspective; the religious dimension and the role of the 
secret societies as elites (Ellis 1999), and Kaldor’s (2001) view of the Liberian 
conflict as a primary example of a new kind of war. 
While Bøas and Hatløy (2008) relate identity to the war, and suggest how this 
issue should be examined and used as a useful tool for the purpose of reconstruction, 
my study is aimed instead at researching how the end of the war affected the former 
fighters’ identity transformation, resulting in their inclusion or exclusion. Bøas and 
Hatløy assert that “the task for the various stakeholders currently involved in Liberia 
is not simply putting Liberia back together again, but, for the first time, constructing a 
state and a polity” (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 37). This leads to a major concept – that it 
is imperative for the DDR programme to focus more on social cohesion and security 
rather than on simple skills transmission. This mirrors the challenge facing individual 
former fighters as they attempt to re-order their lives after the war.
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On the same lines, Hazen (2007) discusses the social disintegration and 
integration process during and after war, introducing the idea that war not only 
fragments the social community but also integrates various members of the 
community into a new social fabric. Hazen defines social, economic and political 
disintegration as “the breaking of community bonds between individuals and the 
disassociation of the individual from community beliefs, norms, laws, structures and 
goals” (Hazen 2007: 2).
According to Hazen, if society in general has disintegrated and the previous 
social norms have changed as a result of war, the reintegration process involves trying 
to include the former fighters in a society that is itself in a state of recovery. However, 
to fully comprehend this reintegration process, it is essential to understand the whole 
development of the society from the beginning. It is in fact necessary to analyse, since 
the start of the conflict, the process of “integration into the war family, disintegration 
of the war family, and reintegration into society” (Hazen 2007: 5). To fully reintegrate 
the soldiers, it is necessary to identify patterns of disintegration and integration during 
the war. It is important to ensure, when reconstructing society, that the conditions that 
led to the war are not rebuilt. 
Chapter 2 reconstructs the process of debonding the former fighters from their 
previous networks and society, and the consequent state of confusion. It is then 
necessary to understand the identity with which the former fighters associate, or 
which they are “labelled with”, in the transition from war to peace. This means 
dealing with more than the simple reintegration of the former fighters; it requires an 
effort to reconstruct the social bonds of the entire society. Hazen refers to social 
integration and reconstruction of these bonds not only in positive ways but also as 
involving the risk of creating “competing group identities” (Hazen 2007: 1). She 
defines, in fact, a clear division between combatants and non-combatants, as two 
different and opposite groups. From this division arise alienation, stigmatisation, 
polarity and marginalisation of the combatant; in this way, the “us versus them” 
mentality develops. In my work, this clear division between the two groups and the 
mentality of “us versus them” is more centralised around the concept of identity 
transformation and its outcomes.
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2.3.2 Inter-group behaviour
The paragraphs above give a clear idea of how identity is central to the debate on 
conflict. However I chose identity as one of the three variables to understand the 
developing relationships between the categories of ex-combatants and civilians. How 
does identity fit in the discourse? 
The link between identity and categories is very close. I mention above that 
identity in the web of connections is the measure for calculating either the intensity of 
the bonds of the ex-combatants with their peers or the limits to their recognition as 
civilians. We now need a tool that enables us to quantify the strength of the ties that 
link ex-combatants between them and separates them from the civilians. This tool is 
the Social Identity Theory (SIT) originally formulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979; 
1986). SIT approaches the concept of identity from the point of view of inter-group 
behaviour and has frequently been used to explain concepts such as group, category, 
self-identification and discrimination. It is an excellent instrument for recognising the 
group identity of former fighters as a reason for their exclusion from social life, which 
is an essential part of the marginalisation process. 
From the SIT point of view the former fighters are seen in this thesis as 
members of a group. They are not categorised by economic, cultural or educational 
factors but by the self-categorisation of group members. The identification of the 
former fighters with a particular group occurs through the process of collective self-
identification that derives from similar behaviour or circumstances (Jenkins 1996: 
103). More recently, sociologists have been exploring not how the “self” is identified 
through interpersonal relations but how it can help identify “the other”. This idea is 
part of the social identity discourse elaborated by several authors (Tajfel and Turner 
1979; Turner et al. 1987) to express how the similar characteristics of “the selves” 
shared by individuals are used to characterise a group.  SIT mostly focuses on the 
distinguishing features associated with this group membership (Tajfel 1981; Turner 
1982). Social identity is “that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from 
his knowledge of his membership of a group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to the membership” (Tajfel 1981: 255). This approach 
explains some of the dynamics and mechanisms of interaction between the members 
of the group as well as their interaction with members of other groups. In other words, 
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this assumption helps to understand the categorisation as members of the group of 
fighters during and after the war. 
This theory was originally designed for analysing inter-group behaviour and 
especially inter-group discrimination. This part of the theory also helps to explain the 
gap between citizens and former fighters. A further development in this theory asserts 
that the perceived group membership leads to self-categorisation. Hogg and Williams 
(2000: 83) say that “the categorization of stimuli produces a perceptual accentuation 
effect in which intra-category similarities among stimuli and inter-category difference 
among stimuli are accentuated on dimensions believed to be correlated with the 
categorization”. As stated above, this categorisation is not only derived from the role 
played during the war by certain individuals but also from others’ perception of the 
individual himself. If others identify an individual with a particular group, this 
automatically legitimises the collective self of that person. The identification of the 
individual by the community as a former fighter legitimises the person to self-
categorise himself into that group. Self-categorisation as a soldier during the war and 
as a former fighter after the end of the conflict is an expression of the collective self. 
For instance, this classification derives from the concept of in-group/out-group as 
differences between the groups. 
Taking into consideration the process of self-categorisation into groups in SIT 
is in fact the best way to analyse the differentiation between the former fighters and 
civilians, and even more the mechanism of inclusion or exclusion by the community. 
During the self-categorisation process, individuals compare themselves to others, and 
those who are perceived as similar are considered the in-group, while those who are 
seen as different are seen as the out-group (Leary and Tangney 2003: 145). Self-
identification with a group is recognition of oneself as a member of the group and it 
affects personal identity (Turner et al. 1987). This process of identification is applied 
in this thesis to see how the former fighters define themselves in terms of 
commonalities with others associating themselves with a group. It is through the 
process of self-categorisation that the development of the identity formation (Stets 
and Burke 2000: 224) or transformation occurs. 
SIT helps to understand the exclusion of the ex-combatants from society and 
the in-group/out-group mechanism through self-categorisation. Generally the support 
is shared between the in-group members rather than out-group members. “According 
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to social identity theory, when individuals take on a group-based identity, there is 
uniformity of perception and action among group members (Haslam, et al. 1996; 
Oakes, Haslam and Turner 1994)” (Leary and Tangney 2003: 145).
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a navigation through the relevant theories that frame my work. 
All the assumptions and problems to be addressed by my research revolve around the 
relationships between the categories of ex-combatants and civilians. The first 
impression during my fieldwork was of a “controversial” rapport between these two 
categories that in some cases recalled the spectre of marginalisation. I decided then to 
review some of the major ideas on marginalisation in Liberia linked to particular 
categories. Once I detected that marginalisation was among the causes of the conflict 
in Liberia I looked at the mechanism of the international community to unravel the 
source of this hostility: the reintegration process. A reintegration process can have two 
possible results: success or failure. A successful reintegration brings an end to the 
marginalisation of those who took up weapons and started the conflict in the first 
place. To measure this result I decided to take into consideration three variables linked 
to the ex-combatants, called the web of connections. Between these variables identity 
required a particular level of attention, with a review of some of the theories in the 
field. In particular I found, in the in-group/out-group mechanism, the tool to measure 
the intensity of the identification of the former fighters between peers.
Before moving to the next chapter and starting to analyse the data collected 
during the fieldwork, there are two more points to address. First of all I need to 
explain further the connection between the category of youth and that of the ex-
combatants. Secondly I have to identify the theoretical question of the research.
2.4.1 Youth marginalisation theories as a theoretical framework of the thesis: 
from youth to fighters 
In recent years the topic of youth marginalisation from political and social roles in 
Africa has been extensively approached from many angles by several scholars. 
According to de Boeck and Honwana (2005), even if often “out of place” and with a 
lack of self-realisation, youth have managed to create identities and to be noticed – as 
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seen in their participation in conflicts in many African states. In the paragraph above 
we have seen how the marginalisation of youngsters has been the triggering point for 
violent conflicts. This work assumes those theses as the relevant basis representing 
the starting point for my research. Refusing to accept ethnicity and 
warlordism/factionalism as main causes for the conflict, we have seen how the strong 
marginalisation of the youth has without doubt been one of the main reasons for the 
war in Liberia. But what happened to the marginalisation of the youngsters after the 
end of the war? Did the marginalisation end, or was it accentuated after the 
reintegration process? What is the relationship between the category of “youth” and 
the ex-combatants? While I will address the first two questions in the following 
chapters, we need now to rationalise the last question.
First of all, youth must be considered as a social category. While recently 
formed, the category of youth possesses 
…its multiple subcultures expressed in terms of dress, music, specific modes 
of violence, and the emergence of a new co-operative units such as gangs and 
‘ecuries’ which have replaced more traditional kind-based ethnic and 
multigenerational associations. (de Boeck and Honwana 2005: 6) 
What happened to this category with the outbreak of hostilities? In accordance 
with the theories that portray the youngsters’ marginalisation as the cause of the 
conflict, the outbreak of the war transformed them from youth to fighters. From this 
moment on the category of “former youth” will be identified in the research as 
“fighters”. The next chapter will fill the gap about the transformation from “former 
youth” (the fighters) to ex-combatants.
2.4.2 Theoretical question
After assembling all the pieces of the puzzle in the first two chapters, we are 
ready to review the research problem formulated in Chapter 1 (How did the 
relationship between civilians and ex-combatants influence the success or failure of 
the reintegration process?).  We have now all the missing information about history, 
methodology and theoretical framework. If we consider the relationship between 
civilians and ex-combatants as the starting point of this research, the central part of 
the debate is obviously the complete success of the reintegration process to end the 
marginalisation process. From the analysis of history it is clear that discrimination and 
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marginalisation are part of the Liberian environment. While we agreed that 
marginalisation based on social age represented the causes of the conflict, how did it 
evolve after the call for peace? Therefore, what happened to the group of armed 
mobilised youth after the war? At first glance it looked like they became ex-
combatants, but did they influence the change? Through personal observation I 
noticed that some of the former fighters were being treated with inequity after the end 
of the war, generating a feeling of discrimination. I also started to recognise behaviour 
typical of marginalisation. In addition, if marginalisation appeared to be common for 
various vulnerable groups (internally displaced, refugees, women, etc.), it appeared 
that it was accentuated for ex-combatants. Was not the aim of the reintegration 
process to reinsert the former fighters into the community?  Accordingly, in 
developing the research problem a theoretical question arises: Can the failure of 
reintegration of ex-combatants generate a further step in the evolution of the 
marginalisation process already present in Liberia? It is the purpose of this thesis to 
address this question in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3: Disarmament and demobilisation – triggering 
the transformation of the former fighters’ web of 
connections
3.1 Introduction
During the Disarmament and Demobilisation I changed my name. My real 
name is Michael K. N. Dan.  Dan is my father’s name, Michael is my first 
name, K is my middle name and N is also my middle name. Kadafi [he 
introduced himself as Kadafi] is my fighting name, that’s the name I have on 
my ex-comb. ID card. Everybody knows me as Kadafi. One thing 
international community has known is that ex-comb. are not someone who 
are born to become ex-comb. They were not born to become a bad person and 
it’s all because of disadvantages in this country caused them to join the army 
and the rebel. But after the war now we need to learn. As for me, I am very 
good in school, I have my certificate, I want to do medical science, after that I 
want to become a lawyer. I want to go to a good institution, whether here or 
abroad and get my certificate. (Kadafi 2005, pers. comm., 27 November)
Kadafi is a 29-year-old former fighter from Grand Kru who fought with the 
government troops. He joined the army after the rebels killed his family, and soon 
after went to fight in Nimba County against the “rebels”. Kadafi was one of my most 
reliable informants, who contributed much of the information collected during my 
visits to Liberia. In this passage he expresses how former fighters had once been 
normal people who passed through a transition phase, after which they wished to 
return to their normal lives. This began with the Disarmament and Demobilisation 
process (DD), and happened simultaneously with the changes in Liberian society. The 
transformation of the wartime Liberian society to a state of peace involved a complete 
change of an individual’s personality, behaviour and relationships. 
This chapter describes in detail the elements that constitute this social 
transformation of Liberian citizens and specifically of former fighters after the end of 
the conflict.  In particular this chapter monitors the transformation of the three 
variables forming the web of connections: status, networks and identity. The first 
significant post-conflict event that brought notable change to the situation in Liberia 
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was the establishment of UNMIL in October 2003. The component of the 
peacekeeping operation dealing directly with former fighters was the DDR 
programme. The DD phase was the first external intervention in Liberia that to affect 
the lives of former fighters.
As stated in Chapter 1, the DD programme commenced in December 2003, 
following the August 2003 declaration of the CPA, contributing to the speedy 
implementation of DDR. This phase started badly due to insufficient protection of the 
lone cantonment location, where disarmament had not been completed, and to the 
rushed organisation of the process, which failed to take fully into account the actual 
situation on the ground. In addition, the DDR lacked the approval of a number of the 
primary partners, while poor communications meant that former fighters were not 
sure what to expect from the disarmament process. Immediately after hostile 
outbreaks that led to fatalities in the cantonment and beyond, this first period of the 
DD was halted. It did not operate fully again until April 2004, following the 
restoration of security (Jennings 2008) and the construction of adequate cantonments. 
By the conclusion of the DD segments, around 103,000 participants had been 
catalogued as neutralised, as opposed to the estimated numbers of 38,000–45,000 
former fighters (UNDP 2006). However, only about 27,800 weapons and six million 
rounds of ammunition were stockpiled. Furthermore, the haste of the operation 
illustrates how quick and abrupt this process was, generating unexpected reactions 
from the former fighters and causing much internal and external confusion.
3.2 Internal and external factors triggering the identity transformation process
The establishment of the DD phase signalled the beginning of a period of 
transition for Liberian society that was supposed to lead the country from war to a 
peaceful environment. But such a transition implies a variety of changes and
transformations, not only at a political, societal and organisational level but also on a 
personal level. DDR is a process that entails not only social and material but also 
psychological elements (Motumi and McKenzie 1998: 183). The first people to be 
affected by the changes that came about with the DD were the former fighters. The 
following is a description of how the DD process affected the role of those who had 
taken part in the war, taking them from the status of “fighter” to that of “former 
fighter”. The implementation of the peacekeeping operation generated in former 
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fighters a series of psycho-social transformations that affected the whole sphere of 
their web of connections.
3.2.1 The meaning of the status of “fighter” and the support of war networks 
during the conflict
A step back in time is needed to outline the meaning of being a fighter in Liberia 
during the war. Joining the factions at a certain point of the conflict meant the 
difference between life and death. A need for a better position in society was the main 
reason for youth joining the conflict (relevant background is cited in Chapter 2). From 
an analysis of my interviews, it is clear that this new position would include access to 
food, shelter, clothing and, more importantly, a supportive network – a new family or 
community that could look after people and give them status.
Status, in general, indicates a combination of measurable factors that relate an 
individual to others. It is the fusion of social and economic factors that determine the 
rank the subject holds in society. The higher the position in the social order, the more 
privileges and opportunities the holder has. To determine the status of a person in 
modern society, three variables must be considered: income, education and 
occupation (Lindemann 2007). During the 14 years of civil war in Liberia, it was 
impossible to consider these variables to determine someone’s status. The variables 
became important only after the end of the conflict; during the conflict the main 
attributes determining status were the degree of power a person exercised and the 
level of security they had access to. Both attributes could be found in the role of 
fighter.
The first variable that conferred strong status during the war was the power a 
person exercised. The relationship between status and power was fundamental to the 
hierarchy of wartime society. Power legitimated status and vice versa, “giving high 
status and high power an effect on private acceptance of justifications that power 
lacked without status” (Massey, Freeman and Zelditch 1997: 238). This was also the 
case in Liberia. Utas (2003: 53), in discussing status, defines the participation of 
Liberian youth in the civil war as a move towards power and influence, while the 
peace that began with the first demobilisation in 1997 led to an immediate loss of 
influence. Indeed, some of the youths used the role of being a soldier as a way to gain 
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importance in society. Wartime societies allowed young men to become strong figures 
in society through military bravery and success (Utas 2003: 115). This analysis 
emphasises how the only way to gain a strong position in wartime society was to play 
a direct part in the fighting. 
In many cases, power that involved authority represented the possibility to 
force someone to do something he or she would not otherwise do, even if this 
potential power was not applied. For many of the soldiers, power symbolised control 
over the life or death of the non-combatant. “Perceptions of power and expectations 
of its use can be functional equivalents of actual use” (Massey, Freeman and Zelditch 
1997: 246). In line with this argument, I assume that, during the war, the legitimacy of 
power depended on the status of the fighters and, at the same time, that status tended 
to legitimate power.
One of the ways to exercise power over others was the use of fear. Instilling 
fear and demonstrating power were instruments for maintaining control and gave the 
combatants an important position in wartime society. In other words, the maintenance 
of fear as a coercive tool was the source of the power.
“When we capture you we will slaughter you, make gate with you so people 
can be afraid” (Patrick 2009, pers. comm., 3 August). (The term “make gate” is 
explained below.) Patrick, aged 30 and from Monrovia, was a member of the 
government forces and in 2001 was sent to Lofa to fight the rebels coming from 
Guinea and Sierra Leone. He disclosed during the interview that throughout the 
fighting one of the essential factors for survival was the demonstration of power
through instilling fear. It was common in Liberia during the war to establish 
checkpoints in order to control the movement of people and goods from one place to 
another. Many factions were controlling different areas of the country and, to keep 
control of the people going into or out of the area, there was a need for checkpoints, 
which were nicknamed “gates”. The fighters sometimes displayed on the “gates” the 
body parts or dead bodies of people who had been brutally tortured, mainly to 
increase fear and show that the soldiers’ power over life and death was the only law at 
that time. In his interview Patrick said: “We take off their heads, their hearts, if your 
fellow rebel comes and see you, they’ll be scared because they know how we do 
when we catch you” (Patrick 2009, pers. comm., Monrovia 3 August).
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Power is essential for status in any environment, whether peaceful or wartime. 
The difference arises in where it has its source and the way it is exercised. In the case 
of Liberia, the power of the fighters was what French and Raven (1959) define as 
coercive power. This kind of power is based on the fear of having something 
withheld, which assures the submission of others. That “something” in Liberia was 
freedom or, in extreme cases, life. This kind of power left resentment and resistance 
as a legacy for the future, and affected the fighters during their reintegration.
The second attribute that determined status during the Liberian war was access 
to security. As Bøas and Hatløy (2008) argue, a need for security was the main reason 
for joining the forces. According to my research, security is not just a matter of 
personal or communal safety but also of access to basic goods for survival. 
Before the first war I was in the village, I was in school when the rebels 
entered the town and grabbed my brother and they told him to push their car. 
As he was struggling to push the car they killed him. After that they came to 
my people and now my mother is not alive nor my father. After that they 
came after my people, running behind us, and I decided to join the common 
forces [government troops]. (Kadafi 2005, pers. comm., 27 November)
Kadafi fought in the northern part of Liberia for most of the conflict. His words evoke 
the unstable and unpredictable security situation during the war. Bøas and Hatløy 
(2008: 45), in their survey, found that 82% of people began fighting in order to 
provide for their own, their families’ and their community’s security. According to the 
authors: 
Their original reason for “getting in” was neither very political, nor 
overwhelmingly based on a desire for personal enrichment or due to idleness, 
but in order to improve their security situation. Their motivation for fighting 
may of course have changed as the war continued, but this seems to be the 
initial reason for “getting in”. (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 49) 
This raises two issues that need to be considered: first, in order to provide security for 
himself and for his family, an individual had to join one of the factions; secondly, 
after the choice had been made, motivations for continuing with the armed forces may 
have changed. 
Analysing the issue of security from the perspective of status, it is easy to 
deduce that, in general, the only way to remain safe and to protect one’s family during 
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the period of the hostilities was to acquire the status of soldier. “A characteristic of the 
Liberian civil war has been that civilians suffer the most, and are killed in far greater 
numbers than combatants” (HRW 1995: no page).
According to John, the only way to survive was to follow the combatants, 
becoming a soldier.  “I can say they forced me to join because when the freedom 
fighters entered our town, they said we must follow them. The person who say no, 
they will shoot them [him]” (John 2009, pers. comm., 19 May). For the purpose of 
this thesis, it does not matter whether the decision to join the fighting was 
spontaneous or forced; what is important is the effect produced by the decision. Life 
must be considered as the most important asset which, in some cases during the war, 
could only be protected by acquiring the status of fighter. John is a 29-year-old former 
fighter from Pleebo in Maryland County. He fought for NPFL but is now selling fish 
at the local market in West Point, trying to save money to buy a motorbike to operate 
as a taxi driver.
When it comes to acquiring basic assets or goods, we need to acknowledge 
that in Liberia, as in many countries devastated by conflict, the war modified the 
normal social order. The scattered nature of the Liberian war, with all its warring 
factions and instabilities, changed an economy-based society into a survival society, 
deprived of basic goods and services. In most cases the only way to have access to the 
basic means of subsistence was to join one of the factions. As recalled by one former 
fighter: “I join them by myself. Because when they entered Bomi, there was no food, 
so I used to work for them buying cigarettes, then they gave me food” (Little John 
2005, pers. comm., 17 December).
Little John was a former child soldier from Bomi County who moved to 
Monrovia to live with his aunt after the war. She provided him with food and 
accommodation. He joined LURD in 2003 when just 16 because they provided him 
with security.
It is generally recognised that the highest positions in a wartime society are 
held by those in the military class, who have access to basic commodities such as 
food, shelter, clothing and limited medical facilities. The chaos generated by the lack 
of a legitimate power prevents society from functioning normally. While in normal 
circumstances income determines the variables for measuring and defining status, 
during the war the variables for this evaluation are related to the level of subsistence. 
85
In a war such as that in Liberia, where most of the population was displaced or 
became refugees, elements such as income, education and employment, which are 
used in peaceful societies to identify status, gave way to other variables such as access
to basic commodities. These factors are vividly recalled and expressed in numerous 
interviews with former fighters. A former fighter explains that “LURD made food 
cheap across the bridge so, for this reason, people [civilians] left from all over to 
come here for food. We broke fighter foot for harassing people for their food” (Chief 
Papa 2005, pers. comm., 27 October). To describe the precariousness of the situation 
Patrick, another former fighter, said: 
They said they would pay you when you get there, you get no other way to 
come because you’re in the middle of the rebels. Then when they put you 
down you would be fighting with either your leg cut or you’ve full wound 
before you come to Monrovia so you’ll bleed there and fight till you die, no 
pay, but there would be food but then and the rebels come and fight us and 
take our food. Then we would follow them and kill some of them and take 
our food. Like rice, oil, cassava. All the money, the food, cigarettes, drinks. 
(Patrick 2009, pers. comm., Monrovia 3 August)
This account illustrates how important some goods were for basic survival, even for 
the warring factions. 
Power and security were sometimes reasons for joining the forces, but they 
were certainly a reason for every fighter remaining with the factions. One result of 
becoming a member of the armed forces was the achievement of a particular status. 
This had several advantages. In some cases status meant that some marginalised 
groups could be more active and participate more in society – for example, young 
people (Richards 1995, 2005; Utas 2003, 2008). In the case of the Great Lakes region, 
for instance, youths were willing to join the militia because that was the only way to 
obtain social reintegration and status since they were excluded from any political, 
economic and educational participation (Peters, Richards and Vlassenroot 2003: 34). 
The same is true in the case of Liberia. 
Many of the individuals who enrolled with the warring factions in Liberia 
came to enjoy their status. The initial motivation for joining the forces evolved into 
the desire for a better position, as the status of fighter had been too prestigious for 
someone to return willingly to being “a nobody”. As Hazen (2007: 4) writes:
86
Combatants come to see themselves as part of a new social unit, one that 
accepts them as soldiers, gives them an important title, such as general, gives 
them social status and a voice, and provides them with the means to earn a 
living. The idea of leaving this familiar setting is both threatening and scary 
to combatants, even those who would prefer to stop fighting, because the 
“war family” is seen as a source of security. 
In a war environment – such as that in Liberia from 1989 until 2003 – the 
status of fighter was among the highest in the social structure. The instability of the 
failed state and the martial environment established by the military meant that power 
and security were the main priorities of Liberians. Those who had attained these basic 
needs could be considered to possess a high status in society.
A direct consequence of joining the warring factions was the development of 
specific relationships with comrades. The interlacing of these relationships produced a 
series of support networks that operated at different levels and with different intensity. 
A general definition of a social network is as a social structure made up of individuals 
connected by one or more specific types of interdependency. Depending on the 
strength and nature of the ties, the network may be simple or complex. In the case of 
former fighters, their social networks were very complex, affecting their lives on 
many levels. This occurred especially during the war, when there was constant 
pressure from leaders to detach the soldiers from their previous bonds with family and 
community in order to build stronger ties with their commanders. Hazen claims: 
Faction leaders reinforce the feelings of alienation by often reminding the 
perpetrator that he can no longer return home because he will no longer be 
accepted after the egregious acts he committed. This severs all social ties 
between the combatant and his community. (Hazen 2007: 3) 
The longer the period serving in the faction, the greater the distance from the previous 
networks such as family, friends and community. This distancing from previous 
relationships made the fighters develop stronger bonds with their comrades in arms, 
decreasing the chances of their full reintegration after the conflict.
In the case of former fighters in Ethiopia, 
the informal networks with family, relatives and community members [were] 
still intact at the time of their arrival. The shorter the duration of service and 
87
the younger an ex-combatant on demobilization, the less difficult this process 
was perceived. (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer 1996: 78) 
The case of Liberia was totally different since the two civil wars together 
lasted for more than 14 years. The long period and the young age of the participants –
the average age of demobilised soldiers was 25.3 years (NCDDRR 2004: 3) – made 
the soldiers’ ties with their brothers in arms as strong as those of a family: a war 
family. This process of incorporation of individuals into war families is not just a 
matter of indoctrination but also provides the soldier with a support network that can 
supply him with all his needs (Hazen 2007: 5). 
However, the status and the networks of the former fighter would change with 
the signing of the peace agreement – leading to a complete overturning of his life. 
3.2.2 External factors: disarmament and demobilisation and their effects on the 
status and networks of the fighters
The initial action of the international community for recreating stability in Liberia 
after the ceasefire was the implementation of the DDR. The DDR “is the process by 
which ex-combatants acquire civil status” (GA 2005: 8). This declaration is the 
foundation on which all DDR programmes around the world are built. The main aim 
of the first phase of the process in Liberia was to disarm and demobilise the warring 
factions and consequently the soldiers, in order to take control of the peace process. 
This mechanism was not designed only for pragmatic reasons but also to affect the 
fighters psychologically. The full DD process represents a threat for the combatants 
and provokes internal reactions such as anxiety, fear and insecurity. This occurs 
because the DD mechanism de-structures the social networks that the fighters relied 
on for a long period of their lives (Hazen 2007: 4). To reintegrate former fighters back 
into Liberian society, the DDR had to break the bonds with the past and especially 
with the war family, with the aim of encouraging the ex-soldiers to choose a new 
position in the community. However, breaking with the past essentially meant 
breaking with previous networks and also changing status.
The first attempt to reintegrate former fighters in Liberia occurred with the 
end of the first civil war when a first DD process took place. At that time there was 
already a taste of how this mechanism could affect the status of fighter. Utas (2003: 
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53) writes: “The peace proceeding from late 1996 up to the elections of July 1997 had 
reduced [the ex-combatants’] status from masters to subjects, returning them back to 
the lowly social position they experienced at the onset of the war”. This modification 
of the role of the fighter occurred because the transition to a peaceful society modified 
the variables for the establishment of high social status. As stated above, power and 
security were the two attributes that conferred a high position on fighters in wartime 
society but, with the reestablishment of a civilian society, the variables reverted to 
normal standards. Economic and political power replaced coercive power, while 
security was enforced by the peacekeeping operation, which granted access to safety 
and goods for everyone.  
One of the main factors affected by these changes was the soldiers’ previous, 
almost exclusive access to basic goods. According to Utas, some former fighters after 
the first civil war had hoped for a new outbreak of hostilities so “food commodities 
and respect would return to them, as they again picked up their guns and became 
masters of at least a fragment of the Liberian society” (Utas 2003: 54). During the 
conflict the war economies, looting and exchange of stolen goods were acceptable 
means to sustain the factions. In a period of peace, combatants cannot carry out these 
activities because they are forbidden and punished (Hazen 2007: 6). 
This transition from a period of war anarchy, when looting and stealing was 
the rule, to a period of law enforcement occurred very quickly. The exact moment of 
change was not recognised upon the signing of the peace agreement, as many 
previous agreements had not been respected (see Chapter 1). But with the opening of 
the DD camps, the fighters realised that they were losing the power and influence they 
had once had.
Disarmament is understood to be the “collection, control and disposal of small 
arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants” (DPKO 
2000: 15). It entails a change in position from “combatant” to “ex-combatant”, 
identified as “soldiers no longer serving in formal military or paramilitary structures, 
or ... [participating] in militia or guerrilla activities” (Muggah 2004: 32). A crucial 
element of the Liberian experience was the reduction of entry requirements during the 
December 2003–April 2004 hiatus; initially requiring production of a weapon, the 
recommenced DD process only required applicants to produce 150 rounds of 
ammunition.
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Weapons are central to the definition and characterisation of the disarmament 
process. They are the means used to exercise coercive power during conflicts, 
conferring on their possessor the status and attributes of fighter. The DDR manual of 
the United Nations supports this, linking the status of the fighter to weapons: “Any 
entrant who is unable to surrender any weapon or ammunition and is unable to prove 
combatant status should not be accepted for demobilization and reintegration” (DPKO 
2000: 51). The status of combatant is therefore directly linked to the weapon. The gun 
symbolises the prospect of maintaining an elevated position in society. With the 
opening of the cantonments, to which access depended on the submission of a 
weapon, the Liberian social order was completely inverted. The moment of
surrendering a weapon represented the sudden termination of the status of combatant 
and the sudden removal of privileged positions for more than 100,000 people.
Hazen (2007: 6) presents the handing-in of the weapon as a choice comparable 
to a leap in the dark, with little chance to regain what will be lost:
In war, ex-combatants believe they can control their actions and their choices. 
They are the ones in charge. They are the ones who have a voice and can 
generate change. Such sentiments are especially strong in countries that do 
not provide such widespread opportunities for political and economic 
involvement during peacetime. Thus, to choose to give up one’s weapon, also 
involves the choice to lose this sense of purpose, prestige and control with 
little guarantee that it can be regained in civilian life. 
For the former fighter Love, however, handing in her weapon was almost a relief, a 
symbol of the end of her duties and of her return to her family: “Yes, when the UN 
was giving money for guns, I gave my gun. When I gave my gun I left and came 
home” (Love 2009, pers. comm., 9 May). Love is one of the multitude of soldiers 
who were longing for the moment when they could finally leave the past behind. 
Aged 26 and originally from a small village in Klay, Bomi County, she admitted 
without shame: “I have not attended school before the war and also after the war” 
(Love 2009, pers. comm., 9 May). Her comment, however, indicates that she was not 
one of the “lumpen” youth. After the war, Love joined her family and now lives in St 
Paul Bridge where she sells “cook bowl” for a living. She freely joined the LURD 
forces in 2003, as she says in the interview: “No, I was not forced but the 
disadvantage was too much from the government troops” (Love 2009, pers. comm., 9 
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May). But even if she joined the factions freely, she clearly expressed her relief at 
handing over her gun. She added that when she went home her family did not show 
any problems in accepting her. For this reason she had decided not to participate in 
the reintegration programmes. When asked if she was taking part in any of the courses 
for former fighters, she answered: “No, because after I gave my gun, I was finished 
with war business” (Love 2009, pers. comm., 9 May). For Love, the return of the 
weapon was the end of “war business”, the end of everything related to the conflict 
and the status of fighter.
Dell is a 23-year-old male from Kakata City, Margibi County, who fought with 
the government troops in the 2003 war. Just like Love, he decided not to go through
the RR process. After he handed over his weapon he disappeared into the mass of 
Liberians. He said: “After I gave my gun for the money, I came to Red Light [an area 
in Monrovia]” (Dell 2009, pers. comm., 18 May).
These two interviews exemplify many others, where the interviewee had felt 
the weight of being a soldier. With the status of fighter had also come the 
responsibilities of this position. The abdication of the status of fighter represented by 
the handing-over of a gun was a crucial step for every soldier. For some it was a free 
choice, while for others it was enforced; but for all it symbolised a break with the past 
and all its consequences. This fracture represented more than a shift in status; it 
amounted to a conversion experience, after which a new primary – and unknown –
position in society had to be acquired. 
After the disarmament process and the consequent dissolution of the status of 
fighter came the demobilisation programme. This process was chronologically the 
second external intervention that influenced the lives of former fighters after the end 
of the conflict. Demobilisation signifies the “process by which armed forces . . . either 
downsize or completely disband” (DPKO 2000: 15); the former fighters are 
transferred to their site of preference. The demobilisation of soldiers has been 
universally designed for delinking combatants from their military organisation, as 
“Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed groups” (UN 2006: 2). In the general literature on 
Liberia, little attention and relevance has been given to this social process. The 
transformation of the social actors and structures stimulated by demobilisation deeply 
affected Liberian society, with negative consequences for the reintegration process. 
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One of the aims of the DDR mechanism is to help secure a country by trying 
to avoid former fighters being left without livelihoods or support networks (UN 2006: 
2). In some cases the demobilisation itself can be counterproductive to this objective, 
especially in cases where the only support networks of the former fighters are the 
wartime networks. This was the case in Liberia, where in most cases the only 
relationships existing for the fighters were part of their wartime networks. In these 
instances, delinking the fighters from their social networks obviously affected their 
whole sphere of networks. “When a programme seeks to separate ex-combatants from 
their factions, success in breaking any individual’s ties to the network may undermine 
the network as a whole” (Humphreys and Weinstein 2005: 26). 
Taking a completely different approach, it can be asserted that the existence of 
networks between former fighters after the conflict increased the opportunities for 
economic and psychological benefits and reconciliation (Humphreys and Weinstein 
2005: 6). Of the same opinion are Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996: 12) who 
report that in Ethiopia:
…[m]ost ex-combatants participate in informal social networks. They meet 
their former comrades and opponents at least occasionally to discuss their 
present life, work opportunities, income-generating projects and the general 
economic and political situation. Such informal contacts have proved helpful 
in facilitating their transition to civilian life. In fact, over one third of ex-
combatants cooperate in ventures. Informal contacts also help them to cope 
with the challenge of civilian life better.
With this in mind, in the last part of their work on lessons learned, Colletta, Kostner 
and Wiederhofer (1996: 119) recommend as general policy for all post-conflict 
developments that such economic and social networks should be facilitated in order to 
promote the reintegration of former fighters. 
Undoubtedly, most fighters had to leave their own land, families and 
communities to fight in unfamiliar environments, some for military reasons and others 
for simple survival. The dynamics of this situation caused the fighters to become 
estranged from their families and communities. In some cases this separation occurred 
due to traumatic events such as forced conscription, but in other cases it was just the 
normal cycle of events. These rapid changes affected not only the fighters, but also 
every member of the community. Even those who had not left their communities to go 
92
and fight were forced to change their routines and behaviour as a result of the war. 
Some of them were even forced by their own communities to leave, in order to have a 
greater chance of survival. One interviewee, Kamara, a 38-year-old former fighter 
from Lofa who fought with the Liberian government, said:
Really for me the war affected us greatly because for us we were living with 
our parents, but when the war came my father ask me to go elsewhere and 
remain there. So I couldn’t do nothing now because I was no longer under my 
parents for support at the age, I was to follow up for further studies. Since the 
war already came they’ve dropped everything. I am telling you that at the age 
of 30 I got no school qualification but nothing here, because if the war was 
gone my father could have helped me and I could have something going for 
me. (Kamara 2006, pers. comm., 23 June)
These words are valuable for understanding how the war deeply affected every 
relationship in Liberia. All the changes in relationships affected and modified the 
networks of the people involved. The war, with all its brutality, had shattered the 
normal way of life, such as family bonds and community ties, forming instead more 
external connections and associations. Each individual became a separate entity and 
had to think for himself independently. Many people had no idea if their parents were 
alive or of their families’ whereabouts, so the family network was replaced with 
informal structures (Utas 2005). Even where no blood ties existed, it was common to 
hear people referring to each other as “Dad”, “Brother” and “Uncle”. 
Most of the Liberian population, especially former fighters, had already 
experienced a disconnection from their own social networks even before 
demobilisation. Hence UNMIL found them prepared to be delinked from their world 
and relocated. The demobilisation, which aimed to de-bond the soldiers from their 
superiors and to destroy the chain of command, also had a strong effect on their 
identity. While previously the fighters were bonded to their brothers-in-arms and had 
felt part of something, after undergoing demobilisation they were left in a state of 
isolation. The collective self, which had previously been the focus of their identity, 
was forced to give way to the individual self. After a period of expressing a sense of 
belonging, they were now asked to express their individuality in order to find a place 
in a new society. 
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The reaction to this new condition varied from one individual to another; it 
was usually influenced by many internal and external factors. The internal factors 
were part of an individual’s personal background, such as gender, age, education, 
family situation, behaviour during the war, and psychological disturbances, among 
others. Some former fighters had a cathartic recognition of their previous actions and 
attempted to take a positive approach, seeing in this moment the opportunity for a 
new life. Sheriff, for example, says: “I feel like what I did was wrong. I don’t want to 
be rebel or army any more in my life. I want to study medical science” (Sheriff 2006, 
pers. comm., 23 July). Others decided to resume the same path as before, but the DD 
process certainly gave them the opportunity for a new start. Robert, a former fighter 
aged 25 from Nimba County, who fought with LURD and now works as a labourer, 
said:
The DDRR programme contributed a whole lot to the youths of Liberia who 
participated in the war. There are other youths who did not participate in the 
war but they benefited from it.  Today the ones who decided not to do 
anything at all, they are the ones on the streets who are doing bad things, 
[but] the ones who decided to go and learn what was opportune to them, 
today some of them are working, nobody knows they are ex-combs, they are 
doing things for themselves. They are living in an environment with all 
people knowing about them. (Robert 2006, pers. comm., 14 July)
In conclusion, the end of conflict can sometimes be as traumatic as the beginning, in 
so far as it breaks the status quo. The status, relationships and networks of former 
fighters were essentially “blown up” by the end of the war, creating a sense of 
confusion. This uncertainty gave everyone the opportunity to make a fresh start. For 
some it was the starting point for a new life completely delinked from the past; for 
others it was just a short period of alienation that brought them back together with 
their fellows, with even stronger ties.  
All this occurred because, after the DD phase, there was often a failure to 
realise the importance of protecting the supporting networks. With the DD 
programmes, the fighters experienced strong pressure to abandon their weapons and 
companions in order to return to their communities. Initially some of them tried to go 
back to their own community and follow the recommendation of the demobilisation 
programme to start a civilian life with no links with the past. In a survey conducted in 
2006, “only 4 of 588 respondents indicated that they spent their free time with friends 
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from their former factions or the war” (Pugel 2007: 52). Despite this first phase, the 
former combatants’ social networks seemed to survive and sometimes became even 
stronger. From my experience, in most cases the wartime networks disintegrated for a 
short period after demobilisation, but were re-established after a brief interlude. 
This short period of alienation from the old networks and the dissolution of the 
status of fighter created a state of confusion among most former fighters in the 
context of huge changes in the Liberian social structure.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of external influences on the status and networks of former fighters
3.2.3 Relationship between status and identity 
Status is essential to understanding identity and inclusion. Status can be defined as a 
current state or condition experienced by an individual. This may include status shift 
and/or status dissolution. The concept of identity encompasses a wider and more 
specific or in-depth approach to the reasons or factors behind the status of an 
individual, such as personal philosophy, traits and concepts, but especially personal 
and social associations with other people and even networks. Therefore it is important 
to realise that one cannot exist without the other; this is why, when the dissolution 
status of former fighters is considered, it is also important to consider their identity 
structures and reconstruction (for more detail, see Jennings 2008). The important 
aspect of the relationship between status and identity is that one cannot exist without 
having an impact on the other. The status of an individual is basically a macro 
overview of the individual’s personal choices and traits in a personalised and social 
environment. These choices are structured by the identity of the individual. Herein 
lies the relationship; the identity is micro-structured while the status is macro-
structured. 
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It is important to note here that while identity has a direct impact on the status 
of the individual, the relationship works both ways. The status of the individual 
mainly revolves around the communal aspects that the individual faces and can very 
easily influence the basis of personal philosophies irrespective of how strongly they 
are rooted. The correlation is reversible. Colin Bird argues that “the distinction 
between a person’s status and their identity is not always easy to see, and they often 
overlap (my social status can, for example, be a part of my identity: hence Louis XIV 
– ‘L’état, c’est moi’)” (Bird 2004:  221). This is because the interdependence of the 
two elements is natural and unbreakable. In the case of the former fighters in the 
period just after the end of the conflict, we can say that the dissolution of previous 
status directly affected identity.
The fighters, when exerting their authority on others, were not asking for 
admiration or high regard; they just wanted to show that they were able to maintain 
their status. Since the soldiers claimed to be fighting for a common good, they felt 
entitled to have more privileges than non-combatants. These claims of entitlement or 
privileged treatment are completely independent from claims about identity, although 
they do reflect the identity of individuals. This suggests that, unlike status, identity 
does not exert direct control over external factors but instead is openly influenced by 
them. While status gives direct access to external relationships, identity is just the 
fruit of these relationships. The soldiers’ status is the fruit of their interactions with 
society, while their identity is the way that society perceives them and how they 
perceive society. The recognition of a different status for the former fighters 
accentuates the division between them and the civilians. Identity, in this case, is 
linked to society’s perception of the group recognised by the name of “former 
fighters”.
Jennings writes about delinking. She explains that “delinking simultaneously 
recognises that non combatants are often in similarly dire straits as ex-combatants, 
and may mitigate against the hardening of group identity and lessen resentment from 
non combatants over preferential treatment for former fighters” (Jennings 2008: 8). 
This attempts to reconcile fighters and civilians by finding commonalities between 
them instead of differences, trying to homogenise their identities. 
It counteracts the incentive structure that encourages people to claim and 
maintain the status of ex-combatant, while reducing the period when ex-
96
combatants are perceptibly differentiated from wider society. Combined 
with an adequate information campaign before disarmament begins, 
delinking would also enable the international community to provide an 
immediate and concrete benefit without creating false or unrealistic 
expectations. Furthermore, it would help resolve the entry criteria problem, 
making for less friction between the security and development ends of the 
programme. (Jennings, 2008: 8) 
The delinking process includes both status and identity:  
‘Combatants’ are socialised into ‘soldier’ status, and this remains the prime 
identity for many. ‘Ex-combatant’ identities are situated both in conflict and 
transition. How ex-combatants negotiate various war-generated identities 
when they depart from militarized structures is a much neglected area. The 
expectation, it frequently seems, is that ex-combatants will simply leave 
war-generated identities behind. (Gear 2002: 141).
This process of homogenization of identities in Liberia also includes the 
concept of collectivity. The process of status and identity construction in fact is not 
restricted just to the subjects; it is essential to consider the group. Status and identity 
in this case are linked to a group of people who had something in common that made 
them gather together on a certain level because of shared similarities. As stated above 
when considering the former fighters as a group with its own identity, it is interesting 
to refer to certain studies on organisational identity in order to compare with others. 
As with organisations, the variable that measures the level of inclusion of the group in 
the social fabric is the position of its members in society. This inclusion, or exclusion, 
is essential in status and identity construction. The changes and the similarities that 
led to group reunion are the basis of the creation of a new place in society and “the 
wearing of a new suit” so as to be accepted by others. This “suit” is the new status and 
identity they have chosen or that has been chosen for them, even if in a sub-conscious 
way, as a reaction to the external and internal pressures they have been facing since 
the end of the war. 
A large group of former fighters that could not find their place in the new 
society have created a kind of self-defence mechanism as a means of survival. Self-
exclusion, sometimes generated by society itself, defending other members, 
associating with other former fighters and blaming others, are the best instruments 
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they use to shape their new identity. Their gathering together, which began during the 
war period, is due to the necessity of the individual to assimilate and share the same 
or similar experiences in order to feel a sense of belonging.  
The exclusion of the former fighters from the community mostly arises 
because of the violent behaviour associated with their group. Marshall B. Clinard 
(1949) suggests that it is possible to combat delinquent behaviour by including a 
group in a normal social context. He based his findings on a survey carried out in 
1944 by the California Youth Authority in conjunction with the War Department. In 
an effort to socially reintegrate a group of youths, 150 delinquent boys were placed in 
an army barracks and allowed to work alongside civilians. By being allowed to work 
under normal social circumstances, notable changes arose in the boys’ behaviour – “in 
work habits, in the conceptions of themselves, and in changing anti-social group 
objectives which are reinforced in conventional institutional groups” (Ellingston 
1948: 101).
Clinard (1949) refers to the effectiveness of group psychotherapy in prisons to 
treat offenders while recognising that offenders are not all “mentally abnormal”. We 
can directly relate this to the rehabilitation and reintegration of the former fighters. By 
providing useful reintegration programmes and allowing the former fighters to 
function and work in normal social circumstances, while receiving psychological 
support, it is possible for them to re-associate with their identity before the conflict 
and to abandon the identity of former fighter. 
As in the prisoners’ rehabilitation, it is necessary to incorporate what Clinard 
refers to as “guided group interaction” by not assuming that the former fighters have 
mental illnesses. Clinard (1949) suggests that the success of the programmes may not 
be due to the psychiatric treatment the offenders receive but more to the fact that they 
are part of a group. In this context, the group member tends to become more 
introspective and reflective, and “the belligerent, over-assertive, anti-social rehabilitee 
is brought into line by his fellows and the asocial, shy, withdrawn person is drawn 
into the conversation” (Abrahams and McCorkle 1946: 32).
The author also reports on research into social disorganisation that shows how 
the group approach has been applied to bring about community reintegration. It 
appears that the former fighters’ sharing of a group identity and a “place of belonging 
in the local structure” (Clinard 1949: 6) could have direct and positive consequences 
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for the community at large. He also asserts that group identity has a direct impact on 
“delinquency, crime, mental disease, suicide, race and ethnic conflict” (Clinard 1949: 
6) and can reduce disorganisation in society. In the long term, being part of a group 
can help the individual to gain a positive self-image and transcend stigmas and 
negative identities and labels.  
3.2.4 External factors: formal and informal recognition of a new category of ex-
combatant – the “neglected veteran”
The DD process not only introduced changes in the social structure of Liberia but also 
legitimised the formation of a new social category in that structure. The demotion of 
the fighter from a higher position in society and the temporary disintegration of their 
support networks was not the only consequence of disarmament and demobilisation. 
The implementation of the peace agenda shifted a warlike Liberian society to a state 
of peace. This change re-established all the characteristics of a system of standard 
socio-economic stratification. Liberian society began again to value variables such as 
income, education and employment, each of which contributes (as argued above) to 
status. The dispute in the country changed from military to political as civilians 
regained power, to the detriment of the soldiers. Fighters were now seen as a threat to 
peace and as a collection of unskilled, unemployed and confused individuals 
struggling to find their position in society. Some fighters who were able go back to 
their families or community disappeared into the general masses. Others who were 
more skilful and adaptable found their place in the new society. However, a number of 
former fighters found it more difficult to become reintegrated and were set apart from 
society. This group shares common socio-economic conditions and represents a 
specific social category in Liberian society. This sub-section of the thesis analyses the 
formation of this group and its formal and informal recognition by society as a 
discrete category. More evidence of the existence of this group can be found in the 
self-categorisation described by former fighters during my research (discussed 
below).
The first confirmation of former fighters being a category in itself is the 
formal classification made by the DD process. After handing over weapons in the 
cantonments, former fighters received an identification card with their socio-
economic data. They were screened, registered and entitled to financial and support 
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benefits (UNDP 2004). Establishing criteria for those entitled to social and economic 
benefits can be considered a formal identification process. Jenkins (1996: 103) asserts 
that there are two modes of collective identification. In the first, members recognise 
themselves as being part of a group; in the second, they are recognised by others as 
belonging to a specific category. The internal identification defines the group, while 
the external defines the category. According to the author, discussing a concept 
expressed by Nadel (in Jenkins 1996: 103), these approaches are merely different 
ways of looking at the interaction between individuals. This thesis argues that, in the 
case of former fighters in Liberia, the identification occurs on both levels, external 
and internal. The theory of this work is based on what former fighters said, in their 
own words: essentially, how they perceive themselves. They identify themselves with 
a group, while others see them as members of a specific category. The legitimisation 
of the category of former fighters occurred during the DD process. The identification 
card given to former fighters during the DD phase is a formal recognition of the 
privileges of a special category. This process of classification acknowledged the 
formal creation of a new social category. 
In other countries former fighters were seen as a particular social category. 
According to Gear, “the interest in ‘ex-combatants’ as a social category derives from 
the fact that they possess military skills and have, for significant periods of time, led a 
‘military life’” (Gear 2002: 12). A category involving military skills usually implies 
the lack of employable skills among its members. An extended study of other African 
countries such as Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe describes the 
category of former fighters as lacking the minimum job and social skills needed for 
full social and economic reintegration (Colletta 1997). Sometimes this category has 
been defined as a group with special needs, differentiating its members from others, 
raising the concern about special treatment that creates a differentiation from 
civilians. This differentiation would be easier to avoid if it were ensured that they are 
not treated as “a special group among the community, so that they receive neither 
more nor fewer privileges than their neighbours” (NGO Networking Service 1996: 
79). For Kingma (2000: 12), former fighters “remain the most organised group in 
society and are able to respond to a call to come together at very short notice”.
The legitimisation of this category is not the only effect of the establishment 
of the DDR; another legacy of this process has been the “labelling” of the members of 
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this category as “ex-combatants”, with all the consequences. Before proceeding to 
analyse the sociological implication of the expression “ex-combatants” it is essential 
to clarify the meaning of this expression. The term “ex-combatant” is widely used by 
many authors and in different ways throughout recent literature regarding post-
conflict environments, whatever the content or aim of the papers. Even if the 
argument concerns mental health or the informal economy, the authors use the term to 
refer to the category of soldiers at the end of the war. It is assumed that this term 
identifies a group with particular sociological, economic or political perspectives. The 
use of the term has proliferated; it is commonly used also by practitioners who 
operate in recovery and reconstruction in countries emerging from conflict. With the 
multiple specialisations of the peacekeeping operations conducted by various 
international organisations, the actors operating in the field needed a standard term for 
the fighters, to avoid confusion. A term was needed for identifying the people who 
had fought during the war and needed to be assisted, as they were seen as a vulnerable 
group. Civil society, NGOs, UN agencies and multilateral actors recognise the term 
“ex-combatants” as identifying this category. After the use of the Peace Support 
Operation mechanism intensified around the world, standardisation helped to identify 
the former participants in conflicts as “ex-combatants”, whether they were of South 
African, Pakistani or other origin. In every article, manual and technical paper 
regarding the post-conflict zone, the term appeared, with all its connotations.
According to many studies, ex-combatants are mostly composed of people 
who were recorded and classified during the DD phase and were later sent to be 
reintegrated through pre-selected programmes. This classification recognises all the 
attributes that can distinguish individuals. Age, gender, education, ethnicity and so on, 
are not significant for this classification; the only important identifying factor is the 
fact that they wielded a gun during the war – or, in some cases, only at the moment 
when the cantonments opened their gates for weapons collection. In everyday use, 
“ex-combatant” refers to whoever took part in the war as a fighter, regardless of 
individual attributes, and needs to be helped. 
This term has been widely used without considering its full implications. In 
some cases, identifying subjects with a particular label can deeply influence the future 
of the individual in terms of personality, behaviour, acceptance and future personal 
development. The term “ex-combatant” became commonly used in day-to-day 
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language, turning it from something conceptual to something real. While previously 
the term was impersonal and detached from any meaning, apart from identifying 
former soldiers, it has acquired some specific connotations. In many cases, the 
classification and registration during the DD phase “had the side effect of codifying 
ex-combatant identity. This labelling of ex-combatants as a group with shared 
problems made state interventions possible” (Metsola 2006: 1126). Labelling this 
group “ex-combatants” has established a specific sociological recognition in society. 
In the literature, most writers use the term in a neutral way, by not giving a 
positive or negative connotation to the group a priori. The negative connotations 
associated with the term “ex-combatants” have been expressed mainly by the local 
population, and they originated in attitudes within the Liberian communities. Authors, 
however, remain unaffected by the common use of this term; “ex-combatant” simply 
refers to those who fought during the war and does not include other sociological, 
economic or psychological characterisations. This is mostly because “[t]he majority 
of ex-combatants were ordinary people who joined armed groups based on various 
ideas concerning protection and opportunity” (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 45) and were 
supposed to go back to their previous lives at the end of the war. The only clear 
identification was that “there is the clear break between combatant and non-combatant 
groups” (Hazen 2007: 2). Since my work adds a further implication to the term “ex-
combatants”, classifying them as a particular group of former fighters who do not feel 
reintegrated, it is essential to identify additional points of characterisation and find a 
new term for the refined definition. In some cases, the group of ex-combatants is not 
even seen by the authors as a special category in Liberian society because “the ex-
combatants’ background is … surprisingly normal” (Bøas and Hatløy, 2008: 42) and 
their reintegration into the communities should be conducted, it is proposed, without 
separation from other groups:
DDRR is very much a reaction to the notion that these people are stigmatized 
from society, set apart in their own world, and therefore need reintegration. 
However, the ex-combatants in our sample do not fit this picture very well. 
They are not a world apart from their parents, relatives and local 
communities, but are in fact living with them (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 52).  
In other cases (Colletta 1997; Date-Bah 2003) it is easy to find the “idea of ex-
combatants as a specially disadvantaged group” (Jennings 2008: 13). According to my 
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research, there is a middle ground: not all ex-combatants are perceived negatively and 
not all of them are perceived positively. This conclusion is discussed below, where a 
distinction is made between those who live normally in the communities and those 
who are not part of the new social fabric – for whom a new term is desirable. 
However, for some authors the ex-combatants are just another minor social group 
who do not need special consideration when it comes to reconstructing Liberian 
society. For others, they are part of a larger, more vulnerable category of people who 
must be helped, but are not different from other groups such as women, returnees and 
internal displaced peoples (IDPs).
While in the literature the word “ex-combatant” is mostly used with a neutral 
meaning, it commonly has negative connotations. The statement that those “who did 
belong to a faction have mostly returned to their home communities without ever 
picking up the ‘tag’ as ex-combatants” (Bøas and Hatløy 2008: 38) confirms this –
because this “tag” is not seen as constructive for the communities or the former 
fighters:
There is often a desire to stop using the moniker “ex-combatant” after the 
reintegration process. There are good reasons for this. The use of such a term 
can lead to negative stigmatization of ex-combatants, and further hinder their 
reintegration into a community. (Hazen 2007: 7)
So the term in itself does not have negative associations; these arise because of 
the characteristics that are associated with it. In common usage, the prefix “ex” means 
that something had validity in the past. What is significant in this case is how the 
prefix is attached to a noun indicating a person’s status. It thus refers to a status that 
was gained in the past and has been lost. For example, in the expressions, “ex-
president”, “ex-convict”, etc. we are referring to people who had a particular status at 
a certain point of their lives and then lost it or acquired a different one. 
A positive or negative implication mostly depends on how the previous status 
is perceived. The term “ex-combatants” tends not to identify them as normal civilians 
but rather as people whose past actions carry on into the present:
Once people see two or three people who fight the war together, they will 
say: “Ah! look, here the bad people going there oh!” So many of us who fight 
the war can be afraid to come together in group; the people always say bad 
things about us as ex-combatants; they sometime call us arm robbers. (Dahn 
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2009, pers. comm., 16 May)
Dahn is a former fighter, aged 27, who comes from Bomi County and fought 
with ULIMO. He expresses how past actions are associated with negative feelings. 
Many interviews outline how the label “ex-combatant” is given negative 
connotations:
I think they see us as rebels but to tell us it is hard. Though they can say 
people have rebel attitude, but to look in the eyes of me and say I am a rebel 
has not happened. But generally, they see us as bad people. (Love 2009, pers. 
comm., 9 May)  
This is Love’s response to the question on how her community perceives the 
ex-combatants and how they refer to them. Civilians regard them with circumspection 
and even fear. They associate the term “ex-combatant” with the word “rebel”. They, 
of course, see themselves differently:
Love: I see myself as a Liberian and human being. 
Interviewer: Do you see yourself as a rebel or bad person?
Love: Oh no, I see myself as a former fighter but a changed and good woman 
because no disadvantage again.
Interviewer: But why if you see disadvantage again, will you go back to 
fight?
Love: Oh yes, because I hate. (Love 2009, pers. comm., 9 May)
Love’s choice of words is significant. She does not refer to herself as an “ex-
combatant” but as a former fighter who chose to be a decent woman because there is 
no longer a need for violence in the new environment. In another interview, with a 
former fighter called Dell, it is clear that the “ex-combatants” are usually identified 
with bad actions, with no distinction between them:
Interviewer: Today, in your opinion, how does your community look upon 
the population of ex-combatants?
Dell: Ugly and bad people.
Interviewer: How do you see yourself?
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Dell: Though a former fighter … I see myself as better now than during the 
war.
Interviewer: How do the communities see you? 
Dell: I want believe just how my community sees me. That is a former 
fighter.
Interviewer: What about some of your friends who were reintegrated? 
Dell: The same was how they see me, that is how they see them too. (Dell 
2009, pers. comm., 18 May)
These and many interviews reveal the attitude of some former fighters, who 
identify themselves with different terms. From the former fighters’ perspective, the 
word “ex-combatant” provokes unpleasant sensations and is a reminder of non-
acceptance by the community. The term “former fighter” has been used to indicate 
reintegration and those who do not have difficulties in gaining acceptance. Terms such 
as “old rebel” or “ex-combatant” have been mostly used to indicate those rejected by 
the community. This potential confusion supports my decision to associate those who 
feel accepted and included with the general term “former fighter” and those who 
experience feelings of lack of acceptance and exclusion with an alternative term, 
“neglected veteran”. 
This thesis uses this term only for those who do not feel reintegrated or part of 
society. This use of the term is not shared by all authors. The term “ex-combatant” has 
already been associated with a particular category of former fighters. In Mozambique, 
it referred to the former members of the liberation army, excluding other combatants 
(Kingma 2000). Agreeing with the fact that “not all the ex-combatants are alike” 
(Jennings 2008: 9), my work establishes a differentiation between those who feel they 
are positively received and those who feel they are not. It is therefore important at this 
stage to identify a specific term for the latter. The question is: are all the former 
fighters simply a group, without distinctive elements of identification? According to 
my work they are not, because inside the group of former fighters there is a 
subdivision. 
The characteristics that define the group of “neglected veterans” represent a 
small demarcation that is mostly at the subconscious level.  Analysing the 
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conversations with former fighters, it is clear from the beginning that this 
categorisation is virtual, not concrete; it derives from an individual’s impressions and 
perceptions. Given its intangible nature, the classification “neglected veteran” does 
not arise from the actions of the subjects, but from their feelings and sensations. This 
baggage of common feelings and emotions is part of the internal factors that 
characterised the identity transformation process of the whole group of former 
fighters.
3.2.5 Internal factors:  former fighters’ sensations and emotions
The previous sub-section analysed the two major external factors that influenced the 
life of former fighters after the war: disarmament and demobilisation. The 
consequences of these were the dissolution of the status of “fighter”, the temporary 
disintegration of support networks and the creation of a new social category, the ex-
combatants. These external interventions produced changes in society and in the lives 
of the former fighters, leading to an internal state of confusion. This sub-section 
analyses their common feelings and sensations experienced during this phase, which 
contributed to the state of confusion. For some of them, this was a temporary state; for 
others it is more permanent and is one of the main reasons for the failure to 
reintegrate. During my interviews and informal conversations, it was possible to 
isolate some of the mental and emotional perceptions which can be equated to 
feelings of betrayal, abandonment, loneliness and discrimination. The main purpose 
of this sub-section is to explore these common traits experienced by some former 
fighters, which hinder their reintegration into society and contribute to their position 
of “neglected veterans”.   
Interviewer: I would like to find out more from you, how do you feel now 
that the war has ended?
Prince: Yes is true the war has ended, but there is still problem.
Interviewer: What do you mean? 
Prince: Because we are suffering and nobody cares for us.
Interviewer: Can you explain better?
Prince: When we were fighting in Lofa, the President gave us one million 
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United States dollars to clear Lofa. Our General Roland Duo told us, since we 
were on the front line, he was using the money to build for us housing units; 
which would have been given to us when the war was finished. After the war 
ended, some of us who survived came and told him about our houses, because 
he knew that war was over. He told us he never had any houses for anybody. 
When he told us this, some of the men said we should go to the compound 
over night and kill him. As for me, I told them I do not want to; but they still 
went over night, they missed Roland Duo but chopped one of his brother 
head. When day broke, he carried police to our houses and we were arrested 
and taken to the police station. At the police station, the boys admitted that 
they went to there to kill him because he lied to us and stole the money the 
President gave to us to build the houses he is now having. As we speak the 
houses are on the Roberts Field International Airport halfway. They also told 
the police that I Prince was not part of the mission that night, so I was free but 
he gave the police money and today the boys are still in jail.
Interviewer: What do you think about this situation?
Prince: Roland Duo betrayed us and since the war ended everybody turned 
their backs on us.
Interviewer: Are you saying you feel discriminated against and marginalised?
Prince: Yes, it is hard to get work, nobody care for us except our friends, 
former fighters some times when we meet in the ghetto. (Prince 2006, pers. 
comm., 20 September)
The interview with Prince, aged 23, from Nimba County, who fought with the 
governmental forces, summarises perfectly the feelings of most former fighters after 
the war. Some of them had violent reactions, others forgot about the past, and others 
just did not integrate with society, but most of them had these feelings of resentment 
against society or their own commanders. 
The DD phase left the group of ex-combatants in a state of confusion about 
their position in society, which triggered a series of internal disorders. Questions arose 
about both new and old relationships, which generated inner doubts. For some former 
fighters, this confusion is temporary, marking a period of transition in their lives, 
while for others it is a more permanent state. The label of ex-combatant, which carries 
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with it negative associations and creates a sense of disapproval by civilians, 
aggravates this condition. This then modulates into stigmatization, as some of them 
assert: 
Sometimes in my community I am referred to as old rebel or old killer. But in 
that case I do not get angry because if I want to change my character from the 
above, I must not show weakness to that stigmatism in order to remove it. 
(Roosevelt 2006, pers. comm., 24 September) 
Roosevelt is a 34-year-old former fighter who joined ULIMO in 1992. From his 
interview we can see that the stigma goes beyond being a result of personal 
behaviour, but is also a consequence of the DDR process which isolated the neglected 
veterans as a minority group, further contributing to widening the gap between soldier 
and civilian.
This gap generated different reactions in the former fighters in terms of 
emotions and feelings. One of the feelings quite common among them is the sense of 
betrayal and abandonment. Since the end of the war, high-ranking people have often 
sought a position in the Liberian army, looking after themselves while abandoning the 
rest of the soldiers to their destiny. While such high-ranking officers climbed the 
ranks in government service, most of the normal soldiers were struggling for survival. 
While the demobilisation process worked well to break the chain of command, the 
former fighters were developing a sense of betrayal and abandonment since, during 
the war, they had trusted their high-ranking officers or brothers in arms and expected 
to be looked after at the end of the conflict. “I feel betrayal,” said Ben (Ben 2006, 
pers. comm., 3 August) when I asked him how he felt: 
Some [of the former comrades] benefited from the school as they got a lot of 
money from international organisations in the country. Some of our bigger 
brothers are working in the ministry as they have a relationship with the past 
government, the rebel government. They give jobs to people with a lot of 
family. We put the government into power. A power-sharing government after 
the war. At least our brothers are happy that they have jobs and they have 
money to feed their families. There is no help from the government in this 
country. There were a lot of projects after the war and we can see how people 
live when they are not rebels. The international community visit people in the 
country and give them money. (Ben 2006, pers. comm., Monrovia 3 August)
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Ben (aka Putu), aged 32 from Ganta, fought with the government forces. I met 
him on a beach with two of his friends, Patrick and Andy. They met in 2001 when 
they were sent to fight the rebels coming from Guinea and Sierra Leone. We were 
introduced by a common friend who initiated me into the group as his “brother”. The 
conversation started with the initial standard question “Are you American?” They 
seemed to think that every foreigner in Liberia was an American, and laughed when I 
said I was Italian. When the conversation turned to the conflict, they released all their 
resentment. Ben answered my question directly about his feelings, saying he felt 
betrayed. For Ben, the officers were gaining power and resources with the 
intervention of the international community and were gradually forgetting about the 
conflict and their old comrades. The normal soldiers were excluded from the process 
of power-sharing and felt left out of the reintegration process. The fact that “others”, 
rather than they, benefited from the peace process was seen by them as a betrayal.   
In certain cases the officers also took advantage of their own soldiers. Patrick 
said: “We were supposed to get money from the DDR project to go to school but the 
general took the money as we were in the bush and there was nobody to come and get 
us” (Patrick 2009, pers. comm., 3 August). This illegal system also enlarged the gap 
between them and the commanders. When directly asked what he thought about his 
former commanders, he answered: “Now that the war is finished we don’t owe them 
anything. We have friends who send us money but the commanders they have many 
things. Our things are finished” (Patrick 2009, pers. comm., 3 August).
The issue of the corruption of the former leaders has been addressed in other 
works. Dufka (HRW 2005: 50–51) found evidence in her interviews of this illicit 
practice in Liberia and Sierra Leone. According to her work, senior officers had 
informal control over the access to benefits for their former comrades. There was a 
sort of black market of benefits that were sold in exchange for a part of the profits. 
This mechanism was set up even before the opening of the cantonments, when 
UNMIL allowed the commanders to take control of the weapons for security reasons. 
In return, the commanders were supposed to submit lists with the names of the 
fighters owning guns and entitled to enter the DD programmes. However, as Dufka 
(HRW 2005: 51) affirms, “the lists appeared to be easily manipulated, and in many 
cases, never materialized. The U.N. and national administrators of both the Sierra 
Leonean and Liberian disarmament processes appeared to provide inadequate scrutiny 
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of this process”. The effectiveness of the system put in place was strengthened by the 
commander/subordinate relationship that had been maintained during the conflict. 
According to Dufka (HRW 2005: 52), the phenomenon was more prevalent in Sierra 
Leone than in Liberia, especially because in that country the decision to join the 
forces was more out of free will: “Since most CDF [Sierra Leonean Civil Defense 
Force] militia men had initially volunteered for service out of genuine concern for 
their communities, they described a profound sense that they had been betrayed by 
their commanders and government militia officials whom they accused of stealing 
their benefits” (HRW 2005: 51).
However, according to my interviews, even if corruption in Liberia was not as 
extensive as in Sierra Leone, the sense of betrayal by their own comrades was a 
strong feeling, recognisable in most neglected veterans. Most of them found it unfair 
that some of their companions, especially high-ranking officers, had found elevated 
positions in society as compared to their own low-level status. This sense of betrayal 
derives sometimes from the non-fulfilment of expectations. The period after the end 
of the war was precarious for the security, stability and development of Liberia, but 
the positive approach of the actors involved in the process of reintegration created 
expectations of recovery among the international community, the former fighters and 
the local communities. The debate on expectations offers particular points of interest 
when considering reintegration as policy intervention with an indefinite timescale and 
non-standardised goals. From this point of view, reintegration is an open-ended 
scheme engendering different and occasionally unclear promises. The effect is a 
system hampered by unfulfilled guarantees, unsatisfied objectives, unintended 
implications, and related instability.  According to Alusala (2008: 11) in the paragraph 
“Inability to ‘Manage Expectations’”,
In situations where poverty, conflict and resources (such as money in the case 
of Liberia) are concerned, and especially one in which the criteria was quite 
integrated (for the first time in the history of the UN DDR processes), the 
planning should have taken into consideration the expectations of the society 
in order to avoid a bloated caseload.
This chaos generated by the lack of clearly identified and practical objectives 
for reintegration created unrealistic and unattainable expectations (Jennings 2008b). 
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These unfulfilled promises and false expectations could be counterproductive for the 
process itself and consequently the stability of Liberia. 
Efficient and dependable reintegration depends on setting a clearly specified 
endpoint and looking at assets, methods and capability, along with the regional 
framework, such as the socioeconomic, protection and political restrictions. Failure to 
determine this endpoint and to ensure that expectations will be fulfilled deeply affects 
the security and stability of a country. This concept indicates the degree to which 
security and expectations intersect or compete with one another. The failure of the 
reintegration process to fulfil these general expectations generated a series of different 
reactions to the relations between the communities and the former fighters. Many of 
the latter were promised resources and support after handing over weapons as 
compensation for their services. This strategy was used by some commanders to 
induce the soldiers to surrender the guns through false promises. Peter K., aged 29 
from Lofa County, a former fighter who fought for LURD against the government 
forces in the second civil war, explains:
They tell us that they were going to send some people to go to school until 
they finish with university; some promised us where we wanted work we’ll 
work for plenty money. In fact, they say that the big big people were going to 
help us with our children, school and medicine. (Peter K., pers. comm., 20 
May 2009)
The neglected veterans felt there had been a violation of trust and confidence by the 
commanders. This sense of betrayal was often caused by the dissolution of long-term, 
trusting relationships between some of the fighters and their senior officers. The 
soldiers who enlisted in the factions for more ideological reasons and for longer 
periods were the ones who experienced this feeling most intensely. Some of these 
soldiers wanted to fight to improve their personal conditions or for the good of the 
country. The hope was that when the war was over they could acquire a better position 
in society. This view is shared by Richards (1995, 1996, 2005) and Utas (2003, 2005, 
2008). Peter K. also confirms that the violation of the promises of the commanders 
and the non-fulfilment of the former fighters’ expectations was the cause of the sense 
of betrayal:
I think so because when I joined them, my commander called General Bad 
Blood tell me and the other fighter that some big people in the country and 
111
outside the country were going to take good care of us after the war because 
we were freeing the Liberian people for them. (Peter K., pers. comm., 20 May 
2009)
Peter K. was promised the same as Patrick and his former comrades. Everyone 
fighting in the war, whether government troops or rebels, was directly promised or 
was expecting a better position in society. This expectation is universal in every war 
and among any kind of warring faction. However, for the Liberian soldiers the 
outcome was disappointing as they ended up with an interim government 
demobilising the majority of both factions. The end of the conflict brought everyone 
to the same level, identifying them as ex-combatants, complete with the negative 
prejudices associated with this status. The sense of betrayal was evident among all the 
former fighters, regardless of the warring sides they fought for. 
Many former fighters speak in their conversations about being forgotten, as 
they expected to be rewarded after the conflict. The general expectation among them 
was that they would be granted a better position when peace returned. As Massaquoi, 
a 22-year-old former fighter from Nimba who fought with LURD, says: “Our people 
forget about us. Some of us are on our own, that just God blessing some of us with 
food. Me I here nobody care for me” (Massaquoi 2009, pers. comm., 18 May).
The gap between former fighters was further widened when the post-war 
expectations of many were not met. Interviews with neglected veterans show that this 
generated feelings of being discriminated against. Exclusion from social and political 
life, and a sense of neglect and abandonment by communities and families 
accentuated this feeling. Andy, aged 30 from Lofa, who fought with the government 
forces, said in his interview:
Interviewer: Do you think there’s discrimination for everyone in Liberia or 
just for ex-combatants?
Andy: Just for ex-combs.
Interviewer: Were you promised benefits, jobs?
Andy: As soon as they find out you were ex-comb they don’t give you work 
and no one was happy. People did not want to see you.
Interviewer: So what is your feeling about it?
Andy: They discriminate us. They’re rebels; they kill a lot of people. That’s 
why they have nothing to feed on, they do whatever they can to get what they 
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want. (Andy 2006, pers. comm., 3 August)
In another interview, Dahn explains:
The time the war started, my small brother called Boye and small sister called 
Mamie followed some people to Ivory Coast with our mother and I think they 
went to school there. Boye was lucky to travel to America. When the war 
finished and my sister and mother came back to Liberia, Boye usually send 
money to my mother and sister who presently attending the University of 
Liberia, but when I call him [Boye], he tell me that I was not serious and so 
he don’t regard me as his big brother; when he finished talking to me like 
that, he will not send anything for me. Right now I feel that I am not part of 
our family anymore because our mother cannot even say anything. (Dahn 
2009, pers. comm., 16 May)
As we can see from these conversations, this sense of disloyalty is just part of 
a condition that included several other emotions. The distrust of former comrades was 
always accompanied by a sense of abandonment and discrimination by family and 
community. This is because the association with the group of ex-combatants is 
prejudicial at both a political and social level.  John B., aged 26, from Margibi 
County, fought with the GOL and expresses this feeling of rejection: “Chief, yourself 
can see that the one there, our friend oh, our people and even the big big people in this 
government not get time for anyone they call former fighter or rebel. We just fighting 
for our living” (John B. 2009, pers. comm., 20 May).
The negative view of the whole category of ex-combatants as a ruthless and 
cruel group creates a gap between them and the rest of the population. According to 
Hazen (2007: 2), “Combatants who commit atrocities against members of their 
communities strike the most violent blow to social unity, and these combatants are 
quickly ostracized from their communities. These forces divide communities along 
chosen allegiances”. This is true in cases where particular acts of violence can be 
directly associated with the perpetrator, but most of the fighters are not known by the 
community but are instead stigmatised for violent acts they are assumed to have 
committed by participating in the war. This generates a general stigmatisation for the 
entire category of ex-combatants as result of a clear divide between combatants and 
non-combatants. This division emphasises the sense of victimisation by the former 
fighters. In one conversation Josiah said: 
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My own people called me bad man. Nobody get time for us who fight war. 
Our own cousin who are now working for Ellen Johnson Sirleaf government 
do not even want to hear about us or see us. They have forgotten or 
abandoned us. (Josiah 2009, pers. comm., 20 May)
These common feelings experienced by many of the former fighters as 
betrayal, abandonment and discrimination suggest that they lost faith in their 
comrades, families and community, which jeopardised their sense of belonging to the 
warring factions. The motivational properties of collective identities are 
systematically documented in Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) comprehensive review 
of the evidence in support of a fundamental “need to belong” as an innate feature of 
human nature. This detachment from the factions and the loss of a sense of belonging 
then generated a sense of loneliness among the neglected veterans. This experience, 
according to Weiss, is not caused by being alone but by the absence of some essential 
relationships in people’s lives (Weiss 1973: 17). From this point of view, loneliness in 
the lives of the neglected veterans can be seen as a reaction to the dissolution of their 
supporting networks. “Loneliness is the unpleasant experience that occurs when a 
person’s network of social relations is deficient in some important way, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively” (Perlman and Peplau 1981: 31). The following chapter 
analyses the isolation of some former fighters as a reaction to this feeling of 
loneliness. 
All these feelings and reactions to the end of the conflict represent the 
theoretical evidence of what has been argued above about status, networks and the 
“neglected veteran” label. Loneliness, a sense of abandonment and feelings of 
betrayal are evidence of the temporary disintegration of supporting networks. The 
feeling of discrimination confirms the dissolution of the status of fighter and the 
consequent negative categorisation. All these feelings represent the internal factors 
that provoke the state of confusion shared by former fighters, even if for many it 
lasted only for a short period.
3.2.6 “Former fighter” as primary identity
Establishing a discourse on primary identity automatically implies the existence of 
multiple identities. There would not be a primary identity without the presence of 
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others. The confirmation of their existence entails also the interaction between them. 
In the investigation of interaction between the primary and other identities present in 
the former fighters in Liberia, it is essential not to overlook certain historical and 
cultural factors. It is necessary to analyse other identities that have been reasons for 
the conflict, such as ethnicity and youth.
The disarmament and demobilisation of the warring factions shifts the focus of 
the former fighters’ primary identity from the collective self to the individual self. The 
first element affected by the DD and the new social order was the status of the 
fighters; the disarmament process ended the privileged position of the soldiers. In a 
kind of domino effect, the dissolution of the previous status of fighter together with 
the demobilisation contributed to the temporary disintegration of their war networks. 
These external factors triggered an internal state of confusion provoked by issues of 
acceptance (community) and belonging (warring factions). 
Hazen (2007: 5) synthesizes this process precisely and briefly:
The demilitarisation and demobilisation processes are extremely threatening 
to combatants and generate anxiety, fear, and insecurity because the process 
destroys the social network on which the combatant has relied for many 
years. The loss of this social network, the war family, creates a tremendous 
sense of insecurity for ex-combatants. Through the DDR process, combatants 
lose their social status, their sense of belonging, their sense of importance, 
their income or access to basic goods, their support network, and their 
identity. 
Liberian society experienced an exceptional transformation at the end of the 
conflict in terms of both rapidity and range. Along with this radical change in the 
social order, the roles of people in society have also been transformed, affecting their 
identity. This identity transformation process differs from the natural evolution of 
adult identity changes because of its swiftness and the complete changing of the roles 
in society. This speed and range did not give the individuals time to undergo a natural, 
progressive process of identity development. As stated above, the notion of identity is 
not static but continually in progress (Jackson and Warren 2005; Moran 2006). This 
process of change must follow the natural course of time to allow it to develop and be 
successful. The speed of the changes generated by the end of the war created 
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uncertainty in the identity of most of the former fighters, leading to an internal state of 
confusion. But how is this confusion connected with identity? 
When analysing the transformation which occurred in the former fighter, we 
have to consider that the turning point of the end of the war was a traumatic event for 
the soldiers. During the conflict the soldiers were on top of the power pyramid; when 
peace was restored to the country they lost their authority. This was mostly the case 
for ordinary soldiers; those who were more high-ranking officials learnt how to
recycle their position at a political level. The consequences of these sudden changes 
affected the entire Liberian population, but in particular the fighters. Therefore 
internal and external elements deeply affected their personalities, their relationships 
and their behaviours.
The DDR programme was established at the end of the war with the explicit 
purpose of disconnecting fighters from their brothers-in-arms in order to break the 
chain of command. The “war family” was by then the only social group left for many 
of the soldiers, and their only bonds or connections were with other participants in the 
factions. The strong sense of belonging and loyalty to the warring factions saw the 
primary identity shifting from individual to collective for those who were not part of 
other groups. At this point the only way to sever these relationships between 
comrades to avoid the outbreak of future hostilities was to disarm and demobilise 
them through the DDR programme. The disarmament and demobilisation of the 
soldiers was not just a pragmatic mechanism of conflict resolution but affected also 
other important social components of the war society: the identity of the fighters. 
The withdrawal of weapons during the disarmament phase is symbolic of the 
de-ranking of a position of power to a lower step on the pyramid. The demobilisation 
was designed instead for delinking the soldiers from their military lives. Both of these 
external procedures catapulted the soldiers into a post-conflict society and turned their 
lives upside down.
The concept of the former fighters’ primary identity as an expression of the 
collective self is part of the self-categorisation process and it is central to the debate 
on identity transformation. The construction of the former fighters’ self-concept must 
be seen as divided into two different levels. Social theory asserts that we must 
distinguish between the individual self and the social self as two different levels of 
self-categorisation (Turner et al. 1994: 454). In the self-categorisation, the individual 
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self is defined by the unique characteristics of the person in terms of differences from 
others. The collective self is instead defined by the common characteristics shared 
with others. The balance of these two elements is essential for the identification of the 
primary identity.
Individual self and collective self coexist in any individual at any time of life, 
but not at the same level. The identification of the primary identity originates in the 
shifts from the uniqueness of the individual to the similarities of the group. This shift, 
in the case of the former fighters, produces identity transformation, which occurred 
several times. Before the war their collective identity may have superseded the 
individual one, or vice versa. Any of them could have been perceived according to his 
ethnicity, age, political ideas, religion and so on, or could have been seen just as 
isolated individuals. Their personal or collective identity could have identified them 
but certainly none of them was categorised as part of the group of fighters.
The first recognition of the collective self linked to the group of fighters 
occurs during the war when the soldiers were considered by others as part of warring 
factions. This represents the first mutual common step of each member of the group 
of former fighters. Joining the factions represents the root of the former fighters’ 
group identification. Before this point there were no common identifications for all 
the members of the group. People with different behaviour, personalities, ethnicity, 
religion, age and so on converge for the first time into a recognisable group. In terms 
of social identity, for the first time people with different backgrounds merged their 
individual self and different collective selves into the fighter identity. Joining the 
conflict represents square zero of the former fighters’ group identity. 
The intensity, extent and extreme cruelty of the Liberian war strengthened the 
collective identity of the fighters in terms of a sense of belonging. During the 
intensification of the conflict almost half of the Liberian population was internally 
displaced or became refugees in neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2003). Between 
250,000 and 400,000 died from war-related causes. All these factors caused among 
the fighters a deep separation from community and stronger bonds with comrades. As 
Peters, Richards and Vlassenroot (2003: 35) explain, “Militias are providing fighters 
with a renewed identity. Initiation rituals transform them into respected guards of their 
community while at the same time clearly severing all of their links with their former 
social environment.” Therefore most of the fighters abandoned their previous 
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identities to embrace the identity of the new group that incorporated them, thus 
emphasising their collective self.
This identity transformation is the first specific characteristic of the group of 
former fighters, but not the only one. Another, and more relevant for this thesis, 
occurs at the end of the war. As stated above, this identity transformation differed 
from others in terms of speed and range. 
The abrupt change in the Liberian social order caused by the implementation 
of the peace agreement did not leave enough time for the group of “fighters” to adapt. 
This difficult adaptation was amplified by the fact that most of the fighters were not 
able to recall their previous identity or did not have time to develop a strong 
individual identity before the war. An important aspect to take into consideration is 
that the average age of the demobilised soldiers was 25.3 (NCDDRR 2004: 3). In 
many cases the fighters were going through childhood or adolescence when they 
joined the war. With such a low average age, we can consider that before the war most 
of the fighters had no time to build up a durable position in Liberian society, based on 
a strong ethnic, regional or religious identity. The factional affiliation as primary 
identity overruled the earlier recognition as members of ethnic clans, secret societies 
or religious groups. 
Since identity is by nature in continual formation, the construction of a social 
identity at any stage of life is characterised by personal choices regarding who and 
what to associate with. In the case of the fighters during the war, the approach to 
identity concerns a person’s connection to others and to the particular group of 
warring factions. To describe this full commitment to the group of former fighters, 
which completely overwhelmed their individuality, we can now refer to the 
organisational identity theory. However, Pratt (1988), based on works by Turner et al. 
(1994), says that members of a group identify themselves as belonging to a local 
organisation (formal or informal), and also identify themselves with “encompassing 
organizational form”. This organisational form entails the concept of commitment. 
Foreman and Whetten also write about affective and continuance commitment, a 
concept developed by Meyer and Allen (1984). According to Meyer and Allen (1997: 
11) affective commitment to an organisation concerns how the member “wants” to be 
a part of the organisation, while continuance commitment concerns the member’s 
“needs”, as he or she sees them, to be a part of the organisation. If we analyse 
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affective and continuance commitment to the group of former fighters, we see how 
most of the time there was the presence of both what they needed and what they 
wanted. This created a strong long-term commitment that clouded the rest of their 
decisions.
In conclusion, the concept of identity is central in order to analyse the 
changing context of Liberia after the conflict. The establishment of a new social order 
entirely changes the lives of the former fighters. This mutation has a direct 
consequence on the social identity of the fighters because it triggers a process of 
identity transformation. 
3.2.7 The state of confusion as a possible symptom of an identity crisis
The identification of the fighters with their peers collapsed when they, too, were no 
longer confident of their identity. This collapse led to a state of confusion, echoed in 
the voices of the former fighters. In some cases this confusion could be identified as 
part of an identity crisis. It is not the intention of this thesis to demonstrate that the 
first phase of identity transformation of the former fighters was characterised by an
identity crisis, but only to outline some presuppositions that could be helpful to 
understand the identity transformation. This sub-section gives a brief idea of the 
concept of identity crisis and relates it to the identity transformation process.
The evolution of the lives of the former fighters up to this point has been 
approached through an identity transformation process. This process has many 
similarities with identity formation theories. Erik Erikson (1968), a leading academic 
in the field of identity formation, was the first to use the term identity crisis to 
describe a period of internal analysis and exploration of the “self” during teenage 
years. During this period, the individual faces conflict between feelings of identity 
cohesion and role confusion. With the development of many studies in different fields, 
it is common knowledge now that an identity crisis can take place at any stage of life, 
when triggered by great transitions. It is also interesting to note that Erikson first 
considered the idea of identity crisis when dealing with identity loss among war 
trauma victims in the Second World War (Cote and Levin 2002: 15). He created the 
term “identity crisis” to express the symptoms of identity dissociation and identity 
confusion experienced by the “shell-shocked” war victims (Cote and Levin 2002: 95). 
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According to Erikson (1968) three elements must combine in identity 
development; if not, an identity crisis is recognisable. First, there is the development 
of a strong ego identity, the “self”, as part of the psychological dimension; secondly, 
the presence of a personality that characterises the individual as part of the personal 
dimension; and finally a recognised role in society as part of the social dimension. 
Accordingly, a deficiency in any of these factors may increase the chance of an 
identity crisis or confusion. “Such identity crisis is characterized by a subjective sense 
of identity confusion, a behavioural and characterological disarray, and a lack of 
commitment to recognised roles in a community” (Cote and Levine 2002: 15). 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that all these elements are lacking or are not 
strongly recognisable in the former fighters after the conflict. First, the recognition of 
a strong ego identity and personality in the former fighter is clouded by the 
overwhelming existence of a powerful collective identity. Secondly, with the end of 
the conflict their role in society completely changes and becomes uncertain. The role 
of the individual in society represents an important part of the identity crisis. “In a 
social setting and communal life, role confusion is almost synonymous with identity 
confusion as identity, to a certain extent, is in alignment with the society and its 
expectations from the individual” (Bezci 2008: 4). In the case of the former fighters, 
the delegitimisation of their roles that took place with the disarmament and 
demobilisation process directly affected their identity. As Hazen (2007: 5) says: “This 
support network [war family] provides a sense of identity and purpose”, and the 
dissolution of this network provoked an identity confusion.
From another point of view, a development of Erikson’s studies by Cote and 
Levine (2002: 17) argues that integration into a stable society and culture leads to a 
stronger sense of identity in general. The presence of a structured society helps in the 
formation and maintenance of identity while a poorly-structured society makes this 
identity problematic. This is the case in war-torn Liberia where it is easy to 
understand why the former fighters experience identity problems.
Another aspect to take into consideration in this identity crisis is the 
antagonistic dualism between individual self and collective self.  As mentioned above, 
the absence of two elements – ego and personality – can point to an identity crisis. 
Both these notions are linked to the individual self.  During the war, the major trend 
among Liberians was the development of a strong sense of individualism. The 
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divisions created by the war did little to inspire their desire to belong to a wider 
community and accentuated the selfishness of the survival instinct. The widespread 
tendency was not to unify but to divide. These tendencies previously existed, 
especially in urban areas, but they were magnified by the war and the struggle for 
survival. It was not tension between ethnic or political groups that caused this; the 
constant, day-to-day struggle for survival meant that each individual was forced to 
fend for him or herself. Contrary to this trend, the soldiers tended to be united. The 
brotherhood developed during the conflict by many fighters was the foundation for 
strong bonds that survived after the end of the war. Camaraderie, solidarity, cohesion 
and so on are characteristics that usually develop among soldiers, generating a strong 
spirit of collectivism and sense of belonging. These aspects of the lives of the former 
fighters made them develop a strong primary identity based on a cooperative 
personality and collective self at the expense of the individual personality and the 
individual self.
In conclusion, the principal elements, analysed above, that indicate the 
presence of an identity crisis in the former fighters are:
• the absence of a strong ego due to identity confusion as a result of the shift 
from the collective to the individual self 
• the indefinable role in society due to the complete subversion of the status of 
fighter in the social structure as a result of lack of integration.
While the first component was triggered by internal factors, such as common 
feelings and emotions, the second was provoked by external factors, such as the DD 
programmes (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Elements of the identity crisis
3.3 Conclusion
With the end of the war, the dissolution of the soldiers’ status and the disintegration of 
their networks, the fighters found themselves in a traumatic state in which the whole 
range of their previously established relationships and bonds had been destroyed. The 
transformation of their web of connections that arose from the loss of their privileges 
led directly to a state of confusion. 
While we can associate the disintegration of the status of fighter with the 
handing-over of weapons and the disintegration of the networks with demobilisation, 
it is not possible to link the beginning of this state of confusion to a particular moment 
in time. In any case, during their interviews, the former fighters refer to the period in 
the cantonments as a time of disorder. They were not referring to external chaos but to 
an internal development. They were used to giving orders and ruling among 
themselves, but suddenly were ruled and commanded by strangers. In the 
cantonments, the disruption to their natural order abruptly removed their familiar 
points of reference and cast them into a confused situation. The entire environment 
around them changed, and other internal changes were taking place as part of a full-
scale transformation of society in Liberia. 
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Analysing this transformation of Liberian society, it is necessary to delineate 
the area of interest of the thesis. To outline the boundaries of this transformation, it is 
necessary to consider two factors: the war timeline and the sociological development 
of the lives of the former fighters. An important presupposition is that two particular 
events in history – the beginning of the war and its end – revolutionised the lives of 
Liberians in a radical way, leading to sociological transformations. When the war 
broke out, some Liberians continued to lead normal civilian lives, while others took 
part in the conflict. The main focus of this thesis is the end of the war, its aftermath, 
and the current situation of the former fighters.  
Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to trace the war timeline to follow the 
development of the lives of the former fighters. If we see their lives before the war as 
“normal” – ordinary people living ordinary civilian lives – we can assume that they 
also had a “normal” status in society, being ranked in Liberian social hierarchy 
according to their occupation, education and income. Before the war there was 
nothing significant about their lives marking them out as different to any other 
member of the community. They were “invisible”, hidden among the people. They 
would have fulfilled their roles in the community, gaining the status of “normality” in 
their own eyes and in the eyes of others, in a normally functioning society. 
This period of their lives ended as the war broke out. These once ordinary 
civilians were faced with a major turning point in their lives that would affect their 
self-image, how they saw themselves in society and how society perceived them. 
Their once “normal” or “civilian” selves were beginning to change gradually from 
what they were before or at the beginning of the conflict to what emerged at the end 
of the war. 
The second factor to consider when outlining the boundaries of the identity 
transformation of the former fighters is the societal development (relationships, social 
position, networks, beliefs) of their lives. 
With the start of conflict, a civilian entering the war left behind his or her old 
status and acquired a new one, that of a fighter. This was the first significant event 
that began a transformation in their thinking and behaviour, and consequently in their 
identity.  Those who decided to join the factions became alienated from their previous 
lives and ways of thinking. To survive in the new and unfamiliar order that had sprung 
up around them, they adjusted by adopting the role and status of soldier, and 
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consequently acquired a new identity. However, this adjustment soon fell apart in the 
anarchy that followed the end of the war. This not only marked a significant period of 
change in the fighter’s life; it also brought about a new order in Liberian society, 
which severed any ties the fighter had with the past.   Individuals who had mastered 
their new status as “fighter” were once again “levelled down” to the status of civilian, 
thus facing an internal state of confusion. This condition is the beginning of the 
identity transformation of the former fighter. The acquisition of a new status of 
“civilian” by the fighters determined how they began to see themselves, and 
influenced the new identity they formed around their new self-image.
These new circumstances erased the ex-combatants’ previous connections and 
provoked them to occupy a new position in society. The full development process is 
illustrated in blue in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: The sociological development of the lives of former fighters 
The war timeline and the sociological development of the lives of the former 
fighters must be analysed together.  Figure 3.4 is the matrix that results from 
combining Figures 3.2 and 3.3 and represents stages in the lives of the former fighters 
in relation to the war. 
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Figure 3.5 visually summarises the area of focus of this thesis regarding the 
identity transformation of former fighters. The circumference represents the end of the 
war.  Inside this area, towards the end of the conflict the life of the fighters begins to 
change and be reshaped due to a sociological crisis. At the end of the war, they 
become estranged from their former lives and adopt new outlooks and ways of 
thinking. This came about especially for the fighters who distanced themselves from 
their families and communities.
Figure 3.5: Thesis focus area – the identity transformation of former fighters
125
The process of transformation of Liberian society started with the realisation 
that the circumstances of war were no longer the model for society. With the signing 
of the peace agreement, the leaders of the factions decided to end the war in order to 
bring stability and peace to Liberia. The importance of soldiers as an armed means of 
repression was no longer relevant as the conflict was taken from the level of “the 
field” to the political level. With the abolition of the status of soldier and the 
breakdown of the war networks, the web of connections around the fighters began to 
change accordingly. 
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Chapter 4: Reintegration process: Inclusion or exclusion 
from the community
4.1 Introduction
In line with the chronology of events, Chapter 4 is an analysis of the reintegration 
process that focuses on the perceptions of former fighters. This phase in the post-
conflict setting deals with the inclusion of former fighter in the social and economic 
fabric of the country. This thesis approaches the conflict management mechanism of 
reintegration through the former fighter’s perception of being accepted or rejected by 
society. 
Kingma identifies three dimensions of reintegration: economic, social and 
psychological (Kingma 2000: 14). All three imply the concept of “community”. While 
economic reintegration involves the re-establishment of the former fighters’ 
livelihood, social reintegration is aimed at healing the fracture in relationships and 
trust between them and the communities. The psychological dimension concerns a 
series of mental and emotional perceptions that the former fighters experience during 
the process of reintegration. These three dimensions are the variables needed to 
achieve stability and development in post-conflict situations, which will determine the 
success or failure of reintegration. The first part of this chapter defines the social and 
psychological factors of reintegration. 
It is necessary to bear in mind that a completely successful reintegration is 
unrealistic as there will always be a number of unsatisfied former fighters. Some of 
the major surveys by other authors into former fighters in Liberia highlight the fact 
that there is contrasting information about the success of reintegration. As Hill et al. 
(2008: 20–21) point out:
Using this benchmark, [referring to the question whether they face problem 
gaining acceptance from their family and community] clearly most ex-
combatants have reintegrated successfully. There is, however, a minority –
nearly 20% – that continue to have problems with some of the relationships in 
their lives. More than half of those respondents are having trouble getting 
along with both their families and their communities, a sign of serious trouble 
reintegrating socially ... Another proxy for reintegration success is whether or 
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not ex-combatants feel they are viewed positively by the community. This 
proxy taps into reintegration success for former fighters more generally and 
thus should be used as a complement to the more individual-specific 
questions above. The majority of respondents reported that they believe their 
home community’s perception of them is neutral to positive: 43% of 
respondents feel that ex-combatants are viewed with acceptance, while 20% 
went so far as to say they are respected … There is, however, some evidence 
of friction between ex-fighters and their communities. Negative responses, 
which skewed toward fear and distrust and away from anger and envy, 
accounted for about 35% of the sample. Based on these two proxies, we can 
conclude that though social reintegration has been successful for the majority 
of respondents, some problems remain.
The extract above expresses the ambiguity of former fighters’ perceptions about 
reintegration. During some conversations conducted for this research, the participants 
asserted that they felt reintegrated. However, during further discussions they 
described problems about getting along with their families and communities, because 
they were viewed with fear and distrust. This is often the case with former fighters 
who feel excluded from the social fabric. Peter says: 
[...] the society still sees us as bad people. I feel marginalised because 
everywhere I go looking for work I cannot find anything besides being secure 
and to stay in the cold where the mosquitoes bites at night. Nobody wants to 
give us good job. (Peter 2006, pers. comm., 20 September)
This comment highlights the gap between former fighters and the community, and 
indicates that the success or failure of reintegration can be measured by the extent of 
inclusion. This approach rejects the idea of the reintegration programmes in Liberia 
that seemed to treat former fighters as single entities that could be inserted willingly 
or by force into communities whose members were at times far more developed and 
skilled than the former fighters. However, the Liberian case proves that both the 
communities and the former fighters themselves are responsible for ensuring the 
proper recognition of each other’s identity. 
According to Jennings (2008b: 336), reintegration is more suitable when 
civilians and former fighters are seen as being at the same level. In the case of 
Liberia, the stigmatisation problem arises at a group rather than individual level: 
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… the presumed stigmatization of ex-combatants seemed overstated; among 
our informants, nearly 70 percent lived with family or close relatives, 
indicating that family were not reluctant to take them back, and Pugel reports 
that 94 percent of ex-combatants (both DDR participants and nonparticipants) 
self-reported having no problems gaining acceptance from their neighbours. 
This arguably owes to the duration and encompassing nature of the conflict, 
as well as to the various means of recruitment into armed groups. Some 
informants claimed they were forcibly recruited, but most said they fought to 
protect their own or their family’s security: they figured they were safer on 
the inside than the outside and could use their insider status to extend some 
protection to their family. Even non combatants seemed to recognise this 
logic and acknowledge that people did what they must to survive. 
She further explains that 
“this does not imply forgiveness, but it does indicate acceptance of the post 
war landscape in a society where all were affected by, and many directly or 
indirectly implicated in, conflict. Insofar as a stigma did operate, it was 
seemingly on a group rather than individual level.” (Jennings 2008b: 336) 
Conducting a collective rather than individual analysis of former fighters provides the 
answer to understanding why there is a gap between them and the rest of the 
population. The self-categorisation into a group explains the in-group/out-group 
mechanism of the feeling of acceptance/rejection by the community. The group of 
former fighters does not have boundaries in terms of numbers and geographical 
location. They merely present common characteristics that can come to the surface in 
different ways and create different personalities. Although people with different 
backgrounds seem to have little in common from the outset, they can have some 
common traits linking them together. 
4.2 Reintegration as a community-driven inclusion process
Reintegration is commonly understood as:
the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and 
economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in 
communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a 
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country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term 
external assistance. (United Nations 2006: 2)
In order to carry out this process the reintegration programmes are seen as “assistance 
measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for them 
and their families’ economic and social reintegration into civil society (DPKO 2000: 
15). Such “assistance measures” in Liberia have been associated only with economic 
procedures, leaving no other choice but for the international community and 
academics to use these procedures as the variable for measuring the success of the 
reinsertion process. This approach drastically marked the reintegration process in 
post-conflict Liberia. The social and psychological connotations of reintegration are
overlooked since employment opportunities are seen as the only sign of successful 
reintegration.  In addition, from the point of view of the community and the former 
fighters, the word “reintegration” became synonymous with education and vocational 
training for the purpose of work reinsertion. 
Economic reintegration was the focus of the programme as social 
reintegration was largely left aside. The assumption that economic 
reintegration in turn leads to social reintegration does not hold true. The lack 
of attention to the social dimension, in particular as regards both to 
reconciliation and psycho-social support, was a major gap. (UNDP 2006: 10) 
From this section of the UNDP final report on the reintegration process in Liberia, it 
is clear that the approach to the social situation was weak, while most of the planned 
psycho-social support and counselling was cancelled. 
Concerning the psychological reintegration aspect of the programmes, a study 
by Gear in 2002 emphasised the importance of psychological assistance for the 
recovery of the former fighters. Mogapi (2004: 224) highlights the importance of 
involving the former fighters in the community, for example by organising 
“ceremonies that recognize and honour ex-combatants, to be held at local level, with 
the communities actively involved in the process. This will assist in restoring the 
dignity that these soldiers need and also enabling the community to learn about the 
sacrifices that they have made.” Continued community efforts could help build the 
self-esteem of the former fighters and help their self-identification as members of 
society.
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The notion of community is central to the psychological aspects of 
reintegration. The idea of community is often associated with acceptance and 
rejection. Redfield (1960) points to the community as having qualities such as 
distinctiveness, smallness and homogeneity, and as providing self-sufficiency – all 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the delimitation process of the community. Others 
refer to the community as a process or system: “The community should be viewed as 
a process involving social structure and cultural behaviour” (Arensberg and Kimball 
1965: 2–3). Either you are in or you are out. Important studies by Cohen (1998) and 
Bray (2004) focus on the boundaries that are used for the purposes of identification. 
They analyse identity as a “virtual site” where the boundaries provide the framework 
within which this virtual site is built. All the above concepts relating to borders, 
boundaries and delimitations of the community affect the concept of inclusion and 
exclusion by society. When borders are defined, there is an automatic definition of 
who is inside and who is outside. This creates space for the acceptance or rejection of 
an individual. Consequently, the notion of community is central when talking about 
the reintegration of former fighters. This assumes that the former combatants need 
and warrant support within the community or society into which they are being 
reintegrated. 
This support given by the community to former fighters can vary: socio-
economic, developmental, security-based, humanitarian-based etc. This further 
involves the notion that former fighters are different from the masses or civilians in 
terms of what constitutes their personality or identity, or in terms of their abilities, 
potential to progress etc. This approach or assumption, as shown in the Liberian case, 
intensifies and widens the gap between former fighters and the communities into 
which they are reintegrated. More often than not, when communities feel that the 
former fighters are not necessarily part of their community, or have a negative view of 
their contribution and existence within the community, it is usually because the 
aforementioned approach has created and/or sustained such a perception.
This detachment between former fighters and the communities began with the 
delay at the beginning of the reintegration process. By the time reintegration started, 
local populations had already begun a process of socio-economic reconstruction. As 
soon as there was a sense of security, residents and those who had returned to the 
community earlier began the difficult task of rebuilding relationships, traditional 
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institutions and the local economy, as well as addressing the trauma resulting from the 
conflict. During this community-driven reconstruction process, the former fighters 
were still going through their disarmament and demobilisation programmes and so did 
not benefit from all the positive effects of this community effort. Moreover, the 
former fighters are often seen as “privileged” beneficiaries of the reconstruction 
process. Too often, the focus on former fighters has overshadowed this community-
driven reconstruction process, thus hindering stakeholders from tapping into the 
potential within communities. It seems obvious that a socio-economic reintegration 
process is flawed if it fails to look at community and wider stakeholder groups and 
their needs.
During the period of change and insertion into the community, new questions 
arise over disorientation, a dependency bred in military structures, alienation, and 
stigmatization. This period of personal change requires socio-psychological attention 
(Berdal 1996: 17). Effective integration is not just about being economically or 
physically part of community, but relies on social acceptance generated by the bonds 
of interpersonal relationships. 
4.2.1 A first-hand account of reintegration in Liberia
Before defining the sociological implications of the meaning of reintegration, let us 
look at the UN peacekeeping programmes run in Liberia, particularly during the DD 
phase. Immediately after disarming, former fighters received a DDR recognition card, 
were temporarily accommodated in cantonments, received the first of the two 
instalments of US$150 each (one instalment was paid at the cantonment – the other 
followed three months later when the former fighter had transferred to his resident 
community), and were allowed to enter the reintegration programme, which consisted 
of formal education, apprenticeships, and vocational training in public works, 
farming, livestock, or fishing services. Individuals signed up in reintegration plans 
were to get a monthly stipend whilst engaging and getting their education or coaching 
fees paid for, for up to three years. Numerous additional DDR individuals sought 
resettlement in the Montserrado region outside Monrovia as opposed to elsewhere. 
This might be seen in the light of Kees Kingma’s observation that reintegration is 
frequently less productive in cities in comparison to countryside locations (Jennings 
2008b: 329). 
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As mentioned earlier, a crucial element of the Liberian experience was the 
reduction of entry requirements during the December 2003–April 2004 hiatus; 
initially requiring production of a weapon, the recommenced DD process only 
required applicants to produce 150 rounds of ammunition.
This change led to an explosion in the overall number of DDR applicants, 
while reducing the number of weapons gathered. Consequently, by the conclusion of 
the DD segments, 102,193 participants were catalogued as neutralised (as opposed to 
the previous total of 38,000 to 45,000 former fighters); however, only about 27,800 
weapons and six million rounds of ammunition were stockpiled (UNDP 2006). This 
raises a question as to the extent to which the security goals of disarmament had been 
realised. Certainly, stories and reports of large armament caches continue to surface, 
giving rise to suspicions of widespread security breaches. There is also apparent 
confirmation that many of the DDR applicants were not in fact former fighters 
(Jennings 2008b: 330). 
These security concerns brought back the ghost of the demobilisation after the 
end of the first civil war in Liberia. After that conflict, further clashes and conflicts 
were to be expected, not only because the overall peacekeeping process and strategies 
were ineffective, but also because their execution was poor. Kieh (2009) argues that 
the primary failure point in the peacekeeping process was not just the weak ideas and 
strategies behind it, but a failure to initiate crucial elements such as reform of the 
security sector and encouragement of national understanding and settlement. This 
failure was compounded by the attempt to complete too quickly the procedures of 
disarmament and demobilisation, which ultimately were inefficient and inappropriate. 
For these reasons, further conflict could be expected in Liberia, Kieh points out. To 
avoid this, it was necessary for the government and national parties to learn from their 
mistakes and be better prepared in the future (Kieh 2009: 7).
The second civil war confirmed this analysis, and the post-conflict process 
after this war reproduced some of the problems that caused the failure first time 
round. One of these failures was in the methods of carrying out the DD phase.  
As the basis for the transition of the former fighters from martial to civilian 
status, the DD phase represents an essential aspect of my research. What happened 
during this stage of the transition from war to peace in Liberia is of pivotal relevance 
in understanding how the web of connections of former fighters was affected by the 
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DDR process. The Liberian DD programme is characterised by a number of 
unexpected problems.  By and large these problems appear to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, due especially to political pressures.   
During my first visit to Liberia I interviewed some of the main actors in the 
DD phase of the programme. The general intention of these interviews was to listen to 
those who had helped to shape the policies of the entire process so as to collect 
information on the development of the programme. The main authority in the DD 
process was the programme and policy advisor, Mr Charles Achodo, head of the JIU 
(Joint Implementation Unit), who provided deep insights. It was clear from the 
beginning that the personnel responsible for the programme were not fully satisfied 
with the current security situation of the former fighters; he made clear that some of 
the problems that emerged during the DD programme were political. Comparing the 
two operations in West Africa, Mr Achodo pointed out how the main problem during 
the DD stage related to the legitimacy of the government. 
The Sierra Leone and the Liberian conflict are in a context of failed states, 
but the differences are that in Sierra Leone there was an elected government 
with an international committee there to ensure its legitimacy. Liberia, 
instead, never had an elected government and the government has never been 
legitimated internationally but had a little local legitimacy that didn’t assure 
the complete control over the country. (Achodo 2005, interview, 5 October)
Mr Steve Ursino, country representative for UNDP, also pointed to the political 
instability of Liberia as a factor in the initial failures of the DD phase. 
Both DDR programmes in the two countries were the result of a negotiated 
peace agreement and after a one-to-one talk there was a decision for 
deployment. But while in the case of Sierra Leone the process of conflict 
resolution involves negotiated political commitments and an arrangement that 
includes the factions in the political development, in Liberia, on the contrary, 
the peace agreements of Accra only provided a transitional internship. 
(Ursino 2005, interview, 7 October).
Mr Sergio Valdini, head of the DEX (Direct Execution) unit of the JIU, was of the 
same opinion, and added: 
Because there was a government in Sierra Leone some legitimacy was 
already in place and the government guided the process, calling the 
international committee to support and implement it and to control that all the 
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steps made were neutral. In Liberia, because there is a transitional 
government, made of the factions of the conflict, it didn’t have the essential 
political wheel to drive the programme and therefore demanded the United 
Nations to lead it. (Valdini 2005, interview, 13 October)
It was thus a common opinion that the absence of legitimacy of the transitional 
government and its lack of participation in the process led to malfunctions that slowed 
down the DD programme and, in some cases, brought it to a halt. Indeed it is clear 
that, if the previously warring factions are not involved in the reconstruction process, 
they can decide to stop the process and to boycott the whole operation, or even to go 
back to war. Even if part three of the Liberian Peace Agreement established an 
interdisciplinary and interdepartmental National Commission for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) to coordinate DDRR 
activities, there were no specifications in the agreement on what the responsibilities of 
this group were on the issue of reintegration. This lack of legitimacy and 
responsibility concerning policies accentuated the gap between high-ranking officers 
and common soldiers. Those who attained good positions in the post-conflict setting 
felt no accountability towards their former companions and did not care about them. 
On the one hand, the demobilisation successfully broke the chain of command; on the 
other, individuality prevailed over collaboration. These circumstances helped to 
develop in some former fighters a sense of betrayal (this will be examined in the next 
chapter of this thesis).
The interviews with the main actors of the DD process indicate that the focal 
problem during this phase was the politicisation of the process. It is also clear that the 
main problem noticed by the NGOs involved in the implementation process was 
pressure to speed up the programme. Another significant issue that affected the 
effective implementation of the DD programme is that the time frame for the political 
agenda was out of sync with the time frame for the necessary technical support 
structures being in place. The latter were neglected in favour of speed with an eye on 
a donors’ conference scheduled for December 2003. Political and economic pressures 
led to unrealistic timetables being set. The three NGO directors who organised and 
directed the establishment of the six cantonment sites for the disarmament and 
demobilisation of the former combatants, in Tubmanburg, Buchanan, VOA (Voice of 
America), Gbarnga, Zwedru and Ganta, were in agreement with this criticism. 
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Mr Charles Pitchford, director of the Lutheran World Federation-World 
Service (LWF-WS) said that “the politics threatened the whole process by trying to 
speed it up, because the resources and the people needed for the cantonments were not 
ready”. Mr John Di Stefano, head of the United Methodist Committee on Relief 
(UMCOR), strongly disapproved of the timetable that the UN drew up, claiming that 
it had been aimed at giving a good impression to the public. He added: “We reminded 
them during the meetings that we were not ready for the opening of the cantonments, 
but nobody listened to us and the only answer was that we ought to be ready 
according to the programme”. 
Some key issues may be highlighted in these interviews. Firstly, the DD phase 
should not be used to apply political pressure – if there are political disagreements, 
they should be solved politically. Secondly, issues concerning ministers, army, police 
and so on must not be inserted in the peace agreement as preconditions for 
disarmament; if they are, misunderstandings will arise during the disarmament phase.
Another common opinion is that it was misguided to accelerate the process out 
of fear of a new outburst of fighting, and that this led to the dramatic failure at Camp 
Schiefflin and the death of nine people. The process should only have started after it 
had been fully prepared operationally; resources had to be ready; it was necessary in 
advance to recruit the required experts, to find the right people and equipment, to 
organise the necessary funds, and so on. In addition, UN troops were not fully 
deployed on the ground because the timetable did not foresee that, when the military 
component was composed of soldiers of various nations, it would be almost 
impossible to deploy them all at the same time; it was thus impracticable to attain full 
military strength when required.
On the other hand, all the people I interviewed agreed about the successes of 
this first phase of the DDRR programme. An agreement between the factions was 
reached and implemented, and the circumstances for peace were created. Peace had 
been more or less achieved, IDPs had returned to their counties, refugees were back in 
Liberia, there was a new elected government after free and fair elections, and people 
were not afraid to go into the streets. New small businesses had appeared and children 
started to go back to school. The possibility of new democratic activities had been 
created, providing a stable foundation for the establishment of a reliable government. 
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4.2.2 The social and psychological implications of reintegration
The reintegration programmes in Liberia mostly consisted of the reinsertion of former 
soldiers into the economic marketplace through vocational training, apprenticeships, 
formal education and micro-initiatives and enterprises. Analysis of the 
implementation of these programmes in Liberia shows that not much time was 
dedicated to social and psychological factors of the problem. 
Figures available from the DDR programmes show that the programme was 
designed to receive an estimated 38,000 combatants, which corresponds to what the 
factions declared during the negotiating phase. During disarmament and 
demobilisation, however, 103,000 fighters, almost three times the estimated number, 
were received by the cantonments. This complicated and slowed down the process 
considerably, almost leading to a breakdown in the programme. Cuts were made both 
in costs and timing in some elements of the programme, leading to reduced attention 
being given to psychological and social factors. 
The reduction in time spent at the cantonment sites, for example, affected in 
particular the extent of counselling, which is a central part of psychological 
reintegration. The period for disarmament and demobilisation was originally 
estimated at one month but was effectively reduced to less than 10 days, leaving 
inadequate time for counselling.
The overcrowding and the financial cuts also affected the implementation 
framework that, according to the plans, was to focus on the entire war-affected 
population, including former fighters, returned refugees, returned IDPs, and the 
communities that received these groups. However, the large number of fighters taking 
part in the programmes left insufficient space for attention to be given to the other 
vulnerable categories. This situation was one of the causes of disagreement between 
civilians and former soldiers, and of the sense of resentment that the communities felt 
towards the ex-fighters. In some cases not all the former fighters participated in the 
reintegration programmes due to the shortage of funds. In other cases former fighters 
started the programmes but did not receive the allowances promised, or the payments 
ceased after a short period.
In 2004, UN troops entered and took us to the camp and gave us US$150 
each for our arms. We decided to cease fire because the rebels had support. I 
went through the disarmament and demobilisation and I have my ID card. 
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After disarmament, I went back to school. I took my money from 
disarmament, rented a room to live, bought food, clothes, shoes and helped 
my family. I got enrolled in school but they stopped to receive the fee so I got 
kicked out. I never applied to another institution because the people said the 
money was not enough to send us to another learning institution (Michael 
2009, pers. comm., 17 May).
This is echoed by Andy, who says: “I have ceased formal education due to a shortage 
of funds. Each time we attended school we were supposed to get benefits. When we 
received our cheques we were unable to cash them” (Andy 2006, pers. comm., 3 
August).
An analysis reveals why some of the soldiers at the time of disarmament 
decided not to take part in the programmes, in order to avoid being stigmatised as 
former fighters; avoiding this was an essential part of their psychological 
reintegration. During the interviews, Chief Papa was questioned on how he sought to 
avoid being stigmatised as an ex-combatant. He answered: 
I did this by not going through the DDRR programme. Because having an ex-
comb. ID card cannot separate me from a combatant. To act in an orderly 
manner, to be very serviceable to people in the community, most of all, not to 
act traumatised. (Chief Papa 2005, pers. comm., 27 October) 
His response echoes that of many others; some decided to participate in the DD stage 
to get the first part of the allowance but avoided going through the RR phase. Another 
former fighter, Roosevelt said: 
I never went through the DDR because it would have damaged my character 
‘cause I wanted to travel. Not all of us were illiterate and I have my parents to 
support me in furtherance of my education. Being a DDR student can 
associate me from the title ex-comb. (Roosevelt 2006, pers. comm., 24 
September)
Certain authors have expressed a similar point, such as Pugel (2007: 5):
Formal identification as an ex-combatant was the reason most often cited by 
nonparticipants (47%) for declining entry into the DDRR programme. 
Whether the decision of the non-participants was due to a general social 
stigma or the result of individual conduct cannot be explained here. 
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The decision was taken in order to avoid being identified as former fighters, 
exploiting the resources for reintegration, and therefore highlighting the division 
between civilians and fighters. One of the major assumptions that exist in the Liberian 
post-war system that directly affects the reintegration process of former fighters is the 
appropriateness of the specific policies for the equal treatment of fighters and 
civilians. This assumption is multifaceted and hence a number of different factors can 
influence the overall success or failure of the whole reintegration process. For 
instance, the main facet of this assumption is the ability of the practitioners to select 
the correct individuals for the programmes. This indicates that the division between 
civilians and former fighters is clear-cut and that they can be divided easily based on 
status before and after the war/conflict. However, researchers agree that in Liberia the 
division was not at all clear-cut. 
The case of Jeoffrey clearly illustrates this lack of clear division between 
victim and perpetrators: 
“I join the war after the rebels kill my family. I was conscripted by the rebels, 
they tied me beat me then they killed my mother and brother so I decided to 
join government to revenge ‘cause they starved me and putted me in pain” 
(Jeoffrey 2006, pers. comm.)
The number of fighting forces and the extensive length of the war gave birth to 
numerous situations such as that of Jeoffrey, where individuals shifted from the status 
of non-combatant to that of combatant or from one warring faction to another. 
Sometimes people took up weapons to defend themselves, their families or their 
possessions, fighting against whoever tried to cross their path, no matter which 
factions they were. This made it very difficult to differentiate between non-
combatants and fighters. After recent conflicts, especially those involving the 
conscription of youth and repeated waves of violence, it was difficult for practitioners 
to categorise those involved in and affected by the conflict. Take, for example, an 
individual who was tortured and kidnapped during one phase of conflict, was later 
forced to fight, and then eventually had to find shelter in a neighbouring country at 
another stage of the war. What is the most appropriate group to place him in? Is he a 
refugee, a victim of torture or a former fighter?  
The official criterion used by the United Nations to classify a war-affected 
person in the category of former fighter has been the ID card given after the handover 
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of a gun. Moreover, during the DD phase in Liberia, the standard method of 
categorisation of fighters was based only on the possession or non-possession of a 
weapon. If someone owned or was in possession of arms during the disarmament 
process, he would automatically be included in the category of former fighter and 
would benefit from this status. The question that arises where there is a standardised 
method is how to deal with the reality of the particular context of a specific country, 
such as Liberia. Those who have worked in the field in Liberia have learnt to call 
those who were affected at any stage by the war a “survivor” or “war-affected”. The 
eventual location of an individual will be in a predetermined, often inappropriate unit 
that, in some cases, accentuates the stigmatisation and marginalisation of the 
individual.
Reintegration programmes were originally intended to be the tool to deal with 
recovery, with the aim of ensuring equal political, social and economic opportunities 
for war-affected populations and the receiving communities, and as a way of avoiding 
the exclusion of vulnerable groups. However, in some cases, the deficiencies had the 
opposite effect and stopped or slowed down the complete social integration of former 
fighters. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has played an important role 
in social and psychological reintegration. Within the much-disputed topic of the 
reintegration of former fighters, the human rights issue is a focal point of 
disagreement. On the one hand, there are those who support the right of civilians to 
protection from crimes such as murder, massacre, torture and rape and who seek the 
prosecution of the perpetrators. On the other, there are those who emphasise the right 
of the former fighters to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into the social fabric of a 
new post-conflict transition, where non-discrimination is the basis for total 
reconciliation. In the middle of the debate is the TRC, which aims to investigate and 
provide an accurate analysis of the violence committed during conflict. In the tragic 
context of Liberia, where conflicts have left a deep split in society, the scales are 
tipped in favour of one side or the other, trying to find a common ground for both 
victims and perpetrators of past abuses. It is, indeed, only in an environment where 
human rights are upheld that long-term peace, dignity and stability can proliferate and 
reconciliation among the survivors is feasible. An important role in the psychological 
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integration of former fighters was supposed to be played by the TRC, but this 
mechanism was never completely implemented.
The TRC was designed to become a powerful tool for Liberians to make a 
collective effort to understand the effect of war on former fighters as well as 
eradicating the mythology and disgrace that surrounded the trauma experienced by 
them. However, in practice, most of the TRC sessions seemed to exclude the true 
and/or traumatic war memories of the ex-soldiers. A similar experience can be found 
in the case of South African. According to what Mogapi (2004) wrote about the South 
African experience of its own TRC, there also seemed to be little or no discussion of 
the traumatic war experiences of ex-fighters. Instead, the same kind of evasion is 
apparent, as most of the former soldiers kept their emotions bottled up instead of 
using the TRC as a platform to vent their frustrations, anger and worries about their 
experiences.
Mogapi (2004: 222) writes: 
South Africans still don’t understand the pain and impact of war on the 
soldiers. As a result, war experiences and soldiers are still mystified and 
stigmatized. And although South Africa has become more empathic and 
understanding towards victims of trauma, such as abused children and 
women, there seems to be a deafening silence about the trauma of war. This 
silence contributes to the perpetuation of myths and the stigmatization of ex-
combatants … as a result there has been a lack of advocacy in the country on 
the traumatic experiences of soldiers. The lack of preparation also meant that 
mental health professionals lack the specialized skills needed to work with 
this group, resulting in compromised services offered to ex-combatants. 
The failure of the TRC and such organisations in Liberia is a huge setback for the 
social and psychological reintegration of former fighters. As has been said earlier, 
suppressing one’s experiences and emotions about war does not help in overcoming 
one’s difficulties and being able to contribute to the community or being accepted and 
approved by it. 
Understanding former fighters’ memories after the war is an important part of 
the reintegration process. As it is difficult for the families and friends of those once 
close to the former fighters to understand their experiences, their input into the role of 
the various reintegration programmes is pivotal for their development. As those once 
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close to the soldiers often do not know how to cope with them in the new situation, 
these programmes help them to deal with their memories and experiences, so that they 
will not repress them, which would hinder their future development. Roosevelt, a 
former fighter who underwent some trauma counselling during his reintegration 
programme, said: 
I feel very bad about my past. Things we were forced to do still rotate in my 
mind.  However I feel good of my present, because I have the chance to live a 
normal life. And comparing the past to the present, the present is fruitful and 
hopeful for me because everything I do is done by my own choice, not 
forcefully. I completely regret the past but the present gives me strength to go 
on. (Roosevelt 2006, pers. comm., 24 September)
He speaks freely about his actions while fighting at the border with Guinea. 
He said that it was normal to take “other people’s things, many jewellery and women 
and killing innocent people”.  He adds: 
I regret because of the bad, evil acts like killing of people with saw [power 
saw], raping, and beating but I was forced to carry out commands. They 
ordered you to do things against your will. But now I feel like normal, a 
citizen with my way and habit like playing with babies. Sometimes in a push 
or argument I am referred to as old rebel, a killer but it is only said out of 
anger. They can hurt my feelings, but I understand that it is true, at being 
rebel, those are your attributes. But me being detraumatised I know and 
understand that staying calm and un-anger it will gradually go away one day. 
(Roosevelt 2006, pers. comm., 24 September) 
Regarding the need to take into consideration these traumatic experiences and 
memories, Mogapi remarks:
studies have shown that the attempt by society and soldiers to banish war 
memories is detrimental to the healing of ex-combatants. The greatest 
psychological distress of soldiers is related more to the attempt by society and 
the soldiers themselves to wipe out these memories than to the memories 
themselves. (Mogapi, 2004: 222) 
In his study Mogapi (2004) points out the most stressful process in the clinical trials 
for former fighters to learn how to deal with traumatic experiences in the war: 
142
…during the war the soldiers were trained to remain calm even in midst of 
events that would naturally evoke strong reactions. There was no time to 
grieve for a lost friend or process a painful memory. As a result, many 
experiences of war remained unprocessed in the psyche of the soldiers. 
(Mogapi, 2004: 223) 
Mogapi (2004) says that the post-war situation and the repressed emotions of former 
fighters hindered their overall development in the workplace and in education 
programmes, making it more difficult for them to feel a sense of belonging. Not being 
able to speak about their war emotions or experiences meant that former fighters 
remained alienated and thus less able to become valuable members of the community 
or see themselves as active contributing members of a normal functioning society.
According to Mogapi (2004) the former fighters felt alienated from their 
families, friends and communities, and the reconstruction process could be hindered if 
family and friends did not know how to cope with this. This is not a new problem and 
has been witnessed since the first investigations on war trauma. One of the first 
examples is a study dealing with World War I, where Rivers (1918) writes that former 
fighters were expected to resume normal life and disregard their war experiences; 
that, while recovering in hospitals and in therapy, they were told by doctors and 
therapists “they should endeavour to banish all thoughts of war from their mind” 
(Rivers 1918). Trying to deal with the experiences of war and return to normal life 
while repressing their memories accentuated the former fighters’ state of confusion. 
According to Mogapi (2004), these negative feelings would affect their overall social 
stature and in turn the process of reconstruction. Whether or not they were being 
accepted by the community may be seen as somewhat irrelevant, as their confused 
state clouded their judgment and left them feeling depressed, lonely and isolated. In 
this negative state they also perceived that they were not accepted by the community. 
Rivers (1918) writes that successful reintegration into the community can take place 
after the proper psychological and emotional care of a former fighter. This has proved 
to be the most successful approach in the past (Mogapi 2004). 
4.2.3 The role of community acceptance and approval in effective reintegration 
Effective social integration means that the former fighter is homogenised and takes on 
a civilian identity, breaking any links with the past. This occurs when they leave 
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behind the status of former fighter and are no longer associated with war. The aim of 
effective social and psychological reintegration is that the former fighter can live as a 
normal active member of the community and even, in some cases, achieve complete 
immersion in the community. Hence one of the few ways of measuring the success of 
reintegration is to determine if the former fighters see themselves as being accepted 
and approved by the community. 
While the level of social reintegration can be measured by this sense of 
acceptance by the community, psychological reintegration is an expression of a series 
of mental and emotional perceptions experienced by the former fighters, which 
requires more in-depth analysis. In other words, the level of social and psychological 
reintegration can only be measured by analysing the complete sphere of feelings and 
reactions experienced by the former fighters towards the community. Perceptions 
analysed in the previous chapter such as a sense of betrayal and abandonment, feeling 
excluded, loneliness and discrimination generate reactions such as depression and low 
self-esteem. 
So far, the expression reintegration of former fighters has been used to refer to 
a complicated process beginning at the end of the war and aimed at reinserting the 
former fighters into the community. The level of acceptance by the community 
measures the social inclusion or exclusion of the former fighter. According to some 
surveys, a high percentage of ex-soldiers did not experience any problems being 
accepted back into the communities (Pugel 2007; Bøas and Hatløy 2008; Hill et al. 
2008), but what does acceptance mean for them? The concept of acceptance is often 
misunderstood and needs to be analysed in order to establish if an individual is truly 
included in or excluded from social life. 
As an explanation for this ambiguous situation, we must recall the meaning of 
some terms. Acceptance, for most former fighters, has a practical meaning: to be 
integrated means not to be rejected or expelled by the community. Being accepted 
mostly means: “I can live there and no-one can send me away” (Michael 2009, pers. 
comm., 17 May). Michael, a former fighter who feels he is part of the community and 
reintegrated, said when asked about his life: 
I came in Monrovia the year 2006 because life in Ganta was not to compare 
to life in Monrovia. Education is not right in Ganta. After the war, I decided 
to go to school and learn so my brother [cousin] was the one who brought me 
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and I came with the intention to go to school but, when there was no money, I 
decided to get on motor bike and ride. Ganta is much better than Monrovia 
‘cause everything is cheaper. The only thing missing in Ganta is education. 
Everybody struggle for themselves. I sold the bike because it became very old 
and cannot work. My uncle bought me another bike of which I have right 
now. (Michael 2009, pers. comm., 17 May)
Michael, who is recognised in his community as a former fighter, lives with his cousin 
and uncle, who did not fight during the war. The subjects of his conversations are 
similar to those of many other youths in Liberia – education and money. He could be 
just another average youth, but the community see him differently. During the 
interview he says that, although he feels part of the community, he also feels their 
disapproval. 
This falls far short of effective reintegration. Former fighters often feel that 
they are received into the communities with fear, resentment and apprehension. 
Charles is a 27-year-old who fought with LURD from 1999. He apparently leads a 
normal life, is managing “small, small” (a Liberian expression that means “quite 
well”) and is running a video club in Duala, Bushrod Island. Charles’s story is similar 
to that of hundreds of former fighters in Liberia. He is originally from Kolahun in 
Lofa County where he joined the forces voluntarily 
…because they told us in Lofa that Mr Taylor was treating our people bad. So 
anyone who was brave should join and, when we kill Mr Taylor, we were to 
be given plenty of money. (Charles 2009, pers. comm., 9 May) 
Charles claimed to have a security reason for joining the forces – that the government 
was not treating all Liberians equally but was giving preferential treatment to the 
group supporting the newly elected president, Charles Taylor. He had undergone 
formal education and continued to live a normal life even after the war: “Before the 
war I was a six-grade student and right now I am a 10th-grade student” (Charles 2009, 
pers. comm., 9 May). Charles feels completely reintegrated into his community, 
claiming that many neighbours enjoy watching shows and films at his video club. 
However, despite his “normal” life, when asked about how the community perceive 
him, he remarks: “I think they see us as bad people. But to tell us in the faces is what 
had no happened. [They tell us directly it never happened] Maybe they feel the war is 
145
not over completely yet” (Charles 2009, pers. comm., 9 May). This clarifies the extent 
to which he is seen as different by the other civilians.  
Love fought in the same community where she lives now, in St Paul Bridge in 
Monrovia. In her conversation she speaks about her return to Klay in Bomi County. 
She says she had no problem in gaining acceptance from her family and community: 
“No problem. In fact my people were happy to see me alive, but people can be 
looking at me” (Love 2009, pers. comm., 9 May). She has become accepted, but 
people nevertheless see her differently: “They see me as a former fighter” (Love 
2009, pers. comm., 9 May). She concluded that, even if the community accepted the 
former fighters, most of the time approval was lacking.
Asked if he faced any problem with the community, Dell said “No, not at all”, 
but later in the conversation added: “Well, I think so [I feel problems of acceptance] 
because there are not many people that are friendly with me. Maybe they are afraid of 
me being an ex-combatant” (Dell 2009, pers. comm., 18 May). This again supports 
the idea of former fighters being accepted only because members of the community 
fear them, and not because they approve of them as active members of the 
community.
Other findings from these conversations show that the majority of respondents 
do not have integration problems with families, neighbours and communities, but that 
they perceive problems over approval. When asked what were their perceptions of 
their status, the majority said they were seen as rebels, bad people, and fighters; 
showing that inclusion was far from being realised. In some cases former fighters are 
perceived as a liability. The only reason for accepting them is the fear of an outbreak 
of hostilities in the future and because it is always better to be allies rather than 
enemies. This is the case with John, a 29-year-old former fighter from Pleebo in 
Maryland County. John fought for the NPFL but is now selling fish at the local market 
in West Point, and trying to save money to buy a motorbike, to operate as a taxi:
I joined the second day the freedom fighters entered Pleebo, I think it was in 
October 1990. In the forces I was having two ranks. In the ATU [Anti 
Terrorists Unit] I was Sergeant but on the front line, I was a General since I 
enjoyed the General rank, so they called me General. I did not participate to 
the RR programmes because when I gave my gun and they gave me my 
money, I ran away and came to West Point. I don’t think I have family 
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anywhere. Since I left Pleebo, went to Gbarnga and now to West Point here, I 
have not seen family because I left them back and I don’t know where to find 
them. (John 2009, pers. comm., 19 May)
When asked if he found problems of acceptance in his community, he answered:
No, because plenty of us who live here in West Point are former fighters. In 
fact when some people hear my name they want be friendly with me. Maybe 
they are doing it so when something bad happens and I see them I will 
remember them as friends and will not harm them. But I see myself as a good 
man, in fact I have not been to a police station for questioning whatsoever. I 
see myself as a changed person and a good man. I told you when we started, 
that I am selling fish and will soon buy myself a motor bike to run it. (John 
2009, pers. comm., 19 May)
Asked how the community saw him, he added:
Well, until someone identifies me as former General, I can go to any 
community, no one will have problem with me. But generally, the 
communities will see the ex-combatants as bad people. (John 2009, pers. 
comm., 19 May)
The data from these conversations reflects the figures in Pugel’s larger-scale survey 
(Pugel 2007) in which the statistics show indisputably that former soldiers felt that 
their reception by the communities and their families was strong, but that there was 
not much trust. The Pugel survey (2007: 5) shows that 44% of former fighters 
perceive that the community looks upon them with fear or distrust:
When the sample of ex-combatants was asked to indicate how they believed 
the community viewed the population of ex-combatants, only 66% believed 
that acceptance was the norm. While programme completers perceive 
acceptance from the community at a higher rate than the non-participants 
(62% vs. 44%), they also are doubly disposed to perceive that the community 
lives in fear of the ex-combatants (20% vs.10%).
The figures above show two different sides of the same concept. When answering 
questions about acceptance, former fighters said they felt accepted, but on further 
investigation expressed their frustration with being seen as “rebels” or “bad” people. 
The responses given are contradictory, showing that the former fighters are not always 
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clear whether or not they are being accepted, but their general perception is that the 
community does not trust or approve of them. 
This sense of disapproval from the community comes from their perception of 
the failure of the reintegration process to eliminate the gap between former fighters 
and civilians. Those labelled as “ex-combatants” will potentially isolate themselves 
from society as they perceive a low level of approval by the community. This is also a 
consequence of feelings such as a sense of betrayal and abandonment, no sense of 
belonging, loneliness and discrimination (discussed in the previous chapter). Some 
former fighters never experienced these feelings – or, if they did, for just a brief 
period after the DD process – and are reintegrated into society. For other ex-
combatants, however, these feelings have a more permanent effect on their lives, and 
are associated with depression and low self-esteem, which damage their social lives. 
Psychological feelings and social reactions are a central component of the 
debate about effective reintegration. It is clear that “Ex-combatants frequently 
experience mental health problems at much higher rates than civilians, although some 
forms of modern warfare also expose great numbers of civilians to traumatic 
experiences” (MDRP 2007: no page).
Many studies conducted in Liberia investigate trauma and mental health 
problems such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Asher et al. 2008; 
Abramowitz 2010; Gregory and Embrey 2009). This thesis considers just some 
aspects of the psychological state of former fighters, such as low self-esteem and 
depression, from the point of view of the effect on their social relationships, such as 
isolation and separation from the community.
The transition period after the DD phase is associated with many factors that 
can contribute to depression (Parker et al. 2002). Social interactions and the state of 
society after the war contributed to depression among former fighters. Ruiz (1992) 
talks about the social stress model, writing that the symptoms of stress and depression 
are due to social problems and result in a change in the social status of the individual 
– in this case, former fighters after the DD phase. According to Ruiz (1992) some of 
the most common characteristics of this depression are: 
Disconnection or divorce 
Aggression and physical mistreatment 
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Drug or alcohol misuse 
Depression in former fighters can be associated with self-criticism, low self-
esteem, introspection and a change in social status after the conflict. Developing 
Ruiz’s outcomes due to this type of depression, other studies (Silver 2005; Stein and 
Hollander 2002; Delfos 2004; Nutt, Feeney and Argyropolous 2002; Papageorgiou 
and Wells 2004; Carr 2001; Sloman and Gilbert 2000) state that those who are 
extremely self-analytical usually display symptoms of: 
Isolation





During conversations with former fighters, it was not always as easy to 
identify symptoms of depression as it was to identify the characteristics listed above. 
Many interviewees expressed their disapproval of these characteristics as manifested 
by fellow former fighters. These are common traits presented by those who do not 
feel themselves to be integrated members of the community.  
Some [former fighters] survived by local work labour jobs to make a living, 
some have been involved in armed robbery. They are not doing anything; they 
are not doing anything good for people to see. That’s how the community 
sees them, to me. I feel, isn’t it strange when you hear about someone who is 
doing something evil himself. Those are the ex guys. They are not just 
polluted but they are addicted to this. Because the simple people are going to 
take drugs because it’s a focus point. This is telling the mind to do more than 
what they propose. And it’s just to get a living. We’re just back from war so 
everyone has to look for security for themselves. I feel that my community ... 
they are all young guys. The majority of them are enjoying their lives. 
Community is one word secured by the youth of the area. There are some 
communities that these guys are going to where nobody sees them or nobody 
knows them. But now we are just out of the war so you have to call on 
security for yourself. If there is someone we know, one or two ex-generals 
that tried to put themselves into order after the war with some of them and 
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they go astray. These guys never knew or never felt that the war was going to 
finish. They never felt that terror was going to reign or reach here one day. 
For me the majority of these guys are not learned and they had nothing before 
the war, these guys have nothing except for the war. That’s their living. If you 
take someone’s living from them what would they do? Some of these guys 
don’t want to do interviews, they keep the money and forget everything 
different. Some guys went to school because of money. At the end of the day 
they will always accept me while I have money. At the end of the day they do 
nothing, they don’t go to school and they collect their money from bribing. 
They are earning their own money and they don’t have the notion to go back 
to education. (Robert 2006, pers. comm., 14 July) 
Robert is an “old former fighter” in his 30s. He is very critical of those he refers to as 
“ex guys”. They are always associated with the characteristics typical of depression 
such as aggressive behaviour, use of drugs and disconnection from the rest of the 
community. 
Supporting the idea of separation from the community, Kramlinger (2002) in 
his study claims that the phase just before depression is a decrease in social 
interaction. This can affect the former fighters’ interaction with the normal, stable 
community and in turn affect the self-identification process. 
Another common characteristic of former fighters, according to Stein and 
Hollander (2002), is low self-esteem. A recent study of female former fighters by 
Thase and Lang (2004) indicate that negative relationships usually affected self-
esteem rather than causing depression. However, low self-esteem and depression are 
closely related. Nutt, Feeney and Argyropolous (2002) show that the level of social 
support and self-esteem or lack of depression had a mutually dependent relationship.
Harter (1990) argues that self-esteem was based on the ability of an individual 
to value oneself, while Cooley (1902) claims that self-esteem is based in a social 
conception based in turn on acceptance by family and friends and on one’s own 
personality. According to Bronfenbrenner (1989), the social system is based on either 
identity or status, and self-esteem is therefore based on personal, social and biological 
factors. Self-esteem is one of the determinants of how former fighters evaluate 
themselves and assess themselves as valued members of the community (i.e. the 
process of self-categorization). This definition has proved accurate in recent years and 
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has been linked with associated execution (Markus 1977), manner alteration (Eccles 
et al. 1984; Sullivan 1953), social participation (Rosenberg 1991), post-war academic 
achievements (Assor and Connell 1991; Marsh 1990a), and emotional welfare 
(Bandura 1978; Dweck and Elliot 1983). The growth and development of every 
individual is affected by the level of self-esteem. The significance for this thesis is the 
impact on society and on the individual’s social relationships. It is also necessary to 
consider what motivates the actions of the individual displaying the characteristics of 
low self-esteem and feelings of disapproval from the community. 
Some authors associate levels of self-esteem with self-assessment (Harter 
1983), and self-conception (Marsh 1990a). According to Rosenberg (1991) self-
esteem is not based on ideals but on other factors, such as the following (e.g. Marsh 
1990a; Harter 1983; Wylie 1979):
the varying degrees and interpretation of self-evaluations
the relationships between the self-concept and self-esteem
Orr and Dinur (1995) claim that those whose development is based on the self-
concept and self-esteem place high regard on the opinions and perceptions that others 
have of them. Rosenberg and Pearlin (1978) argue that self-concept is mainly the 
result of the perceptions of family and peers as well as self-perception, and that it has 
a pivotal effect on their social relationships.
The sociological impact of depression and low self-esteem is a sense of 
isolation and separation from the wider community. Stephen, a young former fighter 
who runs a small business in the Duala market, said: 
Most of the time when there is a meeting in our town and me or some of my 
friends who fight the war get up to talk our own ideas, the big community 
people and some others will not even give me the chance to talk; sometimes 
they will say that this is no war business. When I get vexed and say 
something bad, they will say, ah! That’s the same thing we were saying, this 
man still get war business inside him. I am not participating to that anymore. 
(Stephen 2009, pers. comm., 19 May)
Feeling discriminated against adds to the feeling of separation from the 
community. Mammade is another former fighter who, in conversation with Stephen, 
remarked:
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I think I told you that people always take us to be former fighters and we do 
not have good record in our communities; most of the time my own people 
can treat me bad. Sometimes when my own wife does something wrong and 
when I want talk, the people will say, ah, he is ready again. To tell you the 
truth, I actually can feel bad why I had to fight war; some of the same big 
commanders and politicians who fooled us are now in position, but they can 
behave as if they don’t know us from anywhere before, they do not care for 
us. For me, I feel that I need not to live again. I am not part of this community 
anymore. (Mammade 2009, pers. comm., 19 May)
A social reaction such as a sense of isolation sometimes comes from 
sensations of loneliness. The loneliness referred to in this thesis is what Weiss (1973) 
defines as social isolation. This is a kind of social deficit that occurs when an 
individual lacks a social network. This lack of sense of connectivity mostly represents 
not feeling part of the community, especially after losing a sense of belonging in one 
of the factions.
… some people always point the finger to me and say, you see that one there, 
she was fighting for Charles Taylor and so I can be ashamed, for that, I like to 
keep to myself [be on my own]. Even the school that I am going to I can feel 
bad and just go and sit in the class until after school then I can just go straight 
to my house. I am not feeling good because everywhere you go, people will 
just have to point on you that you was one time fighter for NPFL. I don’t 
associate myself to that people anymore. It can make me feel bad so I like to 
keep to myself. (Mammade 2009, pers. comm., 19 May) 
Elisabeth Schauer, director of Vivo, an organisation that works to overcome 
and prevent traumatic stress and its consequences, in an interview for the Multi-
Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), spoke about 
“Psycho-Social Support for Ex-Combatants”. She emphasised:
One of the key psycho-social issues for ex-combatants is that they frequently 
perceive themselves as somehow “different” – they feel that they belong more 
to their peer community rather than their home community. In turn, the wider 
community views them with a judgmental, often stigmatizing, eye … Recent 
reintegration studies in Rwanda show that some ex-combatants feel lonely 
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and isolated, and suffer from PTSD and depression. (MDRP, 2007: no page)
Isolation and separation from society are both cause and effect of the feelings 
of low approval among former fighters. Delfos (2004) claims that strong, healthy 
relationships with family and peers have a positive impact on the psyche, outlook and 
physical performance of former fighters. Stein and Hollander (2002) also affirm in 
their study that former fighters who had a strong supportive environment showed a 
more accelerated recovery from traumatic war experiences and depression than those 
who did not. Stigmatisation plays a major role in the self-identification process. The 
sense of being alienated by the community affects former fighters’ self-esteem and 
self-image and therefore their new self-identification. 
Given a constructive, stable environment, with healthy relationships, the 
identity of the individual can develop as former fighters are more easily able to deal 
with their trauma.  When former fighters are not forced to suppress their trauma they 
can begin a healthy reconstruction of identity. Suppression of the trauma generally 
arises because of external factors, such as reactions from the community. 
Their experiences during the war transformed the identity of the fighters. 
When they returned from the conflict they therefore had to reconstruct their former, 
pre-war civilian identity. However, the former fighters do not always feel accepted by 
the community and this further hampers their identity reconstruction.  
… I want to be a civilian. I am trying to move away from life of being a 
soldier. However the civilians don’t want us. They do not want us to be part 
of them. We are seen as criminals, people are scared of us. The police hate us 
and always blame us for anything that goes wrong. (as quoted in Mogapi 
2004: 223)
The reason for this is the lack of understanding by the community and the families. 
“… Our families ask us: what has being a soldier done for you? You went away all 
these years and what do you have to prove for it” (as quoted in Mogapi 2004: 223). 
This adds to their feelings of frustration and sense of betrayal by the community. They 
feel that the community does not recognise their sacrifices.
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4.2.4 The dynamics of post-war networks
A large number of former fighters did not go back to their own communities after the 
end of the conflict and in cases where they entered a new community they did not feel 
part of it. The failure of community-driven reconstruction in Liberia is confirmed by 
the modest number of programmes designed for the communities. Most of the 
resources for the reconstruction process were directed to addressing the problems of 
former fighters. The inability of the international community to tackle the problems of 
both non-combatants and combatants together created a gap between the former 
fighters and the communities. The natural reaction of the ex-soldiers was to 
congregate with people sharing the same problems into a new “society”.
Conversely, some other former fighters are welcomed back by family and 
neighbours and find a place in society, yet many feel that their community still views 
them as fighters even if their overall attitude is positive and friendly. The fact that 
they are perceived by the community as former fighters, which is mostly perceived as 
a negative factor, makes them feel excluded. 
The overall approach of the community and the DDR policies plays an 
important role in the former fighters’ sense of inclusion because, when they return 
home, they believe they are coming back to the same situations and people that they 
left; hence they expect things to pick up where they left off. However, as the 
interviews showed, this is not the case. 
The community was eager to receive me and still see me as someone who is 
part and parcel the day to day improvement in the community. The 
community had no other option but to warmly welcome me in their midst. 
Because pushing us away couldn’t solve the problem, but rather make it 
worst. (Roosevelt 2006, pers. comm., 24 September)
Subsequent to joining the forces the fighters, especially the younger ones, 
lived in a completely new environment different from the one they had been living in, 
and this eventually led to alienation from their families (Peters, Richards and 
Vlassenroot 2003: 35). Communities and even families perceived the new arrivals 
negatively as former fighters, even though on the surface they seemed to be relieved 
and happy to have them back as part of the community:
When combatants enter the DDR process, they lose this support network. 
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During demobilisation, some combatants will try to return to whatever is left 
of this support network by reconnecting with other ex-combatants, living 
together in the areas where they were demilitarised, and refusing to return to 
their home communities. While the return of ex-combatants to their home 
communities may appear to outsiders to be a great relief and reward, for ex-
combatants it can be a traumatic experience because it requires giving up the 
support network of the war family and returning, often alone, to their home 
community where they may not be accepted, are not immediately integrated 
into a support network, and therefore are left to fend for themselves. (Hazen 
2007: 5–6)
However, the relationships and networks that had previously existed were 
permanently damaged, as was felt by the former fighters: 
You can say some have changed when you observe their way of living. They 
have a normal way of living in the community or on their real lives. Some 
other of these guys just act like this, then when they are rejected from the 
community they fall into the ways they used to behave before and they act 
very angry. I can’t really say something good or bad about them. Everyone 
has a different system, a different notion. Some of the guys were educated 
before the war and this have made an impact. In one way or another after 
their life during the war, the mind is different. Some of them have a similar 
lives, some want a better than before and some want to live upon what they 
have done before. (Bob 2006, pers. comm., 26 September)
This dynamic of exclusion made them change their attitudes towards the community 
and to choose a different path than that of reintegration. Hence it is important for the 
reintegration process, especially in areas like Liberia, to be “foolproof” in order to 
provide some stability and confidence for the former fighters, so that they are 
reassured that effective social and psychological reintegration can help them 
overcome the perception of former fighters in the eyes of the communities they live 
in. Separation from the community of former fighters accentuates the group stigma: 
This group stigma was actually reinforced by DDR, which segregated and 
privileged self-described “ex-combatants”, feeding into a “no satisfaction, no 
peace” dynamic. It may also be that stigmatization is invoked by observers to 
describe what are actually considered to be extremely complicated processes 
of urbanization, migration, and social change. Using reintegration as a tool to 
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combat or compensate for stigma may therefore be misguided (Jennings 
2008b: 336).
The community at the end of the war was not ready to receive the new guests 
because of their negative associations and the way they were perceived:
Sometimes when we go to smoke our cigarettes to forget the hard time on us, 
we can sit and be talking about the war time and the problems we are going 
through now. By the time people see us in big group talking about our 
frustrations when the people passing some of them say: look at the ex-comb. 
There, they are smoking grass so they can go steal tonight. (Saylee 2006, 
pers. comm., 7 July)
The failure to minimise such differentiation within society caused the soldiers to 
create their own links and networks, which further accentuated the gap between them 
and the community. That was also the case in Namibia where 
…[a]lthough a formal mechanism for exchanging or coordinating views 
among ex-combatants does not exist, they have evidently created their own 
informal networks. At the local level interaction with former comrades in 
arms seems to flourish. Any work together, for example, on resettlement 
projects, in the same business or in agricultural activities (Colletta, Kostner 
and Wiederhofer 1996: 12).
After the end of a conflict and also after demobilisation programmes, the 
command structures often survive as networks (Knight 2008: 11). “Experience 
suggests that the command structures will continue to exist as social networks and 
bonds created through shared experiences, and that such structures retain the capacity 
to remobilise combatants or disturb the progression of the peace process” (Knight 
2008: 12). In many cases they disappear for a period but reappear stronger and more 
durable after exclusion from the communities. After demobilisation, in fact, the 
positive reaction to the end of the conflict made the former fighters believe that they 
would return completely to their previous life, and they kept their contacts within the 
war networks only in case of a new outbreak of hostilities (Utas 2003: 226). However, 
those former fighters who experienced problems in returning to their communities, or 
who preferred to retain their previous links, decided to create new, voluntary networks 
based on the previous ones – for example, the young fighters in “The Palace” 
described by Utas (2003: 235–6), where “those who had parents or other relatives in 
156
Monrovia tended to avoid them. Family networks were instead replaced with informal 
structures of wartime friends and commanders”. The social networks born after the 
end of the conflict were a natural evolution of those that existed during the war, with 
changed contexts. In certain cases these social networks were recreated at a later stage 
when the fighters were brought together again by their exclusion by civil society. 
Even if these networks are a development of those of the past, they are not the same. 
According to my experience, most of them lack the boundaries of faction or ethnic 
affiliation:
Interviewer: how do you survive? 
Kamara: There’s nothing much to do to survive. I just go around with my 
friends from war to help out for food because there’s nothing else to do.
Interviewer: Are your friends from back in the time of the war?
Kamara: No, we are all ex-comb. There is no differentiation with us, we are 
all black old fighters from everywhere, rebels, GOL, ULIMO, Mandingo, 
Krahn. (Kamara 2006, pers. comm., 23 June)
A survey conducted in Sierra Leone by Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) 
shows how relationships between the networks originated after the conflict and the 
participation of former fighters in particular factions. They gathered together after the 
war, building networks with people met during and after the conflict. On the other 
hand, in the case of a faction composed of combatants with firm networks of families, 
friends and communities, the majority of its members spent time with the same 
networks after the war. This is not the case in Liberia because there was no clear 
demarcation of factions that were closer to their communities than others. In most 
cases these networks are the expressions of the malfunction of the reintegration 
process and therefore an expression of the failure of the process of inclusion: 
I tried to not go around with fighters ‘cause those who are not fighters will 
think I smoke opium marijuana, because they’re the only people who doesn’t 
mind associating with them, because they say they’ve smoke drug marijuana 
they don’t want to see me so I tried to associate with other groups but to 
associate with them is difficult. I went back to my old school and I went back 
to my old friends. All my friends have been telling me you better go. (Andy 
2006, pers. comm., 3 August)
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Experiencing exclusion, most of the former combatants tried to find comfort by 
gathering with individuals in the same situation. At this stage the former fighters 
decided unconsciously to shift their sphere of interest from the community to their 
new social networks that made them feel part of their “society”. 
There is no evidence that these networks could be considered for a threat to 
the stability of the country. According to Hill et al. (2008) only a small percentage of 
former soldiers would be willing to go back to fighting or think that it could be an 
option for their future. Only 6% of the respondents said their life conditions had been 
better before the war; among the remainder, 36% gave as the first reason for thinking 
that “life is better now” the fact that they were no longer in danger. However, they can 
be considered as tools for political or economic organisations to use as pressure 
groups. In some cases former fighters organised themselves in order to claim certain 
rights. This is the case of the protest in Monrovia in early February 2007 when around 
1,000 former members of Liberia’s former factions sought explanations about their 
allowances and demobilisation packages:
The president did not want to speak with us so for the first time we have been 
organising ourselves. For the first time a group of nationals have come to 
listen to this country and ask the ex-combs how we feel about they pay the 
$75. We were fighting for our countries and between 2000 and 2001 the 
national army of the country were in charge of the government now we 
received no benefit. They move away the army and take our benefits. (Ben 
2006, pers. comm., 3 August)
In conclusion, many factors lead to the maintenance of the war networks after 
the conflict. Lack of familiarity with community and family, feelings of 
discrimination and low sense of approval from the community are all essential 
elements for the general dynamic of exclusion from social life. 
4.2.5 The informal economy’s contribution to the sense of exclusion
According to research conducted by Jennings (2008: 337):
A second layer relates less to targeting and more to the overall suitability of 
the project. Here one must consider the incentives being created or 
perpetuated on individual- and macro- levels through reintegration programs: 
are they distortive to the extent that they facilitate separation, not 
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reintegration, of former fighters from society, as in Liberia?
The fact is that former fighters’ overall attitude to work and willingness to 
undertake it plays a critical part in the general implementation of a successful and 
sustainable post-conflict security structure. If the overall attitude is one of laziness, 
the prospects would not be good. However, most individuals who joined the conflict 
as combatants did so not because they were idle or lazy but because they felt they 
needed to join in order to deal with an imminent threat. The presumption of laziness 
or idleness on the part of former fighters is a misconception relating to pre-war 
circumstances (for more details see Bøas and Hatløy 2008). In relation to the post-
conflict setting, the perception of former fighters of how they are seen by society is 
the focal point for exploring the concepts of laziness and idleness.
To understand how economic reintegration was designed from the beginning 
by the international community, we may note a passage from the Strategy Framework:  
Given the fact that many former fighters have neither finished formal 
education nor acquired marketable skills, the economic outlook for many 
former fighters is bleak. Absorption in the formal sector, including the civil 
service, is beyond the reach of unskilled or functionally illiterate former 
fighters. Hence the need to offer options for economic reintegration, in 
particular in agriculture, the informal sector enterprise and opportunity for 
skills acquisition, to avoid former fighters from reverting to rent seeking at 
the barrel of a gun. (NCDRR 2003: 32) 
This assumes that former fighters are excluded from the formal sector, with 
the informal sector as the only solution. In terms of a pragmatic approach to the 
problem of the ex-soldiers, the above analysis is faulty. Firstly, the soldiers were not 
just unemployed and uprooted, but a heterogeneous part of the population with 
different backgrounds, education and skills. Secondly, the rest of the population 
shared some characteristics with the former fighters because 14 years of civil war had 
interrupted education or work. Hence, the fact that the reintegration programmes were 
designed on the assumption that the informal market was the only way to ensure 
economic self-sufficiency for the former fighters laid the foundation for a general 
exclusion from any other sectors of the labour market.    
The informal sector is so strong in Liberia that there is an objective difficulty 
in defining employment. Some authors, for example, describe economic reintegration 
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as “achieving relatively sustained employment and regular income” (Hill et al. 2008: 
13). The expectations created by the DDR programmes around these two concepts 
also motivated most former fighters to consider themselves as unemployed after their 
courses, highlighting their sense of exclusion. The entire rehabilitation programme of 
the DDR in Liberia was centred on vocational training and schooling. A large number 
of former fighters went through vocational training in areas of work such as carpentry, 
mechanics and masonry. These courses were not chosen systematically to satisfy the 
needs of the economic market, and they created a huge skilled but unemployed 
workforce of former fighters who ended up instead buying and selling goods on the 
roadside.
The informal economy in developing countries represents the only way for a 
large part of the population to subsist – especially in failed states. In some cases this 
“shadow economy” takes on the features of a parallel economy and casual 
employment becomes the norm. In Africa the informal economy was estimated to be 
42% of GDP in 1999/2000 and reached 78% of non-agricultural employment and over 
61% of urban employment (ILO 2002). Liberia is actually a borderline case, with an 
estimated 80 to 85% of the population aged 15 years and over unemployed. Unlike 
the hidden economies of most African countries, with the characteristics of a 
structured financial system, in Liberia the increase in this phenomenon is due to the 
spontaneous efforts to survive of the local population, including former fighters, who 
have no other means of survival.
In 2004 the ILO and UNICEF, in collaboration with the Liberia Institute of 
Public Administration (LIPA), surveyed entrepreneurs in the informal sector who 
could contribute to a future strategy for a “regularisation” of the market. If we endorse 
the idea that Liberia is a “failed state” (Pham 2004), we have to analyse the 
institutional presence of the state and the control of the central government over its 
people and its territory. It is clear that in Liberia there was never a proper exercise of 
authority  (Sawyer 2005) as in most of the Third World, where the sovereignty of 
post-colonial states was more a formal situation than an effective exercise of power 
(Jackson 1990). This lack of control brought about, as in most of the weak states, the 
birth of a parallel, illegal system of rule, with the beginning of the phenomenon of 
“warlordism” (Ellis 1998), which provided the combatants with their basic needs 
during recent decades. After the end of the war and the change of economic control in 
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most of the 15 counties of Liberia, there was a collapse of the previous social 
structure, and an influx of 100,000 ex-combatants to the market added to the already 
desperate circumstances of the population with no income.
The new order led to a substantial change in the Liberian micro- and 
macroeconomic system, which the reborn state, with a transitional government and no 
public revenue, could not control. At this point there was an increase in “shadow” 
economic networks (Jung 2003) and a proliferation of small formal or informal 




In conclusion, this work has analysed the evolution of marginalisation in 
Liberia considering individual cases from Liberian youth to them feeling like 
neglected veterans.  The study has concentrated on establishing a debate on the 
concept of marginalisation of former fighters in the Liberian civil conflict and has 
attempted to underline the connections that exist between status, identity and 
networks within this debate.  The study focused mainly on the status of the identity of 
the former fighters in Liberia, particularly after the end of the conflict as this was the 
significant turning point for their aforementioned identity, as Liberian society began 
to evolve in a post-conflict era.  The work gave a voice to the ex-soldiers and how 
they perceived themselves during the evolution.  The study found that a variety of 
psycho-social factors were important in the perceived feeling of marginalisation felt 
by former soldiers, even if specific individuals did not always highlight the same 
factors as responsible for this marginalisation. 
In presenting this conclusion, it is pertinent to point out that the thesis offers 
five central conclusions to the study within the nature of the overall aim of assessing 
the impact on youth through to neglected veterans through the transformation of the 
web of connections that exist.  This conclusion presents an overview of the main 
conclusions made and is divided into six main sections.  The conclusions of this study 
focus on the belief that the neglected veterans group is viewed as different to that of 
former fighters, that the identity of former fighters is central to the understanding of 
the reintegration process, that the DDR triggered the transformation of former 
fighters’ web of connections, acceptance does not necessarily mean reintegration and 
can often include exclusion and that the economic approach to the reintegration 
process failed to distinguish civilians from former fighters.  
Finally, the main conclusion of this study is presented.  The work found that 
individuals marginalised by society as youths (for a range of reasons) turned to 
violence to solve the problem.  This led to the marginalised becoming a collective 
group during the conflict and gave their lives meaning.  The study concludes that the 
group identity of the neglected veteran as an excluded category is frequently the result 
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of many psycho-social dynamics. A resilient sense of belonging, detachment from 
family and community, marginalised primary identities, and war-connected networks 
are all factors influencing this exclusion.  Through these factors, former soldiers may 
be accepted or rejected by their communities; they may be economically inserted in or 
excluded from the market, but they feel like neglected veterans and they all share this 
new identity.  The creation of this new virtual group and its identity is the key to 
understanding the success or failure of the reintegration process in Liberia, and 
possibly also in other countries and therefore it was vital to consider the factors that 
impacted upon this feeling of marginalisation, as this study has done.  
First though, it was necessary to provide a theoretical conceptualization of the 
observed phenomena in the study.  
5.2 Theoretical conceptualisation of the observed phenomena 
The study has assessed that it is apparent that marginality for some Liberians 
is far from over. The integration of the former fighters in Liberia is a difficult process 
and the youth in particular need to be given a clear indication that they have a future 
in the post-conflict state.  The armed mobilized youth who decided to join the conflict 
have been experiencing transformation in terms of status, networks and identity but in 
some cases they did not see the end of their marginalisation.
United Nations departments, programmes, funds and agencies, together with 
non-governmental agencies, were involved in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants in post-conflict Liberian situations for 
approximately six years. Their activities were crucial parts of both the initial 
stabilisation of a war-torn society and the former fighters’ long-term development. 
The UN was instrumental in the re-establishment of a country left with poor 
governance and lacking basic political, social and economic structures. It also 
supported the new Government of Liberia (GOL) in its quest to restore civil authority. 
It has been evaluated that it is particularly difficult to achieve stability and 
reconciliation in post-conflict countries caught in internal civil conflicts. Many factors 
affecting their achievement must be taken into account. Leaving aside the historical 
background of each country, the main differentiation that must be taken into 
consideration is the process of reintegration of former fighters, which varies from one 
country to another. This thesis is able to contribute to the literature on the 
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reintegration of former fighters in Liberia, approaching the topic from a perspective of 
identity. It covered the full spectrum of the status and networks of former fighters 
after the end of the conflict, describing the psychological and societal changes. 
With the formal closure of the DDRR programme, announced by President 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2009, the reintegration process was declared concluded. She 
praised the programme for bringing peace and security to Liberia. The deputy UN 
envoy, Deputy Special Representative for Rule of Law Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, 
reiterated that all further efforts would be community-based rather than focusing on a 
particular group in the community (UNMIL Today 2009). This declaration signalled 
the end of the international community’s efforts on the reintegration of former 
fighters. Was this the real end of the reintegration process? The analysis conducted up 
to this point about the reintegration process in Liberia has been an accurate 
investigation of the changing behaviour of former fighters and how this affected 
communities and the whole of Liberian society. In most of the literature available, the 
character of “former fighter” has been considered without any questioning of its 
nature and position in society. This thesis proposes a critical analysis of this new 
category of people that arose from the end of the war.
The literature and the primary research conducted underline that the former 
fighters can have an important and central role in the community, during the war as 
well as after it. The end of the war gave them a more passive role in the community 
and they felt disorientated. Their perplexity was increased by their perception of the 
community’s reaction to its new members, which could be acceptance or rejection 
following the in-group/out-group mechanism. 
Bearing this in mind helps us to analyse the evolution of the marginalisation 
process. It is important to note that the confused idea of the former fighters about their 
position in the community did not help to maintain a solid structure of status and 
identity. Usually during the war, the status and identity of the combatants remained 
within the controlled environment of active decision-making. After the war however, 
this drastically changed as defining status and identity lay with the community. The 
status of former fighter prejudiced this uncertain mood and the former fighters were 
not really sure any more of their position in the community. During this period, giving 
voice to the former fighters to describe their sensitivities and observations of their 
position in society enabled this work to understand the way they perceive themselves 
and the way they are perceived by others. Starting from this point, the development of 
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the web of connections of the former fighters is delineated, with an analysis of their 
feelings and reactions to the current situation. 
The approach to the transformation of the former fighters’ web of connections 
is to focus on them not as individuals but as a group. The common characteristics, 
feelings and behaviours of the group of former fighters are presented here in depth. 
Discrimination, loneliness, marginalisation, non-acceptance and disapproval by the 
community are just some of the characteristics outlined. This thesis is a journey into 
the transformation of former fighters’ web of connections, starting from the 
dissolution of the status of “fighter”, passing through the disintegration of the war 
networks and continuing with the formation of the category of former fighters, who 
have a distinctive identity. 
After this trip inside the life of the former fighters through their own words, 
this chapter draws the conclusions of my research. The first sub-section highlights 
these conclusions. The following sub-section is an explanation of why the identities 
approach was relevant to understanding the reintegration process, and discusses 
whether a different approach to the topic, leading to different conclusions, would have 
been more appropriate. A justification is needed of how this thesis is relevant for 
academic and general purposes, explaining why, when dealing with reintegration, it is 
more appropriate to consider factors such as identity, status and individuality 
collectively and in terms of networks, rather than focusing only on the economic 
mechanism of the DDR programmes.
5.3 Drawn Conclusions 
5.3.1 Conclusion 1: The “neglected veterans” group as distinct from “former 
fighters” 
This thesis has defined a difference between the “former fighters” and the 
category of “neglected veterans”. Chapter 3 explained that the term “ex-combatants” 
has sometimes been used for the group of former fighters with a tag carrying negative 
connotations and who do not feel reintegrated, but also for those who do feel 
reintegrated. To avoid confusion the term “neglected veteran” was coined to identify 
this category composed of those experiencing the feeling of discrimination and 
exclusion from the community in more permanent ways. However, further evidence is 
needed to sustain these assertions. Now, after hearing the voices of the former 
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fighters, it is time to put the pieces of the puzzle together. 
The first point to be addressed is the actual distinctive element of 
characterisation that this thesis uses to identify “former fighters” and “neglected 
veterans”. The main point of differentiation between former fighters and neglected 
veterans is whether or not they experience sensations of exclusion from the 
community, generated by the end of the war. This sensation may be permanent or 
temporary. Chapters 2 and 3 described the internal and external factors that led to the 
general sensation of exclusion, reconstructing a series of recurrent events and feelings 
heard through the voices of all the informants met during the research. Even if these 
common experiences were shared by most of the informants, there is no evidence that 
all the former fighters in Liberia shared the same experience. A pragmatic analysis of 
this research makes us understand that the lack of statistical surveys makes it difficult 
to prove the universality of these experiences. However, it has never been the 
intention of this thesis to produce definite empirical results deriving from quantitative 
data. Nevertheless, even if there is no rigorous data, we can assert that there are only 
three situations that any former fighter could have found himself in after the end of 
the conflict: (1) not experiencing any sensation of exclusion, (2) experiencing the 
sensation for a temporary period or (3) experiencing the sensation for a more 
permanent period.
Concerning (1), former fighters who have not experienced any sensation of 
exclusion are those who perceived the reintegration as a success. They are the ones 
who were fully reintegrated. They are “invisible in the crowd”. They do not face any 
of the problematic emotions, states, feelings and experiences presented in this thesis. 
Their social adaptation has been swift and the majority have experienced a smooth 
transition into society. The actual passage from “fighter” to active member of society 
took place over a short period. Some of them did not even go through the DDR 
programmes but went directly back to their communities. Conversations showed that 
the characteristics of these fighters were different from those of other soldiers 
investigated. The main characteristics of this group are that they have ties with the 
community or family and/or had a short period of service in the factions. The 
attachment to community or families prevented them from relying on the war 
networks as their only support system. These factors delayed or prevented them from 
acquiring the status of fighter, facilitating their reintegration into the community after 
the war. It is unlikely that these individuals experienced a state of confusion after the 
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conflict.
The second group is composed of those who experienced sensations of 
exclusion for a temporary period. During my visits to Liberia I met numerous 
informants on different occasions and several of them said that their feelings 
regarding their status had changed. Others whom I met only once also described this 
change. All these informants shared common feelings of exclusion from the 
community in an initial period after the end of the conflict but not thereafter:
The comments of the former fighters who followed this path have been used in 
the thesis to validate the theories expressed. These individuals experienced problems 
with the new social order after the war. In many cases they went through a period of 
confusion and struggled to find the right reintegration path. They shared common 
feelings of exclusion only for a temporary period. There is no evidence (nor is it 
essential for the outcome of this work) to explain why at a certain stage of their lives 
the process of reintegration worked for them and not for others. What is essential for 
this thesis is to highlight that they felt like ex-combatants, even if only for a 
temporary period.
The third and last group are those who experienced a more permanent feeling 
of exclusion. The interviews highlighted that former soldiers often felt excluded from 
the beginning. These are the “neglected veterans”, the central focus of this thesis. 
These individuals have experienced feelings of betrayal, discrimination and 
marginalisation that lead to a state of confusion. Defining the feelings of this group is 
essential to understanding all the components of their social exclusion from society.
A second point to address is the definition of the neglected veterans as a group 
or category. As stated several times, the former fighters in general have been 
considered as a group or category by many authors without analysing in depth the 
implications of this statement. While a group is just a collection of individuals 
interacting and sharing common characteristics, a social category consists of 
individuals sharing common characteristics without social interaction. The essential 
characteristic of the group is in fact social interaction (Hare 1962). Both former 
fighters and neglected veterans share similar characteristics, but what about social 
relations? Chapter 2 explained that former fighters in general can be considered as a 
category because they are recognised by the reintegration programmes. In addition it 
can be said that former fighters in general cannot be considered as a group because, 
when homogenised with the community, they do not interact with each other. They 
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still share similar characteristics that, if linked with the past, make them recognisable
as a category (military skills, former affiliation to factions, etc). 
The neglected veterans, on the other hand, can be considered a group because 
of their interaction through their networks. However, social relationships do not occur 
between all the members of the group but between networks. This level of social 
relationship varies depending on ties and links with the community. Any neglected 
veteran could feel excluded but at the same time have some sort of interaction with 
the community. This usually occurs in a more extended way in rural and semi-rural 
areas rather than in urban areas. According to the comments from informants, those 
from Margibi County had a better interaction with the local community and felt less 
isolated. This was also the case of “The Palace” (Utas 2003) where young former 
fighters were living “footloose” among their peers and out of range of society. A 
different situation was experienced by Utas’ informants in Ganta, who had more 
interaction with neighbours, working places, churches, and so on. 
In summary, this thesis defines the group “neglected veterans” as the 
collection of individuals who temporarily or permanently experienced feelings of 
exclusion. They are a smaller group within the wider category of former fighters. The 
remainder of those people involved in the war who are not recognised as “neglected 
veterans” are the “former fighters”. They have mostly disappeared into the 
communities. While neglected veterans chose to interact with peers from neglected 
veterans support networks, the former fighters returned to their families, the 
community and their networks.
5.3.2 Conclusion 2: The identity of “former fighter” is central for understanding 
the reintegration process 
As stated above, the distinctive characteristic that divides the category of former 
fighters from the group of neglected veterans is the feeling of exclusion from society. 
Furthermore, it is no coincidence that the concepts of inclusion and exclusion are 
central to the notion of reintegration. As shown in Chapter 4, concepts of inclusion 
and exclusion are linked to the notion of identity. Identity was approached in Chapter 
4 as a collective phenomenon that “denotes a fundamental and consequential 
sameness among members of a group or a category. This may be understood 
objectively (as a sameness in ‘itself’) or subjectively (as an experienced, felt, or 
perceived sameness)” (Brubaker and Cooper 2004: 65). From this point of view it is 
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easier to analyse the former fighters in general as a group or category instead of as 
individuals. Starting from the point that “identity is something all groups have, or 
ought to have” (Brubaker and Cooper 2004: 67), the identity affiliation with a group 
triggers the in-group/out-group mechanism of discrimination. The boundaries created 
by the group affiliation generate the sensation of exclusion of the neglected veterans 
group from the civilians. According to the transitive law, if exclusion is related to 
reintegration and identity, then reintegration can also be explained in terms of identity.
From this point of view an effective reintegration process must pay more 
attention to the identity transformation process of former fighters after the war. Before 
and during the conflict the fighters had multiple identities, depending on their 
interaction with different groups. Identification with a particular ethnicity, religion, 
warring faction, political party and so on provided the fighters with a world of 
different options that could be chosen after the end of the war. The critical variable for 
this choice is the strength of the primary identity. When the primary identity is 
completely dominant over the others, it is likely that the choices after the war will 
correspond with it. If we take for example the three possible situations in which the
former fighters may find themselves after the war, it can be asserted that:
(1) Those not experiencing exclusion might have had a strong primary identity 
other than the factional. Their process of identity evolution is gradual and not 
unexpected because they did not go through the phase of being identified as ex-
combatant. This possibly occurred because they did not break the links with their 
identity before the war. Consequently, their primary identity was not “fighter” and 
they could easily detach themselves from being soldiers. After the conflict these 
individuals homogenised their identities with the rest of society.
(2) Those experiencing exclusion for a short period might have had different 
identities at the same level and after a period of confusion they might have chosen to 
abandon the identity of former fighter for their previous identities. These cases are 
more frequent in the rural and semi-rural areas where interaction with the community 
is more common. There is insufficient data available to fully explain this group, 
however, as other variables may be involved such as strong personality, coincidence, 
personal relationships, and so on.  
(3) Those recognised as “neglected veterans” and who experienced exclusion 
all along had a strong primary identity as fighters. They experienced difficulties in the 
reinsertion process because of involvement with the factions. This is the case of most 
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of the informants in this thesis, who believed “my commanders, my comrades and the 
faction were everything for me. They were my home, my family, my food …” (Saye 
2009, pers. comm., 17 June). In many cases they are still relying on the support of 
war-related networks, shared with those who had similar experiences. Their primary 
identity during the conflict was of “fighters” and this overrode other identities. The 
ethnic part of their identity was largely dominated by the factional. The informants 
never identified themselves with a particular ethnic group, as Utas also mentions 
(2003: 17).
In my research, I did not find meaningful separate ethnic entities or “cultures”, 
even though the Liberian civil war to some extent became ethnicised on the level of 
national politics. It would be more accurate to say that many neglected veterans 
experienced the contrary, i.e. ethnic separation. As it was, warring factions recruited 
youth from various ethnic backgrounds and it was common to see movement between 
the competing factions (Utas 2003: 16).
Having a strong primary identity of “fighters” during the conflict made it more 
likely that they would retain this identity after the war, keeping the network alive and 
highlighting the division with civilians. This differentiation is the result of a strong 
primary identity as an expression of the collective group of former fighters. Strong 
collective identity implies strong group bonding and homogeneity, a high degree of 
group dynamics, an identity or sameness between group members, a sharp 
distinctiveness from non-members, and a clear boundary between inside and outside.
To define the identity of neglected veteran, this thesis took into consideration 
the identity of youth in Liberia after the conflict. Without disagreeing with other 
scholars on this topic (Richards 2005; Utas 2003; Munive 2010; Peters 2007), this 
thesis adds another level to the understanding of youth, agreeing with Munive (2010b: 
36) that even if there is extensive literature available on youth and conflict, not many 
studies have been conducted on the young population in the aftermath of the war. For 
the category of former fighters, the identity “neglected veteran” is in many cases a 
natural evolution of the “youth” identity during the war. The relationship between the 
two identities is evident. Both identities are a crossover, which is an expression of 
exclusion/marginalisation independent of the presence of other identities such as 
ethnicity, religion, political, and so on. The marginalisation of youth, which was one 
of the causes of the war, was in some cases exacerbated by the exclusion of the 
neglected veterans after the war. The recognition of the “former fighter” accentuated 
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the previous marginalisation, since being a youth was in many cases the primary 
motivation for discrimination. According to Vigh (2006) the definition of “youth” 
involves a social “becoming” because it is a category of people in movement. In some 
cases members of this category evolved into “neglected veterans”. The social and 
economic marginalisation of youth before the war thus developed into a social and 
economic exclusion of the neglected veteran. 
In summary, this thesis outlines how identity and exclusion are essential 
elements of the reintegration process. While those who do not experience exclusion 
homogenise their identity with the rest of the population, the neglected veterans 
isolate themselves from society. This sense of exclusion has similarities with the 
marginalisation of many of them as youths before the war. To a certain extent, the 
identity of “neglected veteran” can be considered as one possible evolution of the pre-
war youth identity. Developing Utas’ (2008) idea of youth as an “alternative moral 
community”, neglected veterans can be considered as one of the “primary identities –
such as forming part of a marginalised population, or participating in a fighting 
faction – [which] might in some cases be of more importance than apparently 
‘primordial’ attachments such as ethnic identity” (Utas 2008: 114). Fanthorpe (2001) 
defines the moral community as a refuge where disorientated individuals can share 
the burden of alienation and can struggle for cultural rights. This is the case of the 
neglected veteran who, after a period of confusion, gathers together a new set of post-
war networks. These networks are the expression of the identity isolation of the 
group.
5.3.3 Conclusion 3: DDR triggered the transformation of former fighters’ web of 
connections
As stated in Chapter 2, the post-conflict order in Liberian society was directly 
affected by the peacekeepings operation. Liberia is in a state of post-conflict recovery. 
In a post-conflict situation all efforts are directly influenced by the peacekeeping 
measures and strategies of government and communities. One of the most important 
peacekeeping strategies investigated in empirical studies is the DDR. Kieh (2009) 
explains that after the first DDR in 1996 there was an attempt to establish quickly 
procedures for disarmament and demobilisation, and that these were ultimately 
inefficient and inappropriate. This is why, he argues, more conflict was expected in 
Liberia after the failure of the first DDR in 1996; he felt that, in order to avoid further 
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difficulties, it was necessary for the government and national parties to learn from 
their mistakes and be better prepared in the future. 
DDR plans are usually essential to ensure successful intervention in post-
conflict areas. The main aim of the DDR process in Liberia was to take guns from 
fighters and to reintegrate them into the communities, but to achieve these targets the 
fighters had to pass through the whole process of dissolution of the status of “fighter” 
and the disintegration of the “war family”. These actions triggered a series of 
reactions at both a psychological and a social level in the former fighters’ lives. The 
social and economic status of the fighters during the war, recognised even if not
accepted by the majority of the population, was the result of multiple factors, 
including the exercise of power over civilians, access to basic goods, a sense of 
belonging and the support of a permanent and structured network. These elements, in 
contrast to the complete insecurity of civilians, set the fighters on a privileged level 
and in general gave them high status. With the end of the war and the change in the 
social and economic order in Liberia, all the privileges due to the status of soldier 
vanished, making adaptation to their new position more difficult for them than for 
others. While others, in theory, could “climb the ladder” of Liberian society, most 
former fighters slipped down it. The disintegration of all their certainties resulted in a 
state of confusion that put their identities in serious question. 
Some former fighters went back to their previous lives and reacquired their 
previous status or identity; others were able to create new ones after the war, 
unrelated to their lives during the conflict; but there is a group of former soldiers who 
could do neither. This has given birth to a new group, which is linked to the wartime 
past because the surrounding community cannot ignore that link. These individuals 
gather together and form the group of neglected veterans. Though many other factors 
were involved, this group is in part a consequence of the DDR. The recognition of 
neglected veterans as a vulnerable group, addressed by specific policies, accentuated 
their differences from civilians. These differences are not just social or economic but 
also at the level of identity. The inability of the DDR process, by following policies of 
equality, to reduce the gap between combatants and non-combatants accentuated the 
identity differentiation between the two groups. The DDR triggered the web of 
connections transformation process, removing the certainties that were the basis of the 
fighters’ identity. While the CPA ended the war that was the raison d’être for their 
position, the DDR eradicated the status and networks that gave meaning to their lives. 
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These aspects represent the essential characteristics of the web of connections of 
“fighter”. Eliminating these elements meant forcing the fighters to seek other 
purposes in life and consequently to abandon their previous identity for a new one. 
The series of emotions generated by this social transformation, such as the sense of 
betrayal, abandonment, discrimination and loneliness, contributed to the creation of a 
state of confusion among former fighters.  
The swiftness and the all-encompassing range of the passage from a warlike 
society to one marked by reconciliation did not give the Liberian population enough 
time to acclimatise. While for many non-combatants the situation represented an 
improvement, for many ex-combatants there was no progress. The sense of confusion 
generated by this situation symbolises the starting point of the identity transformation. 
The DDR forced the soldiers to abandon the previous identity of fighter and did not 
provide them with viable alternatives. The reintegration programmes in fact focused 
on passing on pragmatic economic and educational skills instead of a more 
comprehensive psycho-social “package”. Many of those who joined the fighting for 
reasons of marginalisation and discrimination did not see any improvement in their 
situation. 
In summary, the DDR process started a process of identity transformation 
among the former fighters without offering a path for effective reintegration. Those 
former fighters who became fully reinserted in the community found the right path 
due to their personal qualities or external coincidences. In many cases the DDR, 
instead of generating reintegration, accentuated the divisions with the community and 
labelled the former fighter with the discriminatory epithet of “ex-combatant” – the 
neglected veteran. 
5.3.4 Conclusion 4: Acceptance does not mean reintegration and sometimes 
involves exclusion
Most of the literature dealing with reintegration includes a final statement on 
the success or failure of the process. Authors discussing this problem have offered 
different ways to analyse the results of reintegration. Chapter 3 discussed works 
focusing on the success of reintegration according to the perception of acceptance felt 
by the former fighters themselves. Analysing the responses offered in some surveys 
conducted in Liberia as well as the responses of many of my informants, this thesis 
considers that a sense of acceptance alone is not enough to indicate effective 
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reintegration. In many cases the informants responded positively when asked about 
acceptance by family and community but also expressed confusion about their “real” 
inclusion. To account for this, the concept of approval by society was included. Being 
“accepted” but not approved by family and/or community is a common issue for 
neglected veterans. Being present in the community but with no social participation is 
considered a failure of the reintegration process. The same traits that were 
characteristic of the marginalisation of certain groups in society before the war are 
reproduced after the end of the conflict. It is not a coincidence that most of the 
informants expressed feelings of discrimination or marginalisation in their comments. 
5.3.5 Conclusion 5: An economic approach to the reintegration process failed to 
distinguish civilians from former fighters 
A number of approaches can be taken in analysing the reintegration of former fighters 
on a larger, national scale. Chapter 3 introduced Kingma’s (2000) three dimensions 
for considering reintegration: social, psychological and economic. This work 
addressed the issue of reintegration from a psycho-social perspective without taking 
into consideration the economic element. However, why did this thesis tackle the 
DDR from a perspective that is counter to actual reintegration policies? In other 
words, since the only programmes established by the DDR were economic-orientated, 
why did this thesis not seek to investigate reintegration from the economic 
perspective?  The literature highlighted that the attempts made to reintegrate former 
soldiers economically failed due to the lack of education and skills held by the former 
soldiers. 
In addition, while the major part of the reintegration process in Liberia is 
focused on economic aspects, this thesis instead focuses on the part of the 
reintegration that involved psycho-social aspects because they are relevant to the 
former fighters. Problems such as unemployment, low education and poor working 
skills are universal in the Liberian population and apply not only to former fighters. 
The approach in this thesis was to focus on identity so as to achieve unambiguous 
results. 
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5.3.6 Final conclusion: from youth to neglected veterans through the 
transformation of the web of connections
Liberia has clearly faced many changes due to a number of significant events 
that occurred in its history. These changes affected the relationships between citizens 
in general and between different categories. Among the various categories, I decided 
to follow the progress of the one that faced marginalisation in the most recent period 
of Liberian history. Many scholars agree that after an initial period when ethnicity 
was the main reason for the marginalisation of some Liberians, the state of 
marginality passed to the country’s youth. 
In setting out the theoretical framework of this thesis in Chapter 2 I pointed 
out how I embraced these theories on the marginalisation of youth. Their exclusion 
from political, economic and social participation inevitably pushed youngsters to join 
factions during the conflict. Neither accepting nor rejecting the theories on uprooted 
youth, the evidence I collected during my fieldwork showed that many of these youth 
came from a normal background. When they joined the conflict they left their status 
and identity of marginalised youth behind to become fighters. 
This research decided to track the changes in the particular category of 
fighters about their status, networks and identity – in other words, their web of 
connections. These changes affected the roles of fighters in society transforming their 
behaviour, beliefs and social position. This whole process is recognisable in every 
Liberian soldier as part of his natural evolution. While the concept of evolution 
embraces the individual from the beginning to the end of life, this thesis takes into 
consideration only those elements of transformation that occurred after the end of the 
war. This event represented the turning point between the past and the future in 
Liberian society.
In order to analyse the development of the events around the fighters, I had to 
consider the reintegration process. While most works dealing with the reintegration 
process in Liberia take for granted the existence of this group, this thesis has analysed 
closely those factors that contribute to their characterisation. This investigation of the 
transformation of the web of connections has been achieved through listening to what 
they had to say on this topic and accurately reporting their words. They state loud and 
clear that social marginalisation, discrimination and rejection represent the main 
threat to their category. 
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To measure the intensity of the recognition of the former fighters with this 
category I have been using identity as the main factor. Identity assesses to what extent 
the status of ex-combatants and their networks bond the individual with the category. 
Once the war started, the youth abandoned their previous identities to gain the identity 
of their warring faction. This shift occurred mainly because of the development of a
strong sense of belonging to the factions.  Their sense of belonging to a social 
category made them more identifiable with the group identity (Hogg and Abrams 
1988) or with the collective identity of the former fighters. 
The notion of collective identity in my work refers to the former fighters’ 
sense of belonging to a group. If we take, for example, Tajfel and Turner (1982), we 
find that people associate themselves with various groups based on race, gender, 
ethnicity, occupation, religious beliefs and so on; by associating themselves with a 
social category, they assume its identity. This is the case of the former fighters who 
associate themselves in a “war family” and sometimes in new networks created after 
the end of the conflict. This act of gathering collectively is central to the identity 
construction process of the ex-combatants as a category. If we consider the two 
questions to define the “self” – “Who am I?” and “Who are we?” (Mead 1934) – this 
thesis analyses the alternation of these questions to define the personal identity. It is 
crucial for this work to analyse how the individual self in certain cases overrides the 
collective self, and vice versa. 
The act of getting together created war networks during the fighting and new 
networks after the end of the conflict that pursued cooperative aims and established 
informal boundaries separating their members from their environments and alienating 
them from the community. This behaviour is a natural effect of the formation of a 
collective identity. Depending on the level of acceptance and approval from the 
community, the self-categorisation can lead to two different paths: the effective 
homogenisation of the identity with the community, or identification with the group of 
“neglected veterans”. The SIT relates this idea to the fact that simply associating 
individuals in groups can result in in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination 
(Tajfel 1970).
The category of “neglected veterans” is based on the mental and emotional 
perceptions of the former fighters themselves. My work is focused on how the former 
fighters see themselves and on their perception of their situation. Both these points of 
view are the direct consequence of, and at the same time create consequences for, the 
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notion of identity. The use of SIT to analyse the former fighters’ identity separated 
this work from the psychological field. When dealing with sensation, emotions and 
“self”, it is easy to shift from the sociological to a psychological approach. This work 
focuses on how sensations and emotions affect the societal aspects of the reintegration 
of the former fighters.
Liberian history already shows how exclusion can lead to instability and 
conflict. The notion of identity exclusion represents one of the main reasons for the 
conflict in Liberia. Marginalised groups that were denied social, economic and 
political access chose violence to solve the problem. Since exclusion exemplifies the 
causes triggering conflict, it is essential to address it during peacetime.
The challenge of the reintegration process is to provide inclusive solutions for 
the categories that were excluded before the war and that then went through an 
identity transformation during it. The war did not solve the problem of exclusion, but 
postponed inclusion. Even if it was less intense during the period of 14 years of civil 
war, the feeling of exclusion was preserved in many of the individuals who joined due 
to marginalisation. The strong sense of belonging to certain groups, for ethnic, 
religious or age reasons was for many of them the meaning of their existence, but also 
the reason for them suffering discrimination. The process of identity evolution of the 
former fighters, which begins with the identity transformation after the war, defines 
their personal identity and occurs through their self-identification with the group. 
Individual identity does not disappear, but it is constructed through association with 
the group’s activities, meanings and symbols, and arose after disaffiliation with other 
groups (Veale 2003: 106). Consequently, individual exclusion often results in the 
group marginalisation of the “neglected veterans”. The group identity of “neglected 
veteran” as an excluded category is frequently the result of many psycho-social 
dynamics. A resilient sense of belonging, detachment from family and community, 
marginalised primary identities, and war-connected networks are all factors 
influencing this exclusion. This new group does not have boundaries in terms of 
numbers and geographical placement but they have the common characteristic of 
feeling excluded.  This common characteristic can be dealt with in different ways and 
create different personalities. I met carpenters, wheel-barrowers, mechanics, farmers 
and thieves with such different life stories that they appeared to have nothing in 
common – but unconsciously they shared some threads that linked them together. 
They may be accepted or rejected by their communities; they may be economically 
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inserted in or excluded from the market, but they feel like neglected veterans and they 
all share this new identity. This new virtual group and its identity is the key to 
understanding the success or failure of the reintegration process in Liberia, and 
possibly also in other countries. 
5.4 Recommendations
Following the conclusion of this study, it is possible to make a number of 
recommendations for further research.  The analysis of the evolution of 
marginalisation in Liberia, assessing the impact on youth who turned to violence and 
became soldiers, which in turn led to the creation of a group of perceived neglected 
veterans in the country, has been successful at underlining the key psycho-social 
factors involved.  The study has introduced a new manner of assessing this impact, 
using qualitative interviews to gain the first-hand perceptions of former soldiers.  
Further research could include the analysis of the possibility of marginalisation for 
other former-soldiers in surrounding countries.  The number of recent conflicts in 
African nations highlights that it could be worthwhile assessing former soldiers from 
other regions to see if the concept of marginalisation also exists in the same shape as 
it does in Liberia.  As well as this, it should be recommended that the same soldiers 
interviewed in this study should be interviewed after a certain period of time has 
passed (perhaps 5 years) to see whether the notion of marginalisation has reduced 
over time or if the psycho-social factors are still present in Liberian society through 
their perceptions.  This would allow a longitudinal study to assess the impact of 
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